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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers an alternative approach to the theory of wage determination, 
producing new and interesting interpretations to labour market phenomena. 
Based on the assumption of heterogeneous labour, a training model based on the 
concept of adverse selection is introduced. The unique feature of this model is 
that the heterogeneity is expressed in terms of the cost of OJT as well as the 
opportunity wage of the potential workers. The model suggests that the exist­
ence of unemployment and the downward wage rigidity are conditional upon 
the market characteristics and that the unemployment can not be eliminated by 
lowering the wage. It also suggests that policies to control the demand side of 
the market such as accepting of immigration of able workers, raising the ed­
ucational standard of the domestic workers, or subsidizing the firm's OJT would 
be more effective.
Also as a training model, the analysis includes a two-period model, in which 
the upward-sloping wage profile is derived.
The analysis is extended to the idea of multiple wage equilibrium in one 
market, which in turn offers a new dimension to the analysis of income distribu­
tion. One important result here is that whatever happens in the society will first 
affect the weakest, to whom therefore the policy makers need to pay greater 
attention. The derivation of a skewed distribution of wage offers yet one more 
explanation to the Pigou paradox.
The model attempts also to explain how firms choose workers in the real world 
job offers usually states a minimum hiring standard as well as the offer wage, 
and how they react to economic fluctuations — would they, for example, reduce 
the wage or raise the minimum hiring standard when the demand for the product 
falls. The analysis suggests that the weaker members of the society are more 
prone to exogeneous shocks.
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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
Traditional analyses of the labour market, in which the equilibrium is achieved 
when the supply equals the demand at a certain wage level, invariably have two 
apparent implications among others: i) there exists no involuntary unemploy­
ment and ii) the wage paid for a given grade of labour is uniform. The validity 
of the first has been a focus of discussion for some time and in great depth, as 
every economist would know. And among these are a significant number of 
attempts by Neo-classical economists to explain what should be described as a 
discrepancy between this Neo-classical implication and the reality that tends to 
support the existence of involuntary unemployment (See, for example, Clower 
(1965), and Barro & Grossman (1971)).
However, there have been few discussions as to why a uniform wage should be 
paid within the competitive market framework, despite the fact that workers are 
not necessarily identical even within a single market. The idea behind it is that 
labour service offered to perform the job in question is assumed to be homoge­
neous, which is a quite separate issue from whether the workers themselves are 
homogeneous. Hence, on one hand, the workers may be paid differently in an 
alternative job, due to their heterogeneous productivity — this makes aggregate 
labour supply upward-sloping. On the other hand, the uniform wage would be 
paid to all workers, as they perform identically what they are asked to do. And 
there is nothing new in this argument. Simply, we need to add that homoge-
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neous labour service and heterogeneous labour force are compatible.
But if workers are really identical with respect to the job in question, for 
which a uniform wage is paid, how can we possibly explain the very common 
phenomenon of employers having clear preference over potential workers? 
Given that employers' decisions are rational, it must be that some workers are 
more beneficial to the employers than other workers. The offer of a uniform 
wage to a heterogeneous labour force suggests that such an offer is made not 
because of the homogeneity of their labour service but because of a lack of 
information to employers due to its high costs, for example, about the heter­
ogeneity of the labour force when offering wages.
(1) The Efficiency Wage Hypothesis
This type of an alternative model of labour market has been developed often 
under the name of the "Efficiency Wage Hypothesis". The fundamental feature 
of the hypothesis is that, with every worker endowed with some Efficiency 
Units (EUs), a level of wage offer affects the EU's of workers in production. 
This concept could already be found in the early literature of economics. For 
example, Adam Smith wrote:
"The wages of labour are the encouragement of industry, which, like 
every other human quality, improves in proportion to the encourage­
ment it receives. A plentiful subsistence increases the bodily strength
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of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of bettering his condition, 
and of ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty, animates him to 
exert that strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, 
we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expedi­
tious than where they are lo w  ”, A.Smith 'Wealth of Nations'(1776)
(p. 184 in reprinted Smith (1977))
In other words, he argued that a higher wage could cause higher productivity 
through higher morale and better nutrition. In the current literature there are 
several types of models based on the efficiency wage hypothesis, known as the 
efficiency wage models. Here we group the main models into four types and 
introduce them briefly in turn.
(a) The Nutritional Model
This is the original type of the efficiency wage model. The concept may be 
found as early as in the writing of Adam Smith, as pointed out above. The basic 
idea is that a higher wage allows a greater level of nutritional intake, which in 
turn makes a worker more productive. Attention was more recently drawn to 
the concept by Leibenstein (1957), when he discussed about a case of develop­
ing economies and it was further developed into more rigorous analyses by 
Mirrlees (1975) and Stiglitz (1976). It goes without saying that labour produc­
tivity is expressed in terms of efficiency units for this type of model.
(b) The Shirking Model (or The Incentive Model)
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With this type of model, a worker is assumed to be able to control the amount 
of EU to exert in production — the EU input would be small if he shirks or he is 
not motivated to work and vice versa. His employer, on the other hand, being 
unable to directly control the workers' EU input i.e. the effort, uses the wage 
offer as the indirect control device. "Moral hazard" or "Principal-and-Agent 
problem" is the terminology given to this kind of situation, which is not con­
fined to labour markets. This type of efficiency wage model can be found in 
Bowles (1981) & (1983), Calvo (1979), or Shapiro & Stiglitz (1982). The 
labour turnover model, as found in Salop (1979) or Stiglitz (1974), may also be 
included in this category. In this model a wage offer by a firm is set above the 
market-clearing wage in order to reduce labour turnover. As turnover is an act 
of lost incentive to work at the workplace, it is equivalent to full shirking. 
Consequently, the model can be thought of as having basically the same formal 
structure as the shirking model.
(c) The Adverse Selection Model
This type of model is found in Stiglitz (1976), Weiss (1980), or Malcomson 
(1981). Unlike the nutritional model or the shirking model, the efficiency unit 
endowment of every worker is fixed in the adverse selection model. Given a 
heterogeneous work force in terms of efficiency unit endowment, the wage level 
determines the composition of the workers willing to work — a higher wage 
attracts better workers, i.e. workers with a greater efficiency unit endowment 
and vice versa. Note that the heterogeneity of workers is a necessary assump­
tion of this model, while in the previous two types of models the work force
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does not have to be heterogeneous.
(d) Sociological Model
Akerlof (1982) argues that each worker's effort is determined by the work 
norms of his work group rather than as a result of neo-classical individual utility 
maximization. The model is a sociological one in that it calls for social conven­
tions to explain phenomena which seem inexplicable in neo-classical terms.
The common result of all the efficiency wage models is that at the equilibrium 
the market may not clear— in fact the equilibrium wage can be higher than the 
market-clearing wage, implying an excess supply of labour. This also causes 
wage rigidity, when the market faces a change in demand for labour. It is 
crucial to the analysis that the endowment of each worker is not known ex-ante 
to the employer. If the endowments were known, then the marginal productivi­
ty of an efficiency unit (M P^) would be equated to a wage per efficiency unit 
(Wgj) at the equilibrium and thus the workers would be paid proportionally to 
their EU endowments, resulting in differentiated wages. The analysis then 
would not differ much from our usual Neo-classical analysis, except for replac­
ing "labour" by "efficiency unit". And in particular there would be market 
clearing in terms of supply of and demand for efficiency units. Indeed, the 
efficiency wage models base their distinctive results on an assumption that the 
efficiency units actually exerted in production is unobservable. This would 
mean, for example, that the effort is unobservable in the shirking model or that 
the workers are indistinguishable in the adverse selection model. This latter
-10-
assumption clearly needs some justification. (See Chapter IV for extended 
discussions on this point)
A higher wage offer attracts a group of workers of better quality "on the 
whole" (i.e. of a larger expected efficiency unit endowments). Firms, then, may 
choose not to lower the wage when it is faced to an excess supply of labour, 
since doing so will lower the expected efficiency unit endowment of the work­
ers and may well lower the profit by a reduction in output level. It turns out that 
the optimal wage, to be called the Efficiency Wage, is the wage level which 
minimizes the labour cost per efficiency unit (See, for, example, Malcomson 
(1981)).
The idea of price affecting the quality as well as quantity of the traded good 
can be found in other markets, too. Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) point out that the 
interest rate a bank charges may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans by 
either 1) an adverse selection effect, sorting potential borrowers or 2) an incen­
tive effect, affecting the actions of borrowers. And it goes without saying that 
their two types of effects are analogous to the adverse selection model and the 
shirking model of labour market respectively.
This concept of quality dependence on price, though not an established one in 
the modem economic theory as a standard assumption, is well-supported by 
various observations in the real world not confined only to these two markets. 
One may purchase a second-hand car from a well-established firm for a higher
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price rather than from an unknown firm offering a lower price, because he 
expects that the former sells a second-hand car of a better quality — this would 
be an example of the adverse selection mechanism, or because he expects that 
the after-sales services by the former is better — this would be an example of the 
incentive mechanism. In both cases the consumer's choice does not depend 
solely on the price but also on other conditions of the purchase, i.e. consumers 
may not always choose the cheapest good even as a result of rational behaviour. 
Typically the dependence of quality on price takes place when the goods are 
heterogeneous and yet the heterogeneity can not be perceived accurately or at a 
low cost before trading occurs.
Let us now go back to the original question as to why employers have a clear 
preference amongst workers. To explain this, we require the labour force to be 
heterogeneous, for if workers were truly homogeneous the choice amongst them 
would be at random. Of course, what matters here is the perception of the 
workers by the firms rather than whether the labour force is indeed heter­
ogeneous. However, we appeal to a rational expectations argument that the 
firms' perceptions are basically correct. Although all of the efficiency wage 
models illustrated above can incorporate the heterogeneity of the labour force, 
the adverse selection model is the one that illustrates the issue most clearly for 
the heterogeneity is the necessary assumption of the model. So we proceed our 
discussion with this type of the efficiency wage model.
(2) The Adverse Selection Model of the Labour Market
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To illustrate the efficiency wage model in a little more rigorous manner, let us 
consider a model of Weiss (1980).
Each worker is endowed with labour endowment 0, which determines his 
reservation wage — the reservation wage w is derived from one's marginal 
productivity in an alternative job. A representative firm, being competitive, 
can not control the supply of labour but knows a functional relationship 0=q(w) 
and a distribution function of the workers in terms of w, F(w). Although it has 
this information on the workers, the firm may be defined as competitive to the 
extent that they compete using a wage offer and a volume of labour input (See 
Stiglitz & Weiss (1981)).
The firm is assumed to maximize its expected profit n
7i = pg(L)-wx (1-1)
where p is the product price 
w is the wage
x is the labour input in terms of number of workers 
g(*) is the production function, whose sole input is EU 
L is the total number of EU
L, the total amount of EU, is a function of w and we can write it as,
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L = q(w)x (1-2)
q(z)dF(z)
where q(w)= J0 mVJ----------  (1-3)
dF(z)
/ .
In words, L, the total number of EU, is a product of x, the number of workers 
employed and q(w), the expected EU endowment of those workers willing to 
work at a wage offer w.
Note that adverse selection implies
q'(w)>0 (1-4)
i.e. the average quality of labour, in terms of EU endowment, rises with the 
wage rate.
Maximizing (1-1) w.r.t. w and x, we obtain the following set of equations.
pg'(L)q'(w) = 1 (1-5)
pg'(L)q(w) = w (1-6)
from which we obtain the third equation
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which is also the solution to a problem "min w/q(w)" i.e. "minimize wage per 
EU" when its interior solution exists. And this is where the name of the hypoth­
esis — the efficiency wage hypothesis — comes from.
Note that w*, the efficiency wage (EW), is derived solely from (1-7), indepen­
dent of x*, the employment level. The solution set (w*, x*) of the profit max­
imizing problem does not give us a conventional demand schedule of the market 
where, to each employment level, there is a corresponding wage when it is 
aggregated over all the firms. This also implies that market clearing is not a 
necessary condition for the market equilibrium — as long as the quantity de­
manded is no greater than the quantity supplied, the equilibrium wage and 
employment level of each firm will be established from (1-6) and (1-7) above.
In other words, an equilibrium may be derived, that is locally independent of 
the supply condition.
Thus equilibrium is characterized either by excess supply or by market clear­
ing, the former presenting a persistent job queue. There will be no "excess 
demand" equilibrium since when the demanders find that their demand is not 
satisfied, competition will drive up the wage until all the demand is met. Fur­
thermore, no worker will acquire a job by compromising to lower his wage 
offer, since this would merely single him out as a below-average worker among 
those willing to work at that wage.
(3) Theoretical Difficulties and Limitations of the Efficiency Wage Models
As we have seen, the efficiency wage models in general have intuitively 
appealing features. However, there are some theoretical difficulties and 
limitations related to the models. Some of the extensive arguments on the 
theoretical difficulties are found in Akerlof & Yellen (1986) and Weiss (1991). 
Here I illustrate their arguments briefly.
For those efficiency wage models in which the workers’ effort levels are the 
missing information to the employer, a low wage at the initial apprenticeship 
period (Carmichael (1985)), or either a bond payment (Becker & Stigler (1974)) 
or an employment fee (Eaton & White (1982)) at the beginning of the contract 
might act to eliminate the involuntary unemployment. What is common here is 
the idea that the workers are paid below their marginal productivity in the initial 
period but there will be an compensation in the next period, which acts to 
stimulate the incentives of the workers. As a consequence, the offer of an 
efficiency wag above the market clearing wage to increase the workers’ effort 
becomes redundant. The concept can also be applied to explain the rationale for 
the use of seniority wage or the reason why the age-earnings profile is upward- 
sloping.(Lazear (1979) & (1981))
The validity of the adverse selection models depends crucially on the 
assumption that the firm never finds out about the ability of each worker. If the
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firm did, it could then pay the workers by piece rate. It has also been suggested 
that a firm might devise a self-selection scheme or a screening scheme (Guasch 
& Weiss (1980), (1981), or (1982)) to differentiate the heterogeneous workers.
However, the real world employment contracts are not always characterized by 
a performance bond, an employment fee, or a piece rate, or some type of self­
selection or screening scheme. There are several reasons for this. First, with an 
imperfect capital market the underpayment in the initial period would not make 
the labour market efficient — it is more likely to give a favourable treatment to 
those with wealth rather than selecting more productive workers. Second, it is 
not easy to measure the precise level of productivity and thus to derive the 
corresponding wage that both the employer and the workers accept. When there 
is a disagreement between the agents, it is said that there is positive 
“transactions cost”, which is the cost of agreeing with each other. And finally, a 
well-constructed self-selection or screening devise may be too complicated for 
the workers to comprehend or too costly to operate for the employer. A more 
formal discussion on this last issue about screening with cost is found in 
Chapter IV. While most of these arguments are descriptive rather than 
presented within a theoretical framework, their basic arguments do offer 
sufficient defence for the efficiency wage models.
The efficiency wage models are based on the concept of efficiency units. But 
this fundamental concept itself limits a scope of the models. Here we illustrate 
the limitations within the framework of the Weiss model presented in the
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previous section. Weiss (1980) states in the introduction that the existences of 
job queues and wage rigidity can be explained if two critical assumptions are 
made : (1) The wage received by workers are not proportional to their 
productivity, i.e. a uniform wage is paid to workers of heterogeneous 
productivity, and (2) the acceptance wages of workers are an increasing 
function of their productivity — this also means its inverse exists. While we 
leave the discussion on (1) to Chapter IV, consider the validity of (2). There are 
at least three limitations brought about by this fundamental assumption of the 
efficiency wage model.
Firstly, there is only one efficiency wage for all sorts of labour markets. The 
efficiency wage is derived from (1-7), which is a composite function of q(w), 
the functional relationship between the labour endowment and the reservation 
wage, and F(w), the distribution of workers by the reservation wage but indepen­
dent of g(L), the production function. This means that there is a unique efficien­
cy wage for all markets, if the idiosyncratic aspect of a particular labour market 
in this framework is expressed in terms of g(L). On one hand, to be fair to the 
efficiency unit framework, its original intention probably was not meant to 
extend the analysis to cover several labour markets. On the other hand, it would 
be a useful extension to the model if we can somehow relate the level of efficien­
cy wage and the type of labour market. One might attempt to do this by allow­
ing the form of 0=q(w) to vary for each labour market so that, for example, the 
function for skilled labour market is different from that for unskilled labour 
market, resulting in different efficiency wages. However, this would be theoret-
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ical incorrect, as 0 is by definition a parameter attached to each worker rather 
than to each labour market.
The second limitation has to do with the existence of the efficiency wage. 
Many of the efficiency wage models seem to assume often implicitly that the 
efficiency wage always exists. However, it is not necessarily the case. The 
equilibrium condition (1-7) is also known as the Solow condition, where the 
elasticity of the average labour endowment with respect to wage is unity, since 
rearranging (1-7) gives,
dq(w) w
 r =l .  (1-7)
dw q
And as the only assumption concerning q(w) is the adverse selection condition 
(1-4), the efficiency wage model does not guarantee the existence of an efficien­
cy wage, let alone the excess supply on the wage rigidity.
Fig.I--l(a) supplements the argument. The minimand w/q(w) is an inverse of a 
slope of a line through the origin to a point w* on q(w). The function q(w) is 
drawn here to have a "convex-concave" shape. Mathematical reason for this is 
not difficult to see. Firstly, the second order condition for min {w/q(w)} is
d2/d2w{w/q(w)}=d/dw{(q(w))'2[q(w)-wq’ (w)]}=(q(w))'2{-w(q’,(w)}
Thus the second order condition dictates that it is concave at w*. And the
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concavity for smaller values of w ensures that the solution does not degenerate 
to zero.
However, for the efficiency wage to be economically meaningful, these condi­
tions have to be justified in economic terms. Noting that q(w) is a composite 
function of q(w) and f(w), it is easier to consider the effects of these two compo­
nents separately. We may assume that q(w) is a monotonically increasing 
function, as it is the inverse of w(0), the reservation wage function, and thus it is 
not likely to generate the convex-concave shape alone. As for the frequency 
distribution f(w), we may assume it "bell-shaped", with both ends of the distribu­
tion having low frequency values. Then, for a given form of q(#), as the pop­
ulation is sparse around the both tails, q(w) does not increase at the very low 
and very high values of w as much as around the middle range. This would 
generate the convexity for the smaller values and the concavity for the larger 
values of w in q(*). Alternatively, there may exist a positive value of w, w0, say, 
below which no worker is attracted — such as an initial expense for starting out 
a new life. This is indicated in Fig.I-l(b) by zero average quality until w0. The 
concavity to follow can be explained as the result of the quality of labour eventu­
ally approaching some upper bound.
Fig.I-l(c) illustrates a special case where the average quality is invariant across 
the workers with different acceptance wages. This can be considered as a case 
of "homogeneous" labour force with respect to the job in the market. Note that 
the kink at w0=0 of this function helps to maintain the "convexity-concavity"
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characteristics required of q(*). Note that in these realistic cases their character­
istics is of a weaker version, i.e. "weak-convexity/weak-concavity". Although 
the case of Fig.I-1(c) does not accord with the standard first order derivative 
conditions for minimizing w/q(w), the wage may still be defined as an efficien­
cy wage in that it is the solution to the minimization problem.
q(w) q(w) q(w)
(b)(a) (c)
Fig.I-1
Of course, more complex shapes are possible. However, as far as the existence 
of an efficiency wage is concerned, the "concave-convex" shape is a sufficient 
condition. While the existence of an efficiency wage may be justified, there is 
no reason to leave out a possibility that an efficiency wage does not exist. 
Indeed, in theory if the function were convex (concave) throughout, the objec­
tive function would be minimized at w=0 ( at the maximum value of w). How­
ever, the economic interpretation presented above in on the shape of q(w) is too 
convincing to consider the case that an efficiency wage does not exists. This 
argument suggests that the adverse selection models usually analyze the special
cases where the existence of an efficiency wage is the necessary consequence of
- 21 -
the adverse selection mechanism.
Thirdly, the adverse selection does not require a one-to-one functional relation­
ship between w and 0, which is the consequence of the assumption of efficiency 
units (EUs). This, together with a production function g(*) being cumulative in 
EU, leads to a situation of "all-round productive ability" among jobs i.e. if a 
worker has a higher 0 than another worker then he is more productive in al[ 
jobs. This, however, is not a necessary condition for an adverse selection 
mechanism nor for excess supply equilibrium to occur. For the adverse selec­
tion phenomenon implies,
q'(w)>0 and not q'(w)>0 (1-8)
It is easy to give an example where q(w) is an increasing function of w while 
q(w) is not. Consider, for example, a discrete case with three workers whose 
opportunity wages are w,<w2<w3, and q(w,)=l q(w2)=5 and q(w3)=4. In this 
case, q'(w) is an increasing function of w as q(w,)=q(w,)=l, q(w2)=(l/2) 
{q(w1)+q(w2)}=3, and q(w3)=(l/3){q(w,)+q(w2)+q(w3)}=10/3, while q(w) is 
not. In fact the condition that q(w) and q(w) are both increasing in w is ap­
propriate for the early efficiency wage models where an increase in w means an 
increase in the productivity of everyone in the homogeneous labour force since 
in this case q(w) = q(w). Therefore, for the adverse selection model, the assump­
tion that w(0) is monotionic is not an economic argument but is a technical one 
in a sense that without this its inverse q(w) may not be defined and this would
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deny the whole setting since q(w) can not be defined as in (1-3) However, for a 
heterogeneous labour force it is too restrictive to assume that ability is solely 
represented as all-round productive skills. Therefore, what the Weiss model 
illustrates is a special case of the adverse selection mechanism at work.
In total, it appears that Weiss neglected the case in which q ’(w)>0 does not 
hold and the case in which the efficiency wage does not exist. By doing so, he 
simplified the argument and succeeded in showing that an excess supply of 
labour may exist. However, he left out the more extensive investigation as to 
when such a outcome is likely to occur. To the extent that the nature of a mar­
ket depends on the forces determining supply and demand, the nature of the 
equilibrium depends greatly on the type of the production process and the 
composition of the labour force within a particular labour market. Yet, this is 
not explicitly analyzed in a type of efficiency wage model as the Weiss model.
Alternatively, one may introduce an ability endowment a, from which his 
efficiency unit endowment 0=q(a) for a particular labour market and the reserva­
tion wage w=w(a) are derived. Then the expected profit would be expressed as
n  -  Pg(q(a)x) -  w(a)x
Then differentiating with respect to x and a, and rearranging the first order 
conditions, we obtain an equation analogous to (1-7),
-23 -
w(a) w' (a)
q(a) q '(a)
and this is also the solution to the analogous problem “min w(a)/q(a)”. Thus the 
efficiency wage may depend on the characteristics of the function q(a), which 
takes an idiosyncratic form of a particular labour market. This is a possible 
extension to the efficiency wage models but is not suggested in the literature — 
in fact, Weiss (1991) considers different q(w)’s but they are for different co­
horts rather than for different labour markets. This is probably because such an 
extension would make the model unnecessarily complicated and the model 
could lose its intuitively appealing features.
Table 1-1 summarizes the three limitations : (1) q’(w)>0, the all-round produc­
tive ability — this is not a critical assumption for the adverse selection mech­
anism, (2) The adverse selection q’(w)>0 implies an existence of an efficiency 
wage — this is not necessarily true, and (3) The efficiency wage is invariant 
across all jobs — this would treat all the labour markets in the same way so that 
we can not analyse the nature of the equilibrium in terms of the market charac­
teristics. While the efficiency wage models can claim success in showing that 
an excess supply is consistent with competitive equilibrium, there is a need to
The Weiss Model
q ’(w)>0 -> q ’(w)>0 3 Efficiency Wage—> Excess supply or Market Clearing
(1) (2) (3)
Table 1-1 
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set up a model that can pick up those aspects of the heterogeneous labour mar­
ket analysis which the efficiency wage models have not dealt with.
(4) Thurow’s Job Competition Model
Discrepancies that exist between what the economic theory predicts and what 
we observe in the real world were the starting point of the analysis of labour 
market in Thurow (1975). For him these “deviant observations” in the labour 
market included the existence of unemployment and the consequent wage 
rigidity, the Pigou paradox, the phenomenon that the distribution of earnings is 
skewed despite the allegedly normally distributed abiliiy distribution, and the 
observation that the wage payments are not always equalized for homogeneous 
labour.
He introduced a concept of “job competition” to explain these deviant observa­
tions in a theoretically acceptable manner. As these concerns of his overlap 
with our interest, let us briefly introduce his job competition here. The basic 
premise of the idea is that labour markets are essentially training markets in the 
sense that firms recruit workers in a labour market to train them to perform the 
required job. This contrasts with a more orthodox concept of labour market that 
workers bring with them the required skills.
In the job competition model, therefore, workers are allocated into job slots 
and wages are paid according to the job characteristics rather than the worker’s
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personal characteristics. Furthermore, Thurow’s workers are assumed to be 
heterogeneous as opposed to the usual assumption of homogeneous labour force 
in the neo-classical model. Thus after recruiting the heterogeneous workers, the 
firm offers training to standardize the labour force so that they can all perform 
the required job. The workers’ heterogeneity is reflected in their ability to 
complete the training — some workers find the training easier than others and 
thus they may cost less to train to the firm. As a result, the firms have prefer­
ence about the workers and rank them in order of the preference to form a 
“labour queue” using educational credentials as a screening device. The prefer­
ence about workers do exist also for Weiss (1980). However, his preferred 
workers are endowed with more efficiency units, while Thurow preferred 
workers have lower training cost than the less preferred ones. Furthermore, 
unlike in a neo-classical model of a labour market, the wage in the job competi­
tion model is determined outside of the market rather than by the supply and 
demand interaction. And this explains the deviant observations of wage rigidity 
and unemployment.
The crucial assumption in the Thurow’s model is that the training cost is paid 
by the training firm — otherwise, the firm would be indifferent about the work­
ers even if they are heterogeneous. The incidence of training cost was discussed 
earlier on in Becker (1964), in which he distinguished “general” and “specific” 
training. General training is relevant to all jobs and thus acquiring such skill 
would increase the productivity of the trainee by exactly the same amount in the 
training firm and in other firms, while specific training has relevance only to the
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job of the training firm and the productivity of the trainee in other firms does 
not change. Consequently, the Thurow’s training firm would pay for the train­
ing since it is specific and not general.
Thurow (1975) contrasts the job competition model with what he calls the 
wage competition model. In the latter, firms do not have preference about the 
workers even if they are heterogeneous, since the training are general and thus 
the cost does not incur to the training firm. These two types of competitions 
co-exist in the real world according to Thurow. The way Thurow incorporates 
the human investment aspect into the labour market mechanism is rather intrigu­
ing. The firm pays to train the workers, and as the workers are heterogeneous in 
the training cost the firm has a preference among the workers. This means that 
the characteristics of a job competition of a particular labour market depend on 
the training cost heterogeneity —  for example, if the training cost is uniform, 
then the firm will be indifferent about the workers. However, Thurow does not 
offer a theoretical model of a job competition nor does he explain how the wage 
is determined. This is our starting point and we use the Thurow’s concept of 
training market to build a more theoretically rigorous model.
(5) Towards a More General Model of Labour Market
The labour service has a very high degree of heterogeneity, while many types 
of goods and services are supplied in relatively homogeneous forms. Hence, it 
would be difficult to find two workers with exactly the same level of productivi-
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ty, while you can find many pencils, say, of the same quality. The reason is 
simply that while the quality of labour service depends a lot on the characteris­
tics of each individual worker (Nobody is bom identical to anyone else!), many 
goods and services are produced as homogeneous products (which makes the 
production easier). However, once labour service is to be used as a factor of 
production it requires a certain level of homogeneity. In that sense acquiring of 
knowledge and skills helps to standardize the innately heterogeneous labour 
force. The simplest example of such is language, without which no collective 
work is possible. Thus while the human capital theorists argue for the invest­
ment aspect of education, where education defined as acquiring of knowledge 
and skills also acts to standardize the labour force,
Such a standardization of labour force exists even after the employment con­
tract is signed. Training signifies precisely this post-educational standardization 
process as much as the post-educational investment, although training may be 
more specific to the job than education. The actual training may take place 
alongside production i.e. on-the-job training, or at different occasions i.e. off- 
the-job training. Its cost consists of the opportunity cost due to the lost produc­
tion during the training and the actual cost of training, as in the human capital 
model of education. With the introduction of the heterogeneous labour force, it 
is reasonable to assume that the amount of training required for a particular job 
and thus its cost differ among the labour force. Furthermore, the training cost 
differential among the workers may not be the same for all jobs. Take, for 
example, a university graduate and a high school leaver for a skilled job and an
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unskilled job. While for the skilled job the graduate may require considerably 
less amount of training and thus of its cost than the school leaver, for the un­
skilled job the gap may not be great.
Let us assume, therefore, that a production process consists of production and 
training. Then the value of net output of a firm may be defined by the value of 
total output minus the total cost of training and be written as
i i
py(2 xi)-2 cix‘ a-9)
i=l i=l
where p is the product price
y(*) is a production function whose sole argument is labour, i.e. the 
number of workers
i is a group of workers with the same training cost and there are I groups 
Xj is the number of workers in group i 
Cj is the training cost of each worker in group i 
and we have assumed that all workers pursue the same type of job. A similar 
concept of production and training is employed in Salop (1979), in which the 
workers must be trained at the outset of employment. Thus the first term may 
be interpreted as what trained workers produce while the second term refers to 
what costs the firm to train the newly recruited workers. Particular characteris­
tics of a firm or of a labour market would be expressed by different forms of Cj.
On the supply side of the labour market, the workers are distributed according
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to an ability endowment a . This must be distinguished from a direct labour 
input endowment such as EU. Rather, it is a potential or latent ability which 
can generate productive skills through training. A reservation wage w of a 
worker with a  is derived, based on his productivity in the alternative job. So to 
each a  attached is the training cost, i.e. c=c(a), and the reservation wage w= 
w(a). In principle, c(a) can take any form, but later on in Chapter III we will 
assume c’(oc)<0.
The firms are assumed to know w=w(a), c=c(a) and the distribution function 
H(a) but not the a  of an individual worker. Thus while a single firm knows the 
quality of labour i.e. the training cost for a given wage offer w, to the extent 
that it is competitive it does not know the quantity of labour supply it can secure 
at that wage.
The firm's profit is given by
i i i
rc =py ( £ Xi) _  X ° ( a 0Xi -  w(ama*)XXi (I-10)
i =  l i = l  i = l
where p is the product price
i is a group of workers with the same a , i.e. a, — as c is a function of a ,
this is equivalent to the above definition of i
ocmax *s a  ° f  group of workers with the highest w among those
employed
Xj is the number of workers with c l . employed by the firm
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In continuous form
7c=py(x)-c(a)x-w(a)x (I-H)
where x is now the total labour input
w(a) is the reservation wage of the workers with a — the workers of the 
highest ability, which is equivalent to in (1-10)
endowment range between 0 and a
The firm is, then, to maximize n  with respect to a  and x. The formal analysis 
will be given in Chapter III and thus I only point out here that the firm quotes 
the wage offer and the number of workers it wishes to employ —  so it is not a 
price taker in the perfect competition sense, but whether this demand is met 
depends on the supply condition — so it acts as a competitive firm.
Thus what we attempt to introduce here is a model of heterogeneous labour 
market with training. Its basic premises are that a labour market is essentially a 
training market, to which workers without skills enter to receive training and 
then work, and that the workers are heterogeneous in some innate ability, which 
generates the heterogeneity in the training cost as well as in the reservation
Jc(z)dH(z)
i.e. the average training cost of the workers with the
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wage. A competitive firm needs to offer a wage to minimize the labour cost 
which consists of wage cost and training cost.
This model differs from the Thurow’s job competition model and the Weiss’s 
adverse selection model in several ways. As pointed out earlier on, our model 
follows the concept of a labour market as a training market employed by 
Thurow (1975). But it is more theoretically rigorous than the Thurow’s model. 
In particular, the wage is endogeneously determined within the theoretical 
framework rather than exogeneously given.
As with Weiss (1980), its limitations discussed in the earlier part of this 
chapter are cleared by using an innate ability a  rather than the efficiency unit 0. 
This is brought about by the use of a function c(a) instead of q(w). For exam­
ple, it was explained that as w(0) is assumed to be monotonically increasing if a 
worker is more productive in the present firm i.e. high 0, he is also more produc­
tive in the alternative sector i.e. high w, but this does not always have to hold. 
For our model, c(a) is not required to be a monotonic function so that we do not 
have to limit our analysis to the “all-round productive ability” cases. For our 
model the adverse selection implies an increase in wage to cause a decrease in 
c(a), i.e. c ‘(oc)<0. But there is no guarantee that the total labour cost will be 
reduced or equivalently, that the “efficiency wage” always exists. While for the 
Weiss model the existence of the efficiency wage was not questioned for the 
reason given in the earlier part of this chapter. Finally, we would like to know 
how the market characteristics determine the level of efficiency wage. While
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Weiss (1980) offers no suggestion on this issue — the efficiency wage is invari­
ant across all jobs, we attempt to relate the training aspect of a labour market to 
the wage levels as well as to the characteristics of the market equilibrium.
In this chapter we have discussed the following:
Firstly, the efficiency wage hypothesis (EWH) and the four types of labour 
market models based on this hypothesis, namely, the nutritional model, the 
shirking model, the adverse selection model and the sociological model, were 
introduced and their mechanisms were briefly described. With the adverse 
selection effect or the incentive effect as the key concept, these models help to 
explain the existence of wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment.
Secondly, the model by Weiss (1980) was examined in detail. Theoretical 
difficulties and limitations of the efficiency wage models were discussed. One 
such difficulty is that the involuntary unemployment may be eliminated by an 
alternative contract characterized by a performance bond, an employment fee or 
a piece rate payment or a self-selection or screening device, though this could 
be counterargued. It was also shown that the fundamental assumption of ef­
ficiency unit restricts the operation of the efficiency wage models in several 
ways. First, it restricts the workers to be all-round productive. Second, the 
adverse selection is treated as if it is the sufficient condition for the existence of 
an efficiency wage. And thirdly, no analysis is given to explain when the 
excess supply of labour is likely to occur.
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Thirdly, a job competition model by Thurow (1975) was introduced and its 
mechanism, in which training plays an important role, was described. And 
finally, a training model based on the concept of Thurow (1975) as well as that 
of the efficiency wage was introduced.
The remaining chapters are organized as follows:
Chapter II offers a selected survey of the literature on theories of wage determi­
nation and a more detailed survey on training models. It is intended to give 
readers some comparative perspectives of this issue and in particular the reasons 
why the training model is offered in this work. In Chapter III the model is 
presented formally and the labour market equilibrium is established Chapter IV 
gives some space to the explanation of why the uniform wage may be assumed; 
or, in other words, to examine the conditions in which the equilibrium so estab­
lished in the previous chapter is robust. Chapter V offers a two-period model of 
training with heterogeneous labour, in which an upward-sloping wage profile is 
derived. Chapter VI looks at this competitive equilibrium of the heterogeneous 
labour market in comparison with monopsony equilibrium, using the 
Lagrangian multiplier method. Comparative static analysis appears in Chapter 
VII, in which several policy implications are discussed. Chapters VIII and IX 
look at slightly different models of labour market by modifying some of the 
assumptions of the original model — Chapter VIII looks at a case of heter­
ogeneous firms as well as workers, which is then followed in Chapter IX by a
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case of observationally distinguishable workers. In both cases, the equilibrium 
is established and the comparative static analysis is offered in an analogous 
manner to that of the original model. Each chapter ends with a brief summary 
of the results established in that chapter. And finally the conclusion appears in 
Chapter X.
CHAPTER I I : A SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON THEORIES OF WAGE
DETERMINATION
In this chapter we survey the literature on wage determination theories. The 
theories are presented in a basically chronological manner to illustrate a brief 
history of the theories of wage determination mechanism. There is a wide 
variety of approaches offering explanations of wage determination mechanism. 
And this chapter intends to contrast them and offer comparative perspectives to 
this issue.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly the overall view is presented to 
describe how the issue of wage determination has been tackled in the past. 
Secondly the theories are grouped into 'approaches' in terms of assumptions and 
basic framework of models. Here the focus of each approach is clarified and its 
merits and demerits in employing as a model to describe the labour market 
mechanism are assessed in turn. Then we have a closer look at theoretical and 
empirical works on economics of training. Finally, these are contrasted with the 
approach followed in this work.
(1) The Overall View
One way to systematically survey the literature on the theories of wage determi­
nation is to categorize them into the following three groups; (a) a determination
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of wage level, (b) a determination of wage differentials, and (c) a determination 
of wage distribution. Each group pursues the analysis of the labour market 
from a slightly different angle from the others. The orthodox neo-classical 
income distribution approach falls into (a), the first group. The approach pre­
sents a labour market within an overall picture of economy in terms of general 
equilibrium analysis. It shows how the wage level is determined in relation to 
other prices. However, when one wishes to investigate the reason for the exist­
ence of wage differentials i.e. ( b ) , the second group, one needs a more detailed 
analysis within one labour market. Thus the human capital approach serves to 
explain how and why an individual with particular characteristics earns a wage 
different from others. The institutional approach also shows how persons with 
different attributes obtain employment in different sectors, thus generating a 
structure of wage differentials. As for the question of the shape of a wage 
distribution i.e. (c), the third group, some have been puzzled by its lognormal 
shape. The statistical/mathematical approach was presented in 1950’s, which 
was then followed by the more economically meaningful job matching ap­
proach.
All these approaches assume perfect information. However, with a growing 
interest in the economics of information since Stigler (1961) through Akerlof 
(1970), there has been a line of approaches in the field of wage determination 
parallel to those presented above but with an assumption of imperfect informa­
tion. Thus the implicit contract approach attempts to explain how a wage is 
determined — i.e. (a) — when the level of output is not known with certainty in
-37-
advance. The human capital under uncertainty approach makes explicit the 
uncertain element at the time the decision making on the educational investment 
i.e. the future earnings, within the human capital framework.
Uncertainty may affect the participants of a market differently i.e. a case of 
asymmetric information. As for labour markets, such an informational asym­
metry typically occurs when the firms do not know the productivity of each 
worker. The screening/signalling approach describes possible processes 
through which wage offers can be differentiated among the workers with differ­
ent attributes even if the firms do not possess perfect information about the 
workers' heterogeneity in advance. These are the answers to question of type 
(b) —■ i.e. how are wages differentiated?, — taking into consideration the issue of 
uncertainty. The job matching under uncertainty approach attempts to extend 
the imperfect information to both sides of the labour market, to describe how 
wages may be distributed in the world where information is imperfect
The main issue of the analysis
(a)Wage level (b)Wage
differentials
(c)Wage/income
distribution
Perfect
Information
(i)Income
distribution
(ii)Human capital 
(3)Training models
(iii)Institutional
(iv)Statistical/ 
mathematical
(v)Job matching
Imperfect
Information
(vi)Implicit
contract
(vii)Human capital 
with uncertainty
(viii)Screening/ 
signalling
(ix)Job matching 
with uncertainty
Table II-1: The basic features of the approaches
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i.e. the question of type (c). Table II-l illustrates the grouping discussed above 
and each approach is explained in the next section in turn..
(2) The Theories
(A) Perfect Information
(i) The Neo-classical Income Distribution Approach
Within a general equilibrium framework, labour demand exists as a derived 
demand alongside demand for capital for the production of goods. The wage is 
a remuneration for labour service, being determined simultaneously with inter­
est as a payment for capital. The firm's profit maximization implies that the 
marginal productivity of the each factor is equated to the corresponding remu­
neration. The equilibrium wage is determined by the interaction of supply of 
and demand for labour as well as that of supply of and demand for capital.
In general, a traded commodity in any one market is assumed to be homoge­
neous within this framework. And it is this homogeneity assumption that limits 
this type of approach to construct a comprehensive model of a labour market, to 
describe a process of wage determination for the following reason. The assump­
tion of homogeneity of labour allows only a single wage in the labour market. 
Thus, if we wish to describe a labour market in the real world, in which there 
are more than one wage, we would need to assume that there is a complete set 
of markets for several different types of labour — for example, a skilled labour
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market and an unskilled labour market. In turn, their wages are determined by 
the corresponding supply and demand conditions. And while theoretically this 
does not restrict the range of wage level in any market, we see in reality that a 
wage in some market is most of the time, if not always, higher than in other 
market, such as a case of a skilled labour market and an unskilled labour mar­
ket. One may argue that a wage of skilled labour tends to be higher than that of 
unskilled labour because there is always a shortage of skilled labour relative to 
unskilled labour. But then we must answer the next question as to why such a 
difference in labour supply exists. It would be necessary to say something 
about the way by which one decides to supply his labour service to one market 
rather than another. Within the general equilibrium framework, such an exten­
sion could make the analysis too complicated to produce some simple and clear 
results.
Therefore, while this approach ought to be credited for its focus on the analysis 
of an overall picture of an economy and hence the analysis of a labour market in 
relation to other markets in the economy, it cannot go very far in explaining the 
pronounced phenomena in labour markets such as the existence of wage dif­
ferentials.
(ii) The Human Capital Approach
The labour earnings of a worker may be found to be correlated with his at­
tributes such as years of schooling, sex, race or the amount of working experi­
ence. Human capital theorists argue that education is an investment that gener­
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ates higher earnings as a return in the future, so that the educational decision is 
analogous to investment decisions of capital. (See, for example, Shultz (1965), 
Mincer (1974), Becker (1975)) They maintain also that such an investment 
extends into one’s working life in the form of 'On-the-Job Training (OJT)\ This 
training aspect is dealt with in the nest section in detail.
This approach has three main contributions to the understanding of labour 
market operations. Firstly, by treating an educational decision as an economic 
issue, it has questioned the orthodox educational philosophy and the one that 
many people hold namely that the value of education cannot be rightly mea­
sured in monetary terms alone. Secondly, the OJT hypothesis gives an explana­
tion to an upward-sloping shape of a typical age-earning profile. And thirdly it 
is important to point out that many empirical works have been done based on 
the human capital theory, using an "earnings equation" of the form : lnYs= 
lnY0+rs, where s is years of education, Y. is the earnings of a person with i years 
of education, and r is a rate of return. I would like to emphasize it here because 
many theories in this field of labour economics are interesting but difficult to 
test empirically.
As for our immediate concern, this approach can deal with the issue of how 
wages are determined and differentiated in terms of the level of investment in 
education and OJT. By giving some insight into decision making on education 
and/or OJT, it attempts to rationalize observed wage differentials in terms of an 
optimization process. It thus solves the problem faced in the neo-classical
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income distribution approach as a result of having to set up one labour market 
for each wage to be determined. In fact, the human capital theory is a labour 
supply analysis, since it describes how a potential supplier of labour determines 
the amount of investment in himself by examining how much earnings can be 
generated in the future. However, as an educational investment requires some 
time to generate its return, the future earnings is likely to bear a considerable 
degree of uncertainty in two ways — namely, uncertainty about the successful 
educational achievement and uncertainty about the condition of the demand for 
the type of labour. The approach could reflect the reality more by taking these 
uncertainties into the model (See (vii)).
(iii) The Institutional Approach
The models in this group all have quite intuitively appealing features, as their 
structures are based on historical, institutional or qualitative aspects of labour 
markets. At the same time, however, their assumptions in some cases do appear 
to be rather ad hoc to Neo-classical economists. In fact the works we refer to in 
this category follow the line of what is often called the segmented labour market 
theories. Their starting point is the questioning of the neo-classical theory of 
labour markets. For example, they point out that the persistence of poverty and 
income inequality despite the long-standing policies to eliminate them can not 
be explained by the neo-classical theory. Cain (1976) offers an extensive 
survey on the segmented labour market theories.
Two of the more notable works on these theories are the dual labour market
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theory of Doeringer & Piore (1971) and the job competition theory of Thurow 
(1975). The dual labour market consists of a primary labour market offering a 
job with a higher wage, better working conditions, more promotion possibilities 
and more stable work, and a secondary market offering the opposite of what the 
primary market is offering. While workers in the primary market have no 
intention to leave for the secondary market, workers in the secondary market 
become accustomed to the working patterns of that sector and find it difficult to 
move out of this inferior sector of the society and thus these two types of labour 
markets continue to coexist. With the job competition theory, there are two 
types of market mechanisms called Job Competition and Wage Competition. 
Under job competition numbers and types of job slots are technologically 
determined. Wages are not principally determined by market forces. In fact 
there said to be a persistent job queue, from which firms choose the better 
workers. Consequently firms use some screening device to select better work­
ers. In contrast, wage competition is what is normally known as a neo-classical 
market-clearing case. By pointing out that workers of different abilities may 
receive the same wage under the job competition, Thurow suggests that a wage 
is paid according to productivity required for the job rather than productivity of 
the worker. As a consequence, workers are recruited to receive OJT to be able 
to perform the required jobs.
The main difficulty with these theories is that their presentations are rather 
descriptive. For example, in the dual labour market analysis it does not explain 
how one market comes to be considered as a secondary rather than a primary
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market. Or there is no clear explanation in the job competition theory as to how 
the wage was determined in the first place. Because of this, as Cain (1976) 
points out, their criticisms of the neo-classical theory are not substantial.
Bhagwati (1977) and Fields (1974) both attempt to model a theory of ed­
ucation in LDC economy, in which the supply of and demand for the educated 
workers do not always match. In particular, they describe as 'Job Ladder and 
Faimess-in-hiring1 and 'Bumping' respectively a phenomenon of hiring the 
better workers first when there is an excess supply of workers. The focus of 
these works is, however, on the social efficiency/inefficiency of education 
rather than how the wages are determined and as a result they do not offer a 
convincing mechanism of wage determination. Similarly the system of labour 
market, i.e. the job ladder model, the flexible wage model, or the social opti­
mum model for Bhagwati (1977) or the bumping model, the stratification mod­
el, or the pooling model for Fields (1974) is a 'choice variable'. Thus, for exam­
ple, Fields (1974) does recommend one system as the socially most efficient 
one but can not guarantee that the efficient system prevails as a stable or robust 
equilibrium.
(iv) The Statistical/Mathematical Approach
At the end of the last century, Pareto (1897) observed that the distribution of 
income was not symmetric around its mean but rather it is skewed to the right. 
He derived what is now known as a Pareto distribution to fit this right-skewed 
income distribution data. It was realized later, however, that this theoretical
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distribution does not fit well the lower end of the actual income distribution. 
Gibrat (1931) presented a lognormal distribution as an improved version of the 
Pareto model, to fit well the lower end of the actual income distribution. Var­
ious attempts to explain this skewness of the distribution to this day include 
Champemowne (1953) and Roy (1950).
Champernowne (1953) employed a theory of stochastic process of the Markov 
chain type. Given continuous flows of income, he assumed that a probability of 
falling into a certain income group as a result of an annual change of income 
follows a certain pattern. He concluded that in a steady state the distribution of 
income becomes Pareto or lognormal irrespective of the initial state of the 
distribution. In other words, the Pareto or lognormal shape of the income 
distribution is the result of continuous income changes that occur following 
some probabilistic laws. This theory seems to offer a very simple and yet 
appealing explanation to the observed skewness of the income distribution. His 
argument relies heavily on his two basic assumptions. Firstly, the presently 
observed distribution is assumed to be in the steady state. However, as Lydall 
(1968) pointed out, one's life may not be sufficiently long to generate the steady 
state and thus his income is more likely to be conditional upon his initial endow­
ment at the beginning of his life. Secondly, the annual income change is as­
sumed to follow a certain pattern of stochastic process. However, no economic 
interpretation is given in the specification of this process. Although one needs 
not deny the stochastic factor in the income generating mechanism, it is hard to 
believe that such a mechanism operates independently of economic factors.
Thus the theory would have been more convincing if its stochastic process had 
been constructed explicitly on the concept of economic rationality.
Others attributed the cause of income differentials to the ability distribution.
To them, however, the crucial issue was to explain what is called the Pigou 
paradox, that is, a paradox that despite the normally distributed ability the 
distribution of its derivative i.e. income, is not. (See, for example, Pigou (1932)) 
Roy (1950) suggested that ability has several dimensions such as intelligence, 
physical strength, decisiveness and leadership, and showed that when these 
normally distributed dimensions are multiplicatively combined it produces a 
lognormal distribution of income. The criticism of this approach is two-fold. 
Firstly, what we define here as ability are difficult to quantify and consequently 
it is difficult to actually prove that they are all normally distributed, let alone the 
determination of its multiplicative distribution. Secondly, it faces the same 
criticism as that of the Pareto model and the Champemowne model, in that it 
does not take into consideration the complex interaction of market forces.
(v) The Job Matching Approach
The models of this approach assume heterogeneities of both workers and jobs 
within a single market. Tinbergen (1951) & (1956) and Lucas (1977) consider 
continuous heterogeneity in both workers ability and job type. The equilibrium 
then entails a wage equation, a continuous functional relationship between wage 
and job/worker attribute. (See Tinbergen (1951) & (1956)) And the wage per 
unit of attribute is often called a Hedonic Wage. (See Lucas (1977)) The idea of
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attaching some monetary value to each attribute of a traded commodity is the 
concept of Hedonic Price and a more general model of this type is found in 
Rosen (1974). Such a concept is useful for analyzing a market for commodities 
of a high degree of heterogeneity such as houses or cars as well as labour ser­
vice. For purchasing a house, for example, one takes into consideration many 
of its attributes as well as the price itself such as a condition of the house, its 
size and of its garden, a number of rooms, and its geographical characteristics 
e.g. its distance to the workplace, or natural and social environment. And the 
hedonic price of an attribute is the market value attached to a unit of each 
attribute.
Tinbergen (1956) considered the matching of a demand distribution for labour 
and a supply distribution of labour. A job in the demand distribution or a 
worker in the supply distribution is characterized by several attributes by means 
of its degree. Thus, for example, a worker may possess a high degree of intel­
ligence and yet a low degree of ability to deal with others, or a job may be 
described by a low degree of precision and a high degree of cooperation among 
fellow workers. The degrees are measured on a continuous scale of each at­
tribute. His argument is that because these two multivariate distributions on the 
continuous scale are not necessarily identical, there is a need for what he calls 
an income scale to match these distributions, through which the income distribu­
tion may be determined. Assuming that the supply and demand distributions to 
be bivariate normal distributions and that the supply is wage elastic and the 
demand is not, he solves the problem as a workers’ utility maximization to
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obtain the income scale, with the additional condition that supply and demand 
for each job are equated. He then attempts to generalize the result for the case 
where the demand distribution is also wage elastic. However, he points out that 
such a generalization would be possible but extremely complicated and does not 
present a general solution.
As for the hedonic theories, their contributions to empirical studies have been 
considerable as the concept of hedonic price/wage is appealing. The human 
capital model may fall under this category as far as its empirical aspect is con­
cerned. At the theoretical level, attempts have been concentrated on investigat­
ing whether the standard results of general equilibrium analysis are valid in the 
hedonic or implicit market cases. What appears to be missed out in this ap­
proach, however, is the issue of imperfect information about the heterogeneities 
of firms and workers. The equilibrium wage in this model of labour market 
corresponds to a set of continuous values of wages known as a wage equation. 
And to each wage level on this wage equation there is a pair of a firm and a 
worker at the equilibrium. With the full information every agent in the labour 
market may be able to find his best partner. However, it would be difficult to 
see that this result holds when the information is less than perfect. And this is 
the issue we turn to in the next section.
(B) Imperfect Information
(vi) The Implicit Contract Approach
The original idea of the implicit contract was due to Baily (1974), Gordon
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(1974) and Azariadis (1975) in the mid 70’s. The approach attempted to find an 
answer to the real world observations that the competitive labour market anal­
ysis could not explain the — namely, the wage rigidity and an existence of 
involuntary unemployment. Consider a risk-neutral firm and homogeneous 
risk-averse workers in a situation of uncertain demand for products. Acting also 
as an insurer, the employer is more likely to offer a labour contract with a 
somewhat lower but fixed wage irrespective of the state of world that would 
actually occur. However, the models do not always generate involuntary unem­
ployment.
More recently, asymmetric information is introduced into the analysis, while 
the earlier models assumed symmetric information about the state of world as 
both firm and workers can observe it. Hence, a firm and workers do not have 
the same degree of access to information on, for example, the state of world 
the firms are more informed (See Grossman & Hart (1983)), or the reservation 
wages — the workers are more informed (See Moore (1985)). For surveys, see 
Rosen (1985) and Manning (1990).
There is no doubt that the approach has given a further insight into understand­
ing of the wage determination by taking into account the aspect of uncertainty. 
However, to the extent that most of results here do not depend on the assump­
tion of heterogeneous labour, it is not quite the ideal approach for understanding 
the reason for the observed wide variety of wage levels in reality.
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(vii) The Human Capital under Uncertainty Approach 
In its simplest form human capital models do not usually assume that risks are 
involved in the investment. It goes without saying, however, that the risk 
element is the important factor in anyone's educational decision making. There 
are two types of risks in human capital investment. One is the risk involved in 
how well the investment programme goes. And the other is how well the prod­
uct i.e. labour after human capital investment, will be valued in the labour 
market.
Levhari & Weiss (1974) define the two types of risk or uncertainty — input 
uncertainty and output uncertainty. The former is due to uncertainty about one's 
own ability to follow the education or about the quality of the education. The 
latter refers to uncertainty about future supply and demand conditions in the 
labour market. Their theoretical work concludes among other things that; (i) the 
optimal level of educational investment is higher for a higher level of inherited 
wealth, (ii) the increase in the degree of uncertainty reduces the investment, but 
(iii) the effect of the level of interest rate on the investment level is ambiguous 
in fact this depends on whether the investor is a net borrower or net lender.
One of the empirical works on the human capital investment with uncertainty is 
given in 01 son,White & Shefrin (1979). They examine the degree of income 
variation in relation to the attributes of workers such as years of schooling. For 
those potential students, a large income variation in the future given a certain 
level of education means a high degree of uncertainty for receiving that level of 
education. They conclude, 'Our empirical results indicate that college should be
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taken as a package or not at all, due to the large positive effect of the fourth year 
of college', as income variation for those with less than four full years of college 
education is found to be larger than those with the full four years.
This approach is much more realistic than the human capital approach de­
scribed earlier, as the risks in human capital investment are taken into consider­
ation. However, the approach does not go beyond the analysis of labour supply. 
As for our principal interest lies in the wage determination mechanism and in 
particular the wage differential mechanism, we need to look more into the 
interaction of supply and demand.
(viii) The Screening/Signalling Approach
Educational achievement may be used by firms to "screen" the heterogeneous 
labour force, when the firms do not have information about productivity of each 
individual worker. With an assumption that a worker with higher productivity 
does better in education also, a higher educational achievement implies a higher 
wage. Contrast this with the human capital theory — educational achievement 
as a screening device merely raises one's earnings relative to others' without 
raising productivity, while if it is human capital investment it would raise the 
earnings through an increase in productivity. (Note here that they both imply a 
positive relationship between educational achievement and earnings.) Stiglitz
(1975) shows that there may be multiple equilibria and an equilibrium with 
screening may be Pareto inferior to others, implying that such an equilibrium 
may not be socially desirable.
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Signalling is another term often used when a market is characterized by infor­
mational asymmetry. The distinction between signalling and screening is not 
exactly an established concept. To some it is the order of move that matters — it 
is screening if the uninformed player moves first and signalling if the informed 
player moves first. (See Rasmusen (1989), Stiglitz & Weiss (1994)). To others 
such as Kreps (1990) the situation is defined as screening if the uninformed side 
proposes a menu of contracts among which the informed side selects, while it 
would be signalling if informed side takes the active role. Here we avoid the 
discussion to be too technical and merely mention that in a labour market the 
workers i.e. the informed players, obtain education to signal, while the firms i.e. 
the uninformed players, use the education to screen. Signalling may be also 
used in a more general sense to describe the informational equilibrium, since the 
introduction of the term by Spence (1973).
A firm may attempt to acquire information on worker's productive ability 
using a "self-selection" device upon their application. A self-selection device is 
a scheme that causes the worker to reveal truthful information about oneself. 
Such a device may be an application fee (See Guasch & Weiss (1981)), a wage 
schedule contingent upon a test result (See Guasch & Weiss (1980)), or the both 
and a test with a cutoff level (See Guasch & Weiss (1982)). One of the earlier 
discussions on the self-selection mechanism was presented by Rothschild & 
Stiglitz (1976). They modelled the imperfect information in an insurance 
market. An insurance firm offers a set of contracts to heterogeneous customers.
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The equilibrium may be characterized as a pooling equilibrium in which custom­
ers all buy the same contract or as a separating equilibrium in which different 
customers buy different contracts or there may not be an equilibrium at all.
This idea is also used in the field of labour economics when, for example, the 
firm does not know the productive ability of each worker drawn form a heter­
ogeneous labour force. A pooling equilibrium would be the equilibrium in 
which all the workers are paid the uniform wage, while a separating equilibrium 
is characterized by wage differentials based on the heterogeneity of the workers. 
(See Chapter IV, in which the argument is employed to derive a condition for 
the uniform wage system of payment.)
This approach explicitly analyses the consequences of imperfect information, 
while such was not explicitly taken into consideration with the model of a 
heterogeneous labour market described earlier in this chapter such as those of 
the job matching approach. It is also worth mentioning that this approach 
explicitly examines the robustness of an equilibrium. My objection to this 
approach are two-fold. Firstly, the analysis has become quite technical as more 
emphasis is placed on the nature of equilibrium. And it is doubtful that the 
suggested set of contracts is actually implementable in the real world — in 
reality such detailed and explicitly stated contracts are quite rare. That is proba­
bly because such a system of employment contract can be extremely complex 
and thus costly and time consuming to create and implement in the real world of 
high degree of worker's heterogeneity. Secondly, firms might be more interest­
ed in devoting time for training the workers to perform the job rather than for
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selecting the optimal workers. This is consistent with the basic concept of OJT, 
as described in Thurow (1975).
(ix) The Job Matching under Uncertainty Approach
Here heterogeneity is assumed on the both sides of the market. The firms do 
not possess information on the productivity of each worker as in the models 
discussed earlier on in this chapter. What makes this approach different is the 
assumption that the workers' productivity depends on the job, or, to put it differ­
ently, there are better matching and worse matching of workers and firms. The 
main result is that as long as there are no workers who have an absolute advan­
tage in all jobs, accurate information is beneficial. (See MacDonald (1980)) 
Jovanovic (1979) relates job matching and turnover in such a way that higher 
productivity generating job matching tends to give a lower turnover rate. With 
this approach, the emphasis lies on seeking the most efficient matching possible 
within this framework. Consequently, as the production function takes the 
simplest form, how wages are determined is not the main issue in this approach.
The main difficulty with job matching models in general lies in the treatment 
of heterogeneities. The more sophisticated we assume the heterogeneity to be, 
the more complicated the operation of the model will be. If the uncertainty is 
further assumed, its analysis would be extremely complicated.
(3) Training Models of a Labour Market
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So far we have been assuming the labour market as a market for trained labour 
so that the newly recruited workers can fully participate in the production right 
away. However, many dispute this proposition and argue that labour needs 
further adjustment to perform the required job. They maintain that training of a 
worker exits as a process of human capital formation which continues through­
out one’s working life and put much more emphasis on the nature of training 
than on the supply and demand interaction of the labour market. This section is 
intended to introduce the basic concepts as well as theoretical models and 
empirical evidence of training.
Training is an investment in human capital in the same way as education is. 
Thus, the more training one receives the more productive he will be. The 
obvious difference between the two is that training is usually given after the 
labour contract is agreed while education takes place before the employment. 
More importantly, training is more purpose-specific in a sense that a worker 
usually receives training with some specific job in mind while education tends 
to serve for a more general purpose. Training may be categorized into “off-the- 
job”, which is given to workers when they are not engaged in production, and 
“on-the-job”, which is said to take place alongside the production. Much empha­
sis is given to this latter type of training for at least two reasons. Firstly, many 
labour economists, for example Becker (1964), believe that the best training is 
“leaming-by-doing,” or “leaming-through-experience,” in a sense that although 
theories may be taught at school, practice is best acquired at the workplace. 
Secondly, this idea of leaming-by-doing helps to explains the observed upward-
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sloping wage profile — one’s wage rises by experience because productivity 
increases through this learning-by-doing.
On of the early works on the economic analysis of training was Becker (1964). 
He argued that there are two types of OJT; general and specific. General train­
ing increases the productivity of the trainee at the training firm and at any other 
firm to exactly the same extent, while specific training does not raise the train­
ee’s productivity except in the training firm. Becker (1964) illustrated his 
argument by referring to various types of training given to military officers in 
the U.S. At one end of the spectrum learning how to fly an aircraft is fully 
general training since the skill can be used in the civilian sector. The author 
referred to the fact that “well over 90% of the U.S. commercial airline pilots 
received much of their training in the armed force.” On the other hand, if one is 
trained to be an astronaut, a fighter pilot or a missile man, there is not much that 
he can do to increase his productivity in the civilian sector and this would be a 
fully specific training. In general, however, the most types of training have both 
aspects. He then argued that the cost of general training is bom by the trainee, 
since it is an investment that the training firm can not secure its return. His 
argument for the cost of specific training is that it would be shared by both 
parties as they both try to take a precautionary step to a possible turnover — the 
firm would fail to capture the return if the worker quits and the worker fails to 
capture the return if he is fired.
A more explicit argument on the incidence of specific training cost is found in
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the transactions cost model of Hashimoto (1981). When there exist some values 
that the both the firm and the worker can not agree costlessly, such as the value 
of the marginal product of the worker in the training firm or in the alternative 
firm, a positive transactions cost is said to exist. This in turn could cause the 
separation of the worker and the firm, even if this means making the both worse 
off. And in such a case the cost of as well as the return to the specific training 
are likely to be shared. Katz & Ziderman (1990) questioned the Beckerian 
preposition on the incidence of general training cost. Their argument is that due 
to an informational asymmetry between a training firm and a recruiting firm 
about the extent and the type of the training the latter does not value the worker 
as high as the former and this discourages the trainee to pay for the general 
training. The interesting point in their argument is that the distinction between 
general and specific training lies greatly on the informational asymmetry rather 
than the actual nature of the training.
Stevens (1994) also reconsidered the Beckerian classification of general vs. 
specific OJT, of which most types of training are said to be combinations of the 
two with differing degrees. Her argument is that while specific training is 
useful to the training firm alone, which corresponds to pure monopsony, and 
general training is useful to all the firms, which corresponds to perfect competi­
tion, other types of training are useful to some firms, which corresponds to the 
imperfect competition. In this last case, the training is defined as “transferable” 
and the firm may finance it, as they hold monopsonic power to capture the 
return to the training. And this explains the observation that firms pay for
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training even if it does not appear to be specific — it is then transferable rather 
than general. Stevens( 1994c) points out that there could be two types of inef­
ficiency when a firm provides training to workers. As in Stevens( 1994b), she 
defines training as transferable and argues that the imperfect competition among 
the firms in the labour market causes inefficiency while the information asym­
metry concerning the value of the trained worker also causes an allocation 
inefficiency. With a simple example of two firms and one worker, she suggests 
that the inefficiency may be reduced if the participants of the market follow a 
labour contract in which firms set a wage offer after the training is completed as 
opposed to contracts with a predetermined wage or in which a worker sets the 
wage.
Specificity of training is also questioned by Acemoglu (1997). He argues that 
a large portion of the investment in training in Japan and Germany, where the 
level of training is high, is general rather than firm-specific and yet it is fi­
nanced by the training firm rather than by the workers. In his model, workers 
and firms have costly search to find a partner, or the labour market is said to be 
‘frictional’ as opposed to a frictionless competitive market. Then some of the 
return to training is captured by the future employer firm rather than by the 
training firm or the worker and this causes underinvestment of the training. As 
for the reason why the training firm pays for the general training, he explains 
that this costly search allows the training firm to capture some of the return to 
the training and thus it does not lose by financing the general training. Put it 
differently, the general training becomes specific to the extent that the workers
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can not costly change the employer because of the friction. He further argues 
that the workers would invest in their skills and accept to receive a low wage 
today to receive a higher wage tomorrow if the firms are more willing to in­
novate, since innovations raises their return to training. Turnover also is ex­
plained within the framework of general training rather than specific training in 
his model.
A few training models have also been developed by those who consider that 
labour markets are essentially markets for training. The job competition model 
of Thurow (1976) was mentioned in Chapter I as one of these approaches. 
Ishikawa (1981) constructed a model of dual labour market, in which he offered 
a generalization of Thurow’s job competition. He pointed out that the “ed­
ucational paradox” of the 60’s and 70’s U.S., the occurrence that education 
functioned neither as human capital nor screening — a general increase in the 
educational level of the nation did not affect the size distribution of income 
significantly, can be explained by characterizing the U.S. labour market as a job 
competition model. Here the emphasis of the analysis is on the macroeconomic 
dynamics of the labour market rather than how a particular training scheme 
affect the equilibrium of a labour market. Bosworth, Wilson & Assefa (1993) 
argued that the employment relationship between a worker and a firm is a 
dynamic relationship through which continuous investment on labour is made in 
the form of training. Thus we may talk of a “market for training” rather than a 
market for trained labour, in which the extent and nature of the training activity 
to be given to workers are determined from the demand for and supply of
trained individuals. They offer the general direction in the labour market anal­
ysis — a dynamic model of a market for training is necessary to understand 
training investment behaviour, but fail to offer a specific model.
A more rigorous and theoretical model is found in Felli & Harris(1996), who 
introduces a dynamic model of training behaviour with specific training generat­
ing an upward-sloping wage profile. Every wage along the equilibrium wage 
profile consists of three components — the opportunity wage, a premium reflect­
ing what the worker would have accumulated if he was in the alternative job, 
and a reduction reflecting what the worker would have lost if he was in the 
alternative job. It is shown that along the time path the wage rises, implying 
that there are positive returns to tenure i.e. the wage profile is upward-sloping. 
The intuition behind this result is that the human capital is interpreted as infor­
mation and thus accumulates over time, causing the value of the specific human 
capital i.e. wage to rise along the time path.
Salop (1979) offered a unique model of training within the efficiency wage 
framework. Although it was introduced in Chapter I as a turnover model, I 
mention it again as it is also one of the well-known training model. His workers 
are required to be trained at the initial period, while their turnover rate is neg­
atively related to the wage offer. Thus the higher wage implies a group of 
workers with a generally lower incentive to quit and this means a less number of 
new workers to train and so a lower training cost to the training firm. As a 
result there exists a wage that maximizes that profit, as opposed to a usual profit
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maximizing problem in which the wage is exogeneously given. Salop (1979) 
assumed the training cost is paid by the training firm and there is no explicit 
discussion about the incidence as in Becker (1964), Hashimoto (1981), Katz & 
Ziderman (1990) or Stevens (1994). The incidence of training cost is discussed 
in Salop & Salop (1976) within a basically same framework as in Salop 
(1979)’s. But with the cost of training invariant across workers, the detailed 
analysis on how the training cost could affect the equilibrium of the labour 
market is not given in either of them.
A list of empirical works on the training issue is far more extensive than that 
of the theoretical counterpart illustrated above. The type of training varies 
between on-the-job and off-the-job, formal and informal, privately given and 
publicly given, or general and specific, but the most of these empirical investiga­
tions focus on the two issues, the upward-sloping wage profile or positive return 
to tenure, and the job mobility or turnover. Recall the Beckerian classification 
of general and specific training. If training is general, the worker pays for the 
training to acquire higher productivity after the training to earn a wage increase. 
As a result, we observe an upward-sloping wage profile. If, on the other hand, 
the training is specific, the wage profile can still be upward-sloping but not for 
the productivity increase. In this case, such a wage profile is set by the training 
firm to keep the trainee after the training, as the trained worker has added 
productivity for the training firm while the trained worker has no merit to stay 
on. With the specific training, the turnover is said to decrease for the same 
reason — the longer the worker stays in the firm the greater his productivity
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contribution will be and thus the firm makes more effort to keep him.
Barron, Black & Loewenstein (1989) examined the U.S. survey on the OJT 
activities in 1982 and observed that “on average a new worker spends over 150 
hours in OJT during the first three months of employment.” They suggested 
with the same data that there is a direct relation between the level of training 
and productivity growth and that at least a half of training is specific because 
about a half of the returns to training is received by a worker. A word of cau­
tion is found in Ashenfelter & Card (1985) for dealing with actual data to esti­
mate the effect of training programme on earnings. Using the U.S. data of the 
Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, they estimated the wage return to 
training of the Comprehensive Employment Act training programme. The 
results were in general supportive of the positive effect of training. However, it 
was pointed out that those who received the training tended to have a low 
income in the period immediately before the programme — in fact, it is not 
surprising since the progremme was geared towards those in most need, and 
thus had to be corrected against the overestimation .
Clearly, not everyone in the society receives the training, or to the same extent 
even if they receive one. The recipients of training are described in Greenhalgh 
& Stewart (1987), Altonji & Spletzer (1991), and Booth (1991). In Greenhalgh 
& Stewart (1987), the British data of the National Training Survey was used to 
show who received training. They found that in general women receive signif­
icantly less full-time training than men, and more specifically the higher oc-
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cupational status means more full-time training for men and single women 
while for married women the higher status implies more evening training. One 
more interesting finding is that the acquired skills depreciates within about a 
decade. Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class 
of 1972 was used in Altonji & Spletzer (1991) to show the link between work­
ers’ characteristics and the levels of training. They found, for example, that 
women receive less training but happen to pay more than men and that blacks 
receive more training than whites. The gender difference in the provision of 
training is also pointed out in Booth (1991), who uses the British Social At­
titudes Survey of 1987. She finds that the women are less likely to receive 
formal training than men of the identical characteristics. Her findings also show 
that the levels of general education and training offered are complementary and 
that public sector is more likely to offer training than private sector.
Studies in the British apprenticeship were conducted by Booth & Satchell
(1994), Chapman (1993), and Stevens (1994d). Their common concern was the 
decline of the number of apprenticeships particularly in the 1980’s. Booth & 
Satchell (1994) shows that those with higher educational achievement, with 
higher employment status of the father, and who work in large firms, are more 
likely to receive apprenticeships. And on the whole the completion of the 
apprenticeship makes both workers and firms favour continuing employment 
relation. Chapman (1993) offered the evidence of training schemes in the U.K. 
For example, in the late 1980’s between a quarter to a third of all 16-18years old 
received some training scheme such as the Youth Training Scheme or apprentic-
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es, although an international comparison shows the U.K. has a relatively large 
number of workers receiving no training or training of very low quality. He 
also suggested that the problem of employers poaching trained workers is cased 
by training firms having no property right over the human capital of the trained 
workers. And this in turn weakens their incentive to pay for the training and 
thus might have been the cause of the insufficient level of training observed in 
U.K. Stevens (1994d) searched the reasons for the decline using an investment 
model. Skilled labour may be acquired either by training workers or by recruit­
ing already skilled workers. She concluded that the hue drop in the apprentice­
ships in 89’s Britain was the result of a high interest rate and relaxed supply 
condition of skilled labour in the external labour market.
Two main topics of empirical work in the training models are the estimations 
of upward-sloping wage slope and the negative relationship between the level 
of training and the turnover, as mentioned earlier. Both Topel (1991) and 
Mincer (1993) use the U.S. longitudinal data of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. Topel (1993) attempts to eliminate some sources of bias when 
estimating the wage and seniority relationship. For example, abler persons may 
be less mobile and thus the wage rises with seniority not because of the ac­
cumulation of the human capital but because they are simply more productive. 
After adjusting for several sources of bias, he confirms that there is a strong 
positive relationship between wage and seniority — 10 years of job seniority 
raises the wage by over 25%. Mincer (1993) gives the rate of return to training, 
which is larger than the return to schooling suggesting the relative underinvest-
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ment in training, and the total annual costs of job training in the economy, 
which adds up to a half of the costs of school education for 1976. Bartel (1992) 
looks at a large manufacturing company and its professional employees. The 
training programmes are categorized into ‘Core Programme’ to improve super­
vising skills, ‘Corporate Employee Development’ to improve general working 
skills such as problem solving and oral and written communication, and ‘Other 
Programmes’ which are more specific to the skill. Their rate of return are 
calculated as 25%, 17%, and 13% respectively. She also introduced a ‘job 
performance’ as a dependent variable in the estimation and found that it is 
improved by training. In Lynch (1990) formal training in U.S. is found to be 
specific and the wage is raised only in the training firm and not in any subse­
quent firm.
On labour turnover and training, Lynch (1991) examined the socioeconomic 
factors influencing the turnover among women using the U.S. data of the Nation­
al Longitudinal Survey Youth and found the probability of leaving job to be low 
and significant for those who have received the training. This conclusion is 
supported by Elias (1994), who found that employer-provided formal training 
has a negative effect on the turnover for both male and female. However, his 
estimates are significant for women but not for men. Levine (1993) presents a 
rather controversial result. With the U.S. and Japanese data obtained form 
surveys of manufacturing establishments, he found no evidence of training 
generating an upward-sloping wage profile or lowering the turnover. Thus he 
concludes that the data are not supportive of human capital theory and the
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specificity of the training in particular in explaining the mechanism of training.
An extensive international comparison on training is found in Shackleton
(1995). The comparison is made among the U.S., the U.K., Germany and 
France. Young people in the U.S. tend to receive job-related vocational training 
in a typically private full-time institution rather than at the job entry. And 
employer-provided training tends to be focused on white-collar, better educated, 
established workers. On the whole, the amount of training appears to be insuf­
ficient. In the U.K. educational institutions tend to provide academic rather 
than vocational education, and the employers are not the major providers of 
training either. He thus followed Chapman (1993)’s argument that the workers 
receive insufficient levels of training in the U.K. and suggested that the training 
system in the U.K. has to be reformed to reflect the need of the labour market, 
have more direct involvement of employers, and to offer more vocational qual­
ifications and skills. In the continental Europe, the governments play a more 
active role than the American or British counterparts. Germany offers a “dual 
system”, in which an apprentice is to receive firm-based training to learn gener­
al work skills and knowledge as well as college-based education to learn general 
education and theoretical basis for occupational practice. In France, initial 
vocational education is the responsibility of the government and is offered at 
schools, while training is the responsibility of employers. And the government 
support the both via levies and taxes. On the whole, however, the recent trend 
is, according to him, that training is receiving much greater attention than 
before. Shackleton (1995) pointed out that the Japanese economic success is
often explain by a high level of educational achievement of the students and a 
high degree of vocational training provided by employers. Training to that 
extent is made possible because of Japan’s well-developed system of internal 
labour market, which often leads to the life-time employment. However, he is 
rather sceptical about introducing the Japanese system of training, as it is large­
ly based on the idiosyncratic nature of the Japanese society and is not easily 
transferable to other countries.
To Higuchi & Mincer (1988) the observed intensity of human capital forma­
tion though training of largely firm-specific skills in Japan is caused by the 
necessity of the firm as well as workers to cope with her rapid technological 
changes. Carmichael & MacLeod (1993) argued that a cooperation of rather 
than a resistance by workers when a firm faces technical changes is a major 
reason for the success of Japanese firms and they attribute this to the multi­
skilling of the Japanese workers. However, they do not see this as the unique 
feature of Japanese labour market but as some characteristics that may be found 
in the West at some point in time. Abe (1994) extends an adverse selection 
model of Greenwald (1986) to explain the observation that labour mobility is 
higher in the U.S. than in Japan. The main argument is that the relatively low 
labour turnover in Japan is the result of rather thin external labour market, as 
this helps to develop the internal labour market and the lifetime employment. 
Hence, the American and Japanese outcomes are interpreted as outcomes of 
multiple equilibria of the same system. It might be necessary, however, for the 
author to show the reason why the external labour market is thinner in Japan
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than in the U.S. in the first place.
Somewhat more descriptive but extensive analysis on the importance of OJT 
was discussed in Koike (1991). He pointed out that a quite extended OJT is 
given to newly recruited workers at large-sized firms in the U.S. as well as in 
Japan — this was contrary to a general belief by labour economists in Japan that 
Japan has a well-organized internal labour market while the market is largely 
external in the U.S. Rather, the difference between the two countries is the 
extent of on-the-job in that Japanese firms offer a wide range of working experi­
ence while it is much narrower for American firms. This wide range of working 
experience complements with a long-term employment, lifetime employment 
being the longest, through which what he called a “career formation” takes 
place. The employees acquire largely firm-specific skills through this process 
in terms of recruitment, placement, OJT, promotion and transfer. Furthermore, 
according to Koike (1991) the training is more likely to be on-the-job rather 
than off-the-job for three reasons — (i) OJT is cheaper than off-the-job, (ii) OJT 
can adjust more easily to the need of each individual trainee, and (iii) OJT fits 
better for trainees to acquire what Koike calls “tacit knowledge.” The wide 
range of working skills may be less important for smaller firms. But Koike 
(1191) pointed that such a career formation does take place in the medium- and 
small-sized firms in Japan, though it is to a lesser extent.
(4) Towards the Training Model of Heterogeneous Labour 
The investigation into a wage determination mechanism in the present work
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was started by presenting some empirical observations that seem inconsistent 
with the neo-classical framework such as a uniformity of wage and firm's 
preference about certain workers. To develop any model to investigate such a 
mechanism, it seems essential to assume heterogeneity of labour and this will 
create the informational asymmetry about the heterogeneity. This rules out the 
approaches such as the income distribution approach, the human capital ap­
proach, the statistical/mathematical approach, the job matching approach, the 
implicit contract approach, and the human capital with uncertainty approach, as 
the heterogeneity of labour is not a necessary assumption for these approaches. 
Of course, it is not to deny that they can incorporate an element of heterogeneity 
but such an attempt will make the model unnecessarily complicated, which in 
turn could obscure the main argument. The signalling/screening approach and 
the job matching with uncertainly approach do take these issues into consider­
ation. However, the analyses can get rather technical and less intuitive. The 
institutional approach offers an interesting attempt to formalize those somewhat 
“informal” i.e. historical, institutional or qualitative phenomena in labour mar­
kets. The main weakness of this approach is, as pointed out earlier, that its 
rather descriptive presentation makes it difficult to prove right or wrong and in 
particular it fails to point out theoretically how the system has come into exist­
ence in the first place.
The training models, by contrast, give a rather different view of labour market. 
They see an employment contract as a relatively long-term relationship between 
a contracting firm and a worker. In particular, it introduces a dynamic element
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to the operation of labour market. As discussed in Chapter I, the efficiency 
wage approach does not only assume the heterogeneity of labour and the infor­
mational imperfection resulting from it, but also it offers an explanation as to 
how an offer wage is determined and in particular how it could be affected by 
the market interaction of demand for and supply of labour. It also maintains an 
intuitive appeal, for example, in the concept of adverse selection. Indeed the 
training model of heterogeneous labour as presented in Chapter I was developed 
along the line of formalizing the job competition theory of Thurow (1975) 
what this intriguing model by Thurow missed out was to offer an explanation as 
to how the wage was determined in the first place. Thus what is presented here 
is a synthesis of the intuitively appealing aspects of the institutional approach 
and the theoretical rigour of other approaches without losing a simplicity of a 
model.
In this chapter we have established the following:
Firstly, various approaches to explain the wage determination mechanism were 
presented in a manner of an overall view of the subject, in which they were 
categorized in terms of the particular aspect of the wage determination mech­
anism that each approach is focused on — the wage level, the wage differentials 
and the wage/income distribution. The approaches range in their style from a 
socioeconomic type i.e. the institutional approach, which emphasizes the impor­
tance of the social structure in determining the wages, through various econom­
ic types to quantitative types i.e. the mathematical/statistical approach, which
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offers highly theoretical models.
Secondly, the approaches were grouped into the “perfect information” group 
and the “imperfect information” group and the basic features of each approach 
were briefly analyzed and the limitations discussed in turn. The main limitation 
of the approaches with an emphasis on the wage level is to leave out the discus­
sions on the cause of wage differentials. And those with an emphasis on the 
wage differentials tend to leave out the discussions on the market interactions, 
while the distributional approaches tend to leave out the explanation for the way 
in which the wages are determined in the first place.
Thirdly, various training models were introduced. They put more emphasis on 
the way the human capital is formed through training rather than the timeless 
interaction of supply and demand of labour market. At the same time the empir­
ical works show that training indeed plays a very important role in the employ­
ment.
Finally, the reasons for employing the training model of heterogeneous labour 
were given. Our model as illustrated in Chapter I contains intuitively appealing 
feature of the institutional approach, such as Thurow’s job competition, and at 
the same time the wage is determined by the supply and demand interaction in 
the labour market. And furthermore it considers the labour market as a market 
for training, in which human capital formation takes place over a period of time.
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CHAPTER I I I : THE MODEL
This chapter presents formally the model of a labour market suggested at the 
end of Chapter I. But before the formal presentation, a brief outline of the 
model may be useful. The firms are assumed to be homogeneous and maximize 
profit. They are engaged in a production process consisting of training of 
workers as well .as production. As the workers receive training during the 
production, it is best described as on-the-job training. The profit of a firm is 
defined as the revenue minus labour cost consisting of wage cost as well as 
training cost. The training cost may be actual cost or opportunity cost. An 
example of the former could be the money value of raw material wasted in the 
production process due to the incompetence of the trainees, while the money 
value of the difference between what the trainees have produced and what 
trained workers could have produced could be an example of the opportunity 
cost.
The training cost of a worker is a function of a , which means that the heter­
ogeneity of the workers is reflected in the cost of training them, and expressed 
by c(a). The heterogeneity of the workers also affects their productivity in the 
alternative sector and this in turn generates the reservation wage as a function of 
cc, i.e.w(a). Contrast this with the Weiss model or any of the efficiency wage 
models for that matter. For the efficiency wage models, the reservation wage 
and the productivity in the job are positively related because as Weiss (1980)
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assumes “the acceptance wages of workers are an increasing function of their 
productivity” and thus the workers possess all-round productive ability. Our 
present model, on the other hand, allows other conditions and can show that an 
adverse selection exists.
With the assumption of homogeneous firms, all firms have the same produc­
tion process, i.e. production as well as training, within one market. This assump­
tion will be relaxed in the later chapter when the firm becomes heterogeneous 
within one labour market. Rather, the different training cost functions reflect 
the characteristics of firms among different labour markets. As a consequence, 
the equilibrium outcome of a particular labour market is characterized to a large 
extent by the form of the firm’s training cost function. At the end of the train­
ing they will all become equally productive and require no more OJT. The 
heterogeneous workers also have different productivity in the alternative sector, 
and this is expressed by w(a), the reservation (or opportunity) wage. Initially, 
we do not impose c ’(a)<0, while by assumption w’(a)>0. And thus we are not 
restricting the model to a case of all-round productive ability as in the Weiss 
model.
The use of the concept of OJT in this model is based on the author's belief that 
wages in reality are related to job characteristics to which workers with certain 
characteristics are allotted — marginal productivity resides with each job and 
not with each worker, to use a phrase coined by Thurow (1975). The same type 
of argument appears in Manning (1994), in which he calls such a payment
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scheme as a "Company Wage Policy". This also implies the payment of a 
uniform wage, despite the heterogeneous productive ability among the workers. 
Equally important is its further implication that the cost of OJT does not incur 
directly to each worker in the form of wage differentials. And the OJT is as­
sumed to be "general" in Becker (1975)'s terminology. This set of issues i.e. the 
validity of uniform wage and the nature of OJT and its cost, receive an extended 
treatment in Chapter IV.
The model implicitly assumes that participating in the production process does 
increase one's productivity to match the level required by the job, while the 
workers' own characteristics may help to sort them into different labour mar­
kets. That is to say the efficiency wage models are pure screening models, in 
the sense that the hypothesis mainly deals with the way in which the issue of 
imperfect information is tackled, while the present model more appropriately, 
for analyzing the real world, that is, combines aspects of the screening model 
and the human capital (or the OJT model).
(1) Assumptions
(Workers)
W1 Workers are heterogeneous in ability with a single index a , which is
distributed according to a density function h(oc), where the range of a  is 
normalized, i.e. 0<oc<l s.t.
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H(a)= I h(z)dz and 0<H (a)^l 
J 0
W2 An acceptance or reservation wage of a worker, i.e. what he would be
paid in an alternative job, with an ability a  is w=w(a), where w’>0.
(Firms)
FI There is a large number of firms with an identical production process,
i.e. a process of training and production; with no free entry.
F2 The production function y(x) is solely a function of the number of work­
ers, and hence independent of the heterogeneity of the labour force. And 
y'>0 and y"<0.
F3 The firms are price takers in a competitive market for their products and
are competitive in the labour market, where their competitiveness in the 
latter means they compete using a wage offer w, and a volume of the 
input x, in maximizing their profit. (This definition of competitiveness is 
also employed in Stiglitz & Weiss (1981).)
(Training)
T1 The workers become identically productive, by attaining the skill, ir­
respective of their a 's, after requiring "On-the-Job Training (OJT)".
T2 The cost of the OJT, c, to attain the required job skill differs among the 
workers of different a 's  and it is expressed by a "Training Cost Func­
tion", c=c(a).
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(Information)
11 Every worker knows his own ability a  and opportunity wage w=w(a).
12 Every firm knows h(a), c(a) and w(a) given a , but is not able to distin­
guish one worker from another.
(Employment Contract)
El Employment contracts are negotiated in advance, last for one period and
specify a wage to be paid.
(2) The model
In this competitive labour market, as defined in F3, consider a representative 
firm which faces a proportion of the aggregate labour supply. Let us construct 
the supply of and demand for labour of the firm and then analyze the market 
equilibrium.
(a) The supply of labour 
Suppose there are n workers and m firms in the market. Then the supply of 
labour available to the firm, xs say, is expressed as,
(n/m)h(z)dz = xs(w) (III-D
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume m=n, i.e. each firm faces a "normal­
ized" potential labour supply. Note that since m and n are exogeneous to the
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model, and in particular m is fixed due to no free entry (cf. FI), there would be 
no loss of generality with this simplification.
This means in particular,
xs(w)=l when a(w )=l or equivalently w=w(l) (III-2)
xs(w)=0 when oc(w)=0 or equivalently w=w(0) (HI-3)
where a=a(w ) is the inverse of w=w(a), which exists by w'>0 (cf. W2). And 
note that xs(w)>0 is a cumulative function. (See Fig.III-1 for how the supply 
curve is constructed from w=w(a) and h(a))
w(a) h(a)w(a)
0
(a) (b)
Fig.III-1
(b) The demand for labour
In constructing the demand function, note that a uniform wage is offered to the
workers of the heterogeneous ability since they are observationally indistinguish-
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able. (For more extensive arguments on the uniformity of the wage, see Chapter 
VI)
Being competitive, a firm can not control the supply quality of labour it faces 
by varying the wage. However, it can control the quality by varying the wage 
as it knows w(a), c(a), and h(a). Namely, the firm knows that a change in 
wage affects the expected training cost c(a) through a change in the maximum 
ability available.
And we can see that c ’(cc)<0 is a sufficient and not necessary condition for 
dc(a)
- —7T -0- We will assume c’(a)<0 from here, emphasizing that it is not a 
dw(a)
necessary condition for the model, as in the Weiss model. Therefore,
T3 c’(a)<0 V0<a<l
The firm is to maximize expected profit n  with respect to w and xd, the demand
i.e. dc(oQ _dc(q) d a  
dw(a) d a  dw(a)
where c(a)=
h(a) I [c(a)-c(z)]h(z)dz
(HI-5)
[H(<x)]2w'(<x)
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for labour, or equivalently a and xd, where
7C= py(xd)-c(a)xd-w(a)xd (III-6)
It should be noted that the difference between choosing (w,xd) and (a ,xd) as the 
variables to maximize n  is a practical one. In theory, w and c are functions of a  
so that it would be more appropriate to use a  and xd. In practice, however, 
workers and firms are more likely to negotiate with w rather than with a . One 
reason is that even if a worker is endowed with a certain a , a firm may not 
accept it and in such a case the agreement is difficult to reach about the ability 
endowment between the two. If they negotiate with w, on the other hand, there 
is no ambiguity about w.
Here for an analytical purpose, we employ (oc,xd) instead of (w,xd). Then the 
first order conditions give us
py'(xd)=c(a)+w(a) (III-7)
c'(oc)+w'(a)=0 (III-8)
It shows that a  may be determined independently from (III-8), which then can 
be substituted into (III-7) to obtain xd. Note that (III-7) resembles a convention­
al demand function of a price-taking firm, since by rearranging it will give us,
w(a)=py'(xd)-c(a) (III-9)
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i.e. wage = net marginal productivity
We can call this a 'Conditional Demand Function', being conditional on the 
value of a , which was determined in (III-8) independently of this function. This 
implies that in the present model through a wage offer the firm can control the 
average quality of labour, expressed by c(a) through a(w) and then determine 
the demand for labour. However, there is no guarantee that it can secure xd by 
the definition of competitiveness as we have not taken the supply condition into 
consideration so far.
Similarly, (III-7) may be interpreted as,
w(a)+c( a)= py'(xd) (III-10)
i.e. labour cost per worker= marginal productivity
Determining the optimal value of a  independently of (III-7) and thus of xd, 
(III-8) states that at the margin a change in the wage rate and a change in the 
average training cost due to a small change in a  offset each other.
Differentiating the profit equation once more, we obtain;
d2n d2n
dxd2 dx^a
d2n d2n
dadxd d a 2
py»(xd) _{w»( oc)+c'( a)}
-{w'( oc)+c'( a)} -xd{w"(a)+c"(a)}
(III-ll)
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so the solution is indeed a local minimum if and only if
y"(xd)<0 (III-12)
y^x 'X w ’XaJ+c’XocWx^wXaJ+cXa)}2^  (HI-13)
The above conditions are satisfied if w”(oc)+c”(oc)> 0  and xd>0, since y"<0 from 
F2 and w ,(oc)+c’(ot)> 0 at the optimum . For the moment, let us assume that 
w”(oc)+c”(oc)>0 holds. And define w (a)+c(a)=¥(a) as 'Average Labour cost 
Function' and its derivative ¥'(oc) as an 'Optimal Wage Function', since when it 
is equated to zero this function gives us the profit maximizing wage, ¥'(00 is 
the marginal cost per worker of employing a group of workers with a slightly 
higher a , which is the sum of (i) the extra cost of raising the wage to attract the 
slightly better workers and (ii) the benefit from the resulting lower expected 
training cost.
Therefore, at some a ,
(i) If ¥ '(a)> 0 , it is cheaper to employ a group of workers whose upper 
bound ability is less than a .
(ii) If ¥ (a )< 0 , it is cheaper to employ a group of workers whose upper 
bound ability is more than a .
(iii) If ¥'(00=0, it is the cheapest to employ the group whose upper bound 
ability is exactly a
In practice, it is not surprising if the firm through experiences knows this
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function ^'(oc) directly instead of h(a) and c(a) in detail to construct it as 
assumed in 12. Redefine the conditional demand function in a wage- 
employment space, i.e. w=py'(xd)-c(a(w)) and write it as O(xd,w)=0. Dif­
ferentiating totally, we obtain
dw/dxd=py’7(l+c’a ,)=py”w7l /^, (111-14)
The two first order conditions are illustrated diagrammatically below in 
Fig.III-2, when xF(a) has a unique minimum as an interior solution. Note that at 
'FCa^O, i.e. when one of the first order conditions is met, the conditional 
demand function: O(xd,w)=0, becomes vertical. The conditional demand func­
tion is also backward-bending when 'R(a) is convex in a  with xd achieving the 
maximum at xd* as illustrated in Fig.III-2(a), in which a*  corresponds to xd* 
through w*=w(a*)
w*=
w(a*)
a
r*
(a) Average labour cost function (b) Conditional demand function
Fig.III-2
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So far we have assumed xF”(oc)>0 in order to derive these results. The techni­
cal reason is that given that the optimal a  exists s.t. lF,(oc)=0, ^ ( a ) > 0  ensures 
that it is indeed the minimum. But what is the economic argument for 'F ”(oc)= 
w”(oc)+c”(a)>0. Let us examine the two functions separately. As for the 
reservation wage w(a), it is difficult to determine the sign of the second deriv­
ative on a purely theoretical ground. Then, given w’(oc)>0, a linear function 
would be the best approximation, i.e. w”(oc)=0. On an empirical ground, howev­
er, we may refer to the Pigou paradox that the normally distributed ability, 
which is a  in our model,, generates a skewedly distributed earnings, which is w 
in our model. This would mean w”(oc)>0, since the skewedness often described 
as lognormal requires that a=logw and thus w”(oc)>0. We do not want to be too 
optimistic about it, since the normally distributed ability is another controversial 
issue. However, we accept the both arguments and assume w”(oc)>0. As c(a) is 
a composite function of c(a) and h(a), they have to be treated separately. Giv­
en c’(ot)^0 it is reasonably to assume c”(a)>0, since this means an increase of a  
does not reduce c so much, as a  becomes larger. If h(a) is “bell-shaped”, 
c”(oc)>0 will be even more pronounced at higher values of oc, while at the low 
values c”(cx)>0 might be less pronounced. However, on the whole, because of 
c”(oc)>0, we assume c”(a)>0. Consequently, 'F ”(a)= w”(oc)+c”(a)>0. We 
might point out, however, that “w”(a)>0 and c”(a)>0” is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition.
Even if ^ /”(a)= w”(a)+c”(a)>0 does not hold , all is not lost. In such a case,
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as long as 'F(a) is a monotonic function, the solution may be found in a follow­
ing way.
(1) If T 'X a)^  V a, the optimal ability to minimize 'F (a) is Gfc=0
(2) If T'XaKO V a, the optimal ability to minimize TXa) is a?=l
(3) If T'Xa^O V a, the firm would be indifferent among the workers.
And in these cases the corresponding conditional demand function: O(xd,w)=0 
will be (1) downward sloping, (2) upward sloping or (3) vertical respectively.
This analysis shows that the adverse selection does not necessarily imply the 
existence of an optimal wage. Adverse selection in this model means a negative­
ly sloped c(a) for a positively sloped w(a) but this will not guarantee xF ’(cc)>0- 
In fact any of the above cases of the monotonic T^a) could result with the 
assumption of adverse selection. Hence, the shape of T^a) depends on the 
relative shapes of w (a) and c(a). In particular, note that the assumptions w’>0 
and c'<0 do not always guarantee the existence of a local minimum, i.e. the 
existence of an optimal wage, at which vF’(a)=0, while it does guarantee an 
existence of an adverse selection problem — adverse selection means a negative 
correlation between w and c in this model. Hence, in this model adverse selec­
tion does not necessarily imply an existence of a profit maximizing wage solely 
determined by each firm, as in the case of the efficiency wage models. Note 
also that the workers are not necessarily assumed to be all-round productive 
this would mean c’(a)>0. But what we assume here is c’(a)>0, the adverse 
selection condition and not c ’(oc)>0. Here the same logic as the numerical 
example of (1-8) should apply. Technically as there is no need to inverse c(a),
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we do not have to restrict this to a monotonic function.
Therefore, profit is maximized as long as the supply of labour is not binding, 
by employing xd* workers at w*, for whom the expected training cost is c(cc*) 
such that w*=w(a*). And this is equivalent to choosing a point on O(xd,w)=0 
with the largest xd. Consequently the firm's demand for labour is a "single 
point". In the conventional neo-classical competition, on the other hand, the 
demand schedule is a locus because along the demand curve n  monotonically 
increases with x.
(3) The equilibrium
Here we analyze the market equilibrium of the present model in comparison 
with a market equilibrium usually described in perfect competition with its 
agents acting as mere price-takers. It can be seen that our equilibrium, though 
competitive in its nature, does not always coincide with the market-clearing 
equilibrium of a perfect competition. The reason is that in our model the firm 
can obtain some information about the nature of the labour supply through an 
"adverse selection" mechanism.
With our definition of competitiveness, at the equilibrium the aggregate supply 
SL and demand DL would be
SL: Ns(w)=mxs(w)=nH(oc(w)) (III-15)
Dl : Nd(w) s.t. w+c(cx(w))=py,(Nd/m) (III-16)
where xs(w) is defined in (III-l).
For each firm the following holds at the market clearing equilibrium, where 
(w+, x \  a +=oc(w+)) is its solution.
xs(w)=H(a(w)) (111-17)
py'(xd)=w+c(a(w)) (III-18)
xd=xs (III-19)
On the other hand, let (w*, x*, a*) be the solution to the firm's profit max­
imizing problem, as derived in the previous sections. Then by our definition of 
competitiveness, the solution of the present competitive model (w**, N**, 
a**), where N**=mx** and cc**=oc(w**), is given by;
(I) if ^ '(oO^O, then (w**, N**, a**) = (w+, N+, a +)
(II) if T'XoOcO, then (w**, N**, a**) = (w*, N*, a*)
We can interpret this in the following way : If 'Ff(cx+)>0, the market clearing 
wage w (a+) is greater than the optimal wage w(oc*) so that at w(a*) the firm 
can not secure the desirable number of workers and there will be an excess 
demand, which will in turn raise the equilibrium wage as far as the market 
clearing wage. If, on the other hand, xF '(a+)<0, the market clearing wage is
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smaller than the optimal wage, causing an excess supply of labour at w(a*).
The same type of argument as in the efficiency wage models applies here to 
show that the wage will not fall to the market clearing level — namely, for firms 
there is no incentive to lower the wage as the profit is maximized at this wage 
and no worker would offer to work at a lower wage since this will merely single 
him out as a below-average worker. The situation is illustrated in Fig.III-3, 
where El and E2 indicate the market equilibria of the two cases and the equilib­
rium values are (wl+, N l+, a ,+) and (w*, N*, a*) respectively. And SI and S2 
are the supply of labour for the corresponding situations.
Ex.Supply
E2
(a) Average labour cost function (b) Two types of Equilibrium
Fig.III-3
Thus in (I) a market-clearing equilibrium occurs, while (II) implies an excess 
supply equilibrium. Which of the two cases the equilibrium turns out to be 
depends on the relative sizes of the supply and demand, which are in turn condi­
tional upon the behaviours of the functions; y(*), c(*), h(*) and w(»), as well as
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upon p. These function reflect the aspects of the market from different angles. 
While h(*) and w(«) reflect the characteristics of the society in which the eco­
nomic mechanism operates, y(*) and c(*) reflect the idiosyncratic nature of the 
production technology of the market and p that of a product market from which 
the labour demand is derived.
Fig.III-4 shows various equilibrium outcomes for different VF(*). In each 
figure the direction of arrows along the conditional demand function: O(xd,w)=0 
indicates higher profit and E's the equilibrium points. To see how ¥ (•)  affects 
the behaviour of <b(xd,w)=0, one may refer to (111-14): dw/dxd= py"w74/' Mar­
ket clearing occurs in (a) (b) (c) (d) and (f) corresponding to the equilibrium 
condition (I), while excess supply occurs in (e) and (g), corresponding to the 
equilibrium condition (II). (a) shows a demand function of homogeneous 
labour force in the sense that the labour cost of every worker is equivalent from 
the firm’s point of view. The equilibrium wage then becomes supply deter­
mined. (b) includes cases of both homogeneous labour force in the sense of 
perfect competition i.e. c=constant, and heterogeneous labour force i.e. c=c(a). 
Note that being expressed in this way the homogeneous case does not seem 
particularly different from other heterogeneous cases.
We might also mention another reason for a constant c(«) — it is possible that 
the firm does not have enough information to construct c(») even if the labour 
force is known to be heterogeneous, if the market is relatively new. In such a 
case, we might expect that market-clearing is a temporary outcome, since when
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and if more information on the heterogeneity is made known the equilibrium 
may be characterized by an excess supply as in (e). In other words, more 
information acquired by firms about the workers’ ability distribution means 
unemployment. As this is involuntary unemployment, it is not good news for 
the workers. However, as far as the firms are concerned, this does not imply 
inefficiency, since they are able to recruit workers with better quality with this 
information than otherwise.
With no information on supply quantity the aggregate demand price and 
quantity would be where the quantity is maximum along the conditional de­
mand function: O(xd,w)=0. In cases (a) (b) (c) and (f), this would means an 
excess demand at the initial value of w. This will have to be revised since the 
demand cannot be met and consequently each firm will have to raise its wage 
offer to attract more workers until supply and demand match, (d) also is charac­
terized by a market clearing equilibrium but its path to the equilibrium does not 
require a tatonnement process since the demanders' initial position already 
matches with the market clearing position.
On the other hand, in (e) and (g), excess supply would persist — there will be 
no tatonnement process, since supply is not binding at the aggregate demand 
price and hence this will be a market equilibrium. In (g), the equilibrium wage 
will be set at the acceptance wage of the best worker i.e. w=w(l). Furthermore,
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no single unemployed worker can increase his probability of obtaining a job, by 
reducing his acceptance wage i.e. by agreeing to reduce the economic rent, 
since this would merely result in indicating to the firms that his value to them is 
lower than the average worker's.
A level of the product demand expressed as a level of p affects the equilibrium 
through a shift in the conditional demand function. A rise in p shifts this func­
tion to the right, analogous to the case of perfect competition. In particular, 
when the average labour cost function: 'F(a) has a local minimum, as in (c) (d) 
and (e), a change in p could alter the nature of the equilibrium from excess 
supply to market clearing and vice versa. Thus these two types of equilibrium 
are compatible outcomes for a single market with firms of given characteristics. 
So the competitive equilibrium may be characterized as either market-clearing 
or excess-supply depending on the nature of the conditional demand function. 
And there are some markets which possess both features: the equilibrium that 
emerges depends on the level of the product demand.
In this chapter we have established the following :
Firstly, by introducing a heterogeneity in a , of which w and c are functions, 
the assumption of all-round productive ability — that a good worker is a good 
worker in all jobs — was relaxed. This helps to clarify that the assumption of 
all-rounder productive ability, i.e. w ’(0)>O, is not a critical condition as stated in
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Weiss (1980), for modelling an adverse selection mechanism. In our model, the 
equivalent assumption is c’(a)<0 and even if we do not assume this the model is 
not invalidated.
Secondly, the introduction of c(*) to reflect the heterogeneity among the work­
ers for training gives a set of first order conditions consistent with marginal 
productivity theory ( i.e. O(xd,w)=0: w(oc)+c(a)=py'(xs)) and with individual 
labour cost minimization (i.e. 4/'(a)=w'(oc)+ c '(a)= 0 ) (See Fig.III-2) Unlike in 
the efficiency wage models, this latter condition may not be satisfied for some 
form of c(a), in which case the optimal wage does not exists.
Thirdly, excess supply was shown to be consistent with competitive equilibri­
um. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the nature of production process i.e. 
the training cost function, c, influences the existence of excess supply in the 
same way as the product price does. It also showed that our competitive equilib­
rium sometimes coincides with the orthodox type of competitive equilibrium 
with market clearing feature.
Finally, recall that we have opted for this type of alternative models including 
the family of efficiency wage models to explain the existence of firm's prefer­
ence over workers. It might seem inconsistent that in our equilibrium, the 
selection of Nd workers out of Ns workers when the supply exceeds the demand 
at the equilibrium, is made at random, despite the firm's preference. But this is 
not because the firm's preference does not exist over the Ns workers but because
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the firm is unable to distinguish the workers once they have ’’self-selected". 
Thus, there is naturally a tendency for the firms to improve the recruitment 
process by some other measure of selection. As to the workers, those left out 
are likely to be unemployed rather than taking an alternative job, since a non­
negative economic rent is attached to the wage in the labour market, which 
cannot be found in the alternative job.
CHAPTER IV : THE VALIDITY OF THE UNIFORM WAGE
So far in our analysis, we have been assuming that the uniform wage would be 
paid to the workers of heterogeneous ability at the equilibrium. This is an 
assumption common to the family of efficiency wage models.
On one hand, in practice it is not rare to observe a payment of a uniform wage 
for performing an identical job even if the workers have different performance 
levels. One may counterargue that the payment is uniform since each worker 
would adjust his performance level so that the performance levels of all the 
workers are equalized. But if it were the case, then one would not observe the 
employer's preference among the potential workers, as pointed out at the begin­
ning of Chapter I. Weiss (1980) refers to some empirical finding that "within 
the same pay group there were very minor pay differences (among the workers)
 On the other hand, the output of the most productive worker was often
more than three times as great as the output of the least productive worker 
among fewer than 20 workers doing the same job with the same supervisor." In 
other words, common practice seems to support the assumption of a uniform 
payment to workers of different ability.
On the other hand, within the theoretical framework of a competitive analysis 
one may argue that there exists a non-uniform wage payment that is preferred 
by all the agents in the market and thus establishes itself as the equilibrium
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contracts. To see this, recall the equilibrium we described in Chapter III. At the 
equilibrium the workers of the ability range Q<a<a* were employed at 
w*=w(a*). Now if a new firm enters and offers to the workers of the highest 
ability among those attracted by w*, i.e. the workers with ability a* , a wage 
marginally above the market wage, w*+£, say, then those workers would be 
attracted by the offer and leave the existing firm. The new firm can do this 
without reducing the profit by reducing marginally, for example, the wage offer 
to the workers of the lowest ability, i.e. those with oc=0. For as long as there is 
an excess supply at the equilibrium, this can attract those workers with the 
lowest ability level. Thus this non-uniform contract is capable of disturbing the 
uniform wage equilibrium. Of course, in the efficiency wage models, such a 
possibility is usually ruled out with the assumption that the workers are indistin­
guishable. This suggests that the uniform wage equilibrium may be disturbed if 
some monitoring device is made available to distinguish the workers.
This chapter examines whether the uniform wage assumption has a theoretical­
ly sound underpinning consistent with a competitive market framework. In 
doing so, we will examine the arguments by Weiss (1980) and the arguments 
based on the nature of OJT and then employ the concept of a pooling equilibri­
um to verify the validity of the assumption.
(1) Possible Reasons for the Uniform Wage : the Weiss model
Weiss (1980) argues that there are several reasons why a firm may not offer,
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instead, wages proportionate to productivity. The most obvious reason accord­
ing to him is that the cost of precise information on the productivity of individu­
al workers may exceed its benefit. This seems to be a rather intuitively appeal­
ing argument. The paper, however, does not describe precise conditions under 
which acquiring the information is not worthwhile for the firm. In fact the 
natural extension of this line of argument is found in the literature on the infor­
mational equilibrium, where there is a monitoring device with a cost on heter­
ogeneous commodities in the market concerned. A large volume of works on 
this topic is found in the analysis of an insurance market, of which Stiglitz & 
Weiss (1976) is one offering a simple and yet clear argument. For the case of a 
labour market, we find this type of argument in, for example, Guasch & Weiss 
(1980) (1981) or (1982) or Clemenz (1986). In this chapter we will employ the 
type of argument employed in Clemenz (1986) to verify the validity of the 
uniform wage assumption.
Another reason for the uniform wage assumption in Weiss (1980) is that risk 
aversion on the part of workers induces a wage payment not proportionate to 
output or expected output at the equilibrium. The idea is that even if the produc­
tivity of each worker is known, it does not necessarily imply that the value of 
actual output can be known with certainty because of the demand uncertainty of 
the product. However, the issue of adverse selection is essentially concerned 
with asymmetric information between the firms and the workers, while output 
uncertainty generates imperfect information to the agents of the both sides of a 
labour market. Thus this argument does not depend directly on the heter-
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ogeneity of the work force as the fundamental assumption of our model and 
thus on the existence of the adverse selection in turn.
Weiss (1980) also argues that a payment proportionate to productivity or 
expected productivity may not be realized as this scheme can cause friction 
among workers, thereby lowering the morale of the workers. It needs to be 
pointed out, however, that the moral issue is a question of workers' incentives 
rather than of heterogeneous work force. While such a reasoning may be valid 
for the incentive models of the efficiency wage hypothesis, this argument is not 
appropriate here as the present model and the Weiss model alike are the adverse 
selection models of and not the incentive models of the efficiency wage hypothe­
sis.
(2) Uniform wage and OJT
According to Becker (1975), OJT may be either "firm-specific" or "general", 
and this determines the incidence of its costs in a following manner. If OJT is 
general, its cost will be paid by the worker as he collects the return for himself. 
On the other hand, the cost as well as return of specific OJT are shared by the 
two parties conditional upon the likelihood of labour turnover. Turning to our 
model, if the training is general, then the workers would receive non-uniform 
wages net of the training cost. Thus the training in our model that offers a 
uniform wage must be specific.
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There is some theoretical difficulty with this line of argument — namely, 
according to this logic the training that each of the homogeneous firms offer s to 
the workers is specific and yet has the identical training cost function c(®) One 
can argue that some OJT cost may be paid by a firm even if it is not specific to 
that firm. As was briefly mentioned in Chapter III, Manning (1994) also argues 
for the uniform wage, or the company wage policy. He points out that the firms 
do not use the information about worker characteristics in wage determination 
and offer an individualistic wage policy, since it would be difficult to derive 
such a complex policy that satisfies everyone in the labour market. Consequent­
ly, the firms end up with providing, i.e. paying for, general training of the 
workers. Stevens (1993) also shows the empirical support for and justifies 
theoretically the idea that firms do invest in apparently general training of its 
workers and are concerned with "poaching" at the same time. But again it is 
difficult to determine the circumstance for such a wage offer within their ap­
proaches.
In the next section, therefore, we develop the first argument for the uniform 
wage assumption — the validity of the uniform wage payment as the equilibri­
um contract when there exists a possibility of monitoring the workers.
(3) Pooling Equilibrium and Its Robustness
In order to simplify our argument, we specify our model to the case where 
workers are characterized by one of only two ability types; each type has cor-
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responding reservation wages and training costs. A similar type of model for 
the adverse selection model of the efficiency wage hypothesis is found in Clem- 
enz (1986). The basic result in his paper is that two types of equilibria are 
possible in the labour market — a pooling equilibrium, in which the two types of 
workers are offered a uniform wage contract, and a separating equilibrium with 
monitoring, in which the two types of workers are employed with different 
contracts from each other, making it a non-uniform wage contract. In the latter 
case, the firms employ a monitoring device to distinguish the two types of 
workers. And in both cases, the analyses examine the conditions in which 
either or none of the equilibria exists.
The basic argument of this type of analysis is as follows. Given that firms in 
the labour market are planning to offer the efficiency wage to all the workers 
uniformly at the pooling equilibrium, the analysis asks whether there exists 
some other labour contract preferred by all the agents in the market which offers 
differentiated wages to the workers of different ability. In the latter type of 
contract the firms are assumed to employ some monitoring device, which is 
costly and inaccurate, in order to distinguish the workers. The particular form 
of the non-uniform wage contract is not given, as it would depend on the specif­
ic natures of the supply and demand conditions in the labour market. Rather, it 
merely asks whether there exists any non-uniform wage contract based on the 
monitoring mechanism, which is preferred by all the agents in the market and 
thus invalidates the uniform wage contract as the equilibrium wage contract. 
Having determined the conditions in which the pooling equilibrium does not
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exist, the analysis then asks whether a separating equilibrium exists.
Here, to employ a similar type of argument for our model, we need to alter
slightly the assumptions made in Chapter III in the following way, where the
modified assumptions are indicated by primes.
(Workers)
W l1 There are two types of workers, Type I and Type II, whose ability levels
are and a 2, such that a ,< a 2, and their proportions in the total work 
force are (3, and p2, such that P,+P2=l
W2' Acceptance or reservation wages of each type of workers, are and w2, 
such that w,<w2.
(Firms)
FI There is a large number of firms with an identical production process, 
i.e. a process of training and production; with free entry.
F2 The production function y(x) is solely a function of the number of work 
ersers, and hence independent of the heterogeneity of the labour force. 
And y'>0 and y"<0.
F3 The firms are price takers in a competitive market for their products and
are competitive in the labour market, where their competitiveness in the 
latter means they compete using a wage offer w, and a volume of the 
input x, in maximizing their profit. (This definition of competitiveness is 
also employed in Stiglitz & Weiss (1981).)
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(Training)
T1 The workers become identically productive, by attaining the skill, ir­
respective of their a 's, after requiring "On-the-Job Training (OJT)".
T2* The cost of the OJT, c, to attain the required job skill differs for the two
types of workers are c, and c2, such that C j>c2.
(Information)
IT Every worker knows his own ability i.e. a , or a 2 and opportunity wage
i.e.w, or w2.
12* Every firm knows Pp Cj and ws of Type i workers, for i= 1,2, but is not
able to distinguish one worker from another.
13' The firm has a monitoring device which costs ji per worker and is
imperfect in such a way that n.. is the probability that it monitors a Type 
i worker as a Type j worker i,j=l,2, with n n+II12= l, n ^ + n ^ l  & n u,
n ^ i / 2 .
(Employment Contract)
El Employment contracts are negotiated in advance, last for one period and 
specify a wage, or a set of wages to be paid according to the workers' 
types.
(Treatment of risk)
RT Workers are risk averse and have an identical utility function of the von
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Neumann-Morgenstem type, whose only factor is wage, i.e. u(w), such 
that u’>0 and u"<0.
R21 The firms are risk neutral and maximize expected profits.
(a) Pooling equilibrium with a uniform wage contract 
At w,, the firm attracts only Type I workers so that its expected profit is,
E^pytxM W j+c^x (IV-1)
while at w2, it attracts the both types of workers so that its expected profit is,
E(it)=py(x)-(w2+Plc,+P2c2)x (IV-2)
And w2 will be the equilibrium wage, if
W .+ C ^ W j+ ftc .+ p jC j
i.e. w2-w,<p2(c,-c2)
(IV-3)
(IV-3)’
provided that there exists an excess supply of labour. We define this as a pool­
ing equilibrium as with this wage offer the firm is able to attract the both types 
of workers with the same condition. In terms of our continuous model of Chap­
ter III, this would be equivalent to saying that at w2=w(a2), w (a)+c(a) is min­
imized or equally w '(a)+cf(a)=0
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(b) A non-uniform wage contract as an alternative
Now introduce a two-wage contract WM=(w,,w2), with an imperfect and costly 
monitoring device, where a worker monitored as Type I receives w, and a 
worker monitored as Type II receives w2. Then the uniform wage contract may 
be upset if;
(i) one or the both types of workers prefer this contract to the uniform 
wage contract.
& (ii) the firm can generate profits with this contract that are at least as 
large as with the uniform wage contract.
The first condition implies that at least one of the following conditions is met.
uf e ) <^ i iu(w i)+ ^ i 2u(w2) for Type I workers (IV-4)
u(w2)< n 2Iu(w,)+II22u(w2) for Type II workers (IV-5)
Fig.IV-1 illustrates this set of constraints with the assumptions that workers are 
risk averse and n n, Il22>l/2. The curves I and II are the indifference curves of 
the two types of workers i.e. (IV-4) and (IV-5) with equality, so that (IV-4) and 
(IV-5) hold to the right of the indifference curves I and II respectively. Our 
interest lies in the area below the 45° line since w,<w2. Any contract in the 
area A is preferred by the both types of workers to the uniform wage contract 
indicated as W , while any contract in the area B attracts Type II workers only 
away from the uniform wage contract W . And no contract in the area C can 
attract any worker away from the uniform wage contract. The both curves are
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convex to the origin due to the assumption of the risk-averse workers, while the 
indifference curve I is drawn above the indifference curve II to the right of the 
45° line because at W p the absolute slope of the indifference curve I, n i2/ n n is 
smaller than the absolute slope of II, I l 22II\2X because of n ,p IX ^ l/2 . As for 
the second condition, the firm's expected profit depends on the type or types of 
workers it can attract by the wage contract. First, if the firm can attract the both 
types of workers, which implies that the contract must lie in the area A, its 
expected profit would be
7cM=py(x)-{(pln l]+p2n2,)wl+(pln,2+p2n22)w2+p1c1+p2c2}x-^x (iv-6)
where P ^  is the proportion of the workers of Type i monitored as Type j over 
the whole labour force, with i,j=l,2. It is assumed here that the required labour 
demand x is satisfied by the labour supply. Here the second condition may be 
expressed as,
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(Pin M+P2n 2|)Wl+(Pin i2+P2n 22)W2+PlCl+P2C2-|X5W2+P|C|+p2C2 (IV-7)
i.e. ( p ,n ll+p2n 21)w1+(p1n l2+p2n 22)w2sw 2-n (iv-71)
However, we can show that such a contract does not exists.
(Proposition IV-1) There is no WM=(w,,w2) that satisfies (IV-4) (IV-5) and 
(IV-7') simultaneously.
(Proof)
The risk-averse workers means
uf e ) <n„u(w1)+ni2u(w2)<u(niIw1+ni2w2) for Type I workers 
u(w2)<n 21u(w1)+n22u(w2)<u(n2Iw ,+II22w2) for Type II workers
and they mean in turn
w2<n, ,w,+ni2w2 for Type I workers (IV-4’)
w .cIT^w.+n^w, for Type II workers (IV-5')
Now with (IV-4') and (IV-5'), the right hand side of (IV-7') will be such that
(Pini,+p2n2|)Wl+(Pini2+P2n22)W2>W2>W2-|i
which contradicts (IV-7')
Q.E.D.
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Next, if the firm attracts Type II workers only, which implies that the contract 
must lie in the area B, the expected profit would be
7tM=py(x)-(n2|w|+n22w2+P2c2)x-|!x (IV-8)
assuming that the required demand x is satisfied by the supply of Type II work­
ers alone. And this means that the second condition is expressed as,
Here we can show that such a contract does not exist if Pj(c,-c2)<p,
(Proposition IV-2) There is no WM=(w,,w2) that satisfies (IV-5') and (IV-91) if 
p,(c,-c2)<^.
(Proof)
Given Pj(c,-c2)<ii, (IV-9') implies n^Wj+II^Wj^cw^. However, this contra­
dicts (IV-51), the condition derived from the risk-averse Type II workers.
As for the area C, there could be no production as no worker can ever be 
attracted away from the uniform wage contract Wp=(w2,w2).
n2,wi+n22w2+P2c2-mw2+PIc1+P2c2
i.e.r^w, +n22w2^ w2+p, (c, ■-c2)- \i (IV-9')
(IV-9)
Q.E.D.
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The two cases are illustrated in Fig.IV-2(a) & (b) together with the indiffer­
ence curves of Fig.IV-1, where the line in the each figure i.e.(I+II) and (I) 
indicates the iso-profit lines of the firm. Fig.IV-2(a) shows, however, that there 
is no monitoring contract W=(w,,w2) that can attract the both types of workers 
away from the uniform wage contract and makes at least as large profit as the 
uniform wage contract at the same time. This is because the iso-profit line 
(I+II) cuts the 45° line at W=(w2-|i,w2-|i) to the south-west of W p=(w2,w2) as 
long as j l i >0 and at the slope (Pin i2+P2n22)/(Pin il+P2n21) steeper than the slope 
of the indifference curve I, FL^/IIn. And when p=0 the iso-profit condition 
implies that the only plausible monitoring contract is W=(w2,w2)=Wp, i.e. the 
pooling equilibrium itself.
w, w,
(I+II)
— 2
2 '
(b) with Type I workers(a) with Type I & II workers
Fig.IV-2
The iso-profit line (I) in Fig.IV-2(b) is drawn with the condition that P ^ - c ^
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=p,. Note here that the iso-profit line (I) is tangential to the indifference curve II 
at W . (I) would shift to the left if P,(c,-c2)<|i and to the right if p,(c,-c2)>|i. As 
in the above case, therefore, no alternative monitoring contract exists if P,(c,-c2) 
3 1 .
Thus together with (IV-3?), the condition for w2 as the pooling equilibrium, the 
uniform wage contract exists as the equilibrium contract if,
^ - ^ c p iC e ,- ^ ) & (IV-10)
In (IV-10), P^Cj-Cj) is the difference in the average training cost per worker 
between the two uniform wage contracts, i.e. w, and w2, while P,(c,-c2) is the 
difference in the average training cost per worker between the uniform wage 
contract Wp=(w2,w2) and an monitoring contract W M=(w,,w2) which attracts 
only Type II workers. Thus these inequalities simply state that in order for the 
uniform wage offer w2 to be an equilibrium,
(i) for the two uniform wage offers, w, and w2, the difference in average 
training cost per worker must be greater than the difference in the wage 
cost per worker.
(ii) for the uniform wage offer w2, or Wp=( w2,w2) equivalently and a 
monitoring contract W=(w,,w2), the reduction in average training cost per 
worker when the latter is considered must not exceed the cost of mon­
itoring.
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In terms of the values of |i, (3,, c,, c2, w f, and w2, this means that the uniform 
wage assumption is valid when,
(i) (I is sufficiently large, i.e. monitoring cost is large
(ii) (3, is sufficiently small, i.e. Type II is a large group
(iii) c,-c2 cannot be too large or too small, i.e. it needs to be large enough 
to make w2 as the pooling equilibrium rather than w,, but at the same 
time it needs to be not too large to make an alternative contract with 
monitoring upset w2 as the equilibrium wage.
This result helps to clarify the first argument by Weiss (1980) for the assump­
tion of uniform wage that the cost of precise information on the productivity of 
individual workers may exceed its benefit. While (i) states that acquiring the 
information may not be worthwhile when its cost is high, (ii) states that a gain 
in monitoring is small because Type II workers already constitute a large part of 
the labour force without monitoring, (iii) states that a gain in monitoring is 
small because the training costs of the two groups of workers are not large 
enough to offset the cost of monitoring. But at the same time if it is too small 
this could make the wage offer w, more profitable than w2 to the firm.
At this point, it needs to be mentioned that the next step in a standard informa­
tional equilibrium literature is to see if any other type of equilibrium exists 
when the pooling equilibrium fails to exists. A separating equilibrium is the 
alternative equilibrium, at which there is a set of contracts, W,=(wn,w12) and 
W2=(w21,w22), say. And each contract is preferred by one type of workers. We
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do not go further into the discussion on the separating equilibrium here, since 
our aim of this chapter is to verify whether the assumption of uniform wage is a 
valid one by examining the conditions in which the pooling equilibrium with 
the wage offer w2 is likely to occur.
(4) An Application To The Case Where Ability Is Continuous
The argument for the continuous ability case is far more complex and the 
intuitive reasoning with a help of figures such as Fig.IV-1 & 2 for the two- 
ability case discussed above is no longer applicable. In this section I merely 
intend to show that the fundamental approach would remain unchanged when 
the two-ability case is generalized to the continuous case.
When the heterogeneity of the workers is assumed as in Chapter III, the alterna­
tive monitoring contract would take a form WM={co(a)} with 0 < a^ l. Assum­
ing that the labour demand were fulfilled by Type a*  workers alone, (IV-9), i.e. 
the condition that it is worthwhile for a firm to offer this monitoring contract, 
may be expressed as,
where II(a*,cx) is the probability of a Type a*  worker being monitored as Typer
a , such that I I I(a* ,a )d a = l and 00(a) is the wage offer to Type a  workers.
However, the assumption that all the labour demand would be satisfied by Type
n(a*,a)co(a)da+c(a*)+(x<w(a*)+c(a*) (IV-11)
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a  workers clearly is not plausible as the supply of labour of Type a  workers 
alone is zero in the continuous case. Rather, the left hand side of (IV-11) 
should be taken as the lower bound of the average training cost, for employing 
the workers with a< a*  would result in an increase in the average labour cost. 
Of course, W M={co(a)} also has to meet the condition that this will only attract 
Type a*  workers only away form the pooling contract with the uniform wage 
w*=w(a*). Let us assume that this is also met.
Then no monitoring contract can attract away the workers from the pooling 
contract if the lower bound of its average labour cost, i.e. wage cost and training 
cost per worker, is greater than the corresponding cost for the pooling contract.
By rearranging (IV-12), we can obtain the analogous condition to (IV-9’) as,
Here the same argument as Proposition IV-2 may be applied to state that the 
pooling equilibrium exists if c(cc*)-c(a*)<ji. And this holds if,
(i) |i is sufficiently large
(ii) c(oc*)-c(oc*) is sufficiently small
Here the first condition is identical to the case of the two-type ability case. The 
second condition says that the difference between the average training cost
n(a*,a)w(a)da+c(a*)+|i>w(oc*)+c(a*) (IV-12)
n(cc* ,a)co (a)da>w(a*)+c(a*)-c(a*)-p (IV-13)
among the workers with Q^a^a* and the training cost of the workers with a* is 
very small. It is easy to deduce here that this difference is small when c(a) is 
relatively flat since this would imply that c(a) does not differ much from c(a) 
for all values of a  and for a*  in particular, and when the workers are concentrat­
ed at the higher values of a  since this would imply a generally low level of 
c(a). And again these conditions are the same as the conditions derived for the 
two-ability case.
In this chapter we have established the following;
First, we examined the reasons put forward by Weiss (1980) for the validity of 
the uniform wage assumption in the adverse selection model of the efficiency 
wage hypothesis. Of the three reasons we examined, it was concluded that the 
only valid reason was the first argument that the cost of precise information on 
the productivity of individual workers may exceed its benefit. However, it was 
pointed out that there is a need to offer a more theoretically rigorous argument. 
The other two reasons were ruled out as they are not necessarily based on the 
adverse selection mechanism.
Secondly, the model in Chapter III was slightly modified to apply the argu­
ment in the informational equilibrium literature to offer the more theoretical 
approach of the Weiss's first argument. Using a two-type ability worker model, 
our equilibrium was established and defined as the pooling equilibrium.
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Thirdly, the robustness of the pooling equilibrium was discussed against other 
alternative wage contracts with imperfect and costly monitoring. And it was 
concluded that the pooling equilibrium exists and thus the uniform wage equilib­
rium derived in Chapter III is valid when the monitoring cost is high, the propor­
tion of the workers with high ability is high, and/or the training cost difference 
among the workers of different ability level is neither too small or too large.
And finally, an attempt was made to generalize these results to the case of the 
continuous ability, in which it was found that the same line of argument may be 
applied and that the conditions for the pooling equilibrium to be robust were the 
same as in the case of the two-ability worker case.
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CHAPTER V : TWO-PERIOD MODELS OF TRAINING
In this chapter, we add one more period to our analysis of the training model 
This would be a reasonable extension, as training is essentially a dynamic issue. 
However, the main purpose of this extension here is to contrast our training 
model of heterogeneous labour with the adverse selection models based on the 
efficiency unit assumption such as Weiss (1980), so that the model is kept as 
simple as possible. The discussions proceed in three steps. First, the general 
framework of the model is briefly explained in relation to the Weiss model as 
well as other training models. Then a two-period model is introduced, in which 
the firm maximizes its profit for each period. And finally, we consider the 
two-period model with the firm maximizing the present value of the profit 
stream.
(1) The Basic Framework
The basic framework of the model remains unchanged in this two period case. 
Thus in the period I the workers receive the training alongside production. In 
the period II the workers are assumed to become equally productive and need 
no more OJT. Thus in the period II the firm does not have preference among its 
work force, while the Weiss’ firm was never indifferent about its work force. In 
fact the assumption in the adverse selection model that the firm never learns 
about the heterogeneous productivity of its workers is often called into question.
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This becomes even more questionable when the model has to operate several 
periods. Besides, it would be difficult to model the upward-sloping wage 
profile within the Weiss’ framework.
Indeed, one of the main features of the labour models with specific training 
See, for example, Donaldson & Eaton (1976), Nickell (1976), Ohashi (1983), 
or Felli & Harris (1996), is the derivation of an upward-sloping wage profile. 
The firm invests in workers by training them in the first period to receive the 
return in the second period. However, if the worker quits it can not procure the 
return. As a result the firm sets the wage lower in the first and higher in the 
second periods, to prevent the premature quitting by the trained workers. Note 
that this OJT has to be specific for this result to hold, since the standard view is 
that the firm is not going to pay for general training. The incidence of training 
cost was discussed with the survey on training models in Chapter II. As pointed 
out, the distinction between general training and specific training is not the core 
assumption in some of the recent models such as Stevens (1994c) and Acemo- 
glu (1997).
Most of the training models assume homogeneous labour and consequently 
there is no adverse selection, let alone the existence of unemployment. The 
exception is Salop & Salop (1976), who assume that the quit rate is a negative 
function of wage offer. When new workers are recruited in place of the quitters, 
there is a fixed cost of training them. There is an adverse selection in the sense 
that the higher the wage offer is the more reliable the type of labour will be
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reducing the average quit rate and hence the lower the total training cost will be. 
Hence the firm has to weigh the wage cost and the training cost, to determine 
the wage offer. Salop & Salop (1976)’s modelling of a labour market with 
training and heterogeneous aspects is very similar to ours. However, the heter­
ogeneity is not as explicit as ours with c(*) and thus can not relate easily the 
degree of heterogeneity and the nature of equilibrium.
We assume that the firm always “pays” for the training whether it is general or 
specific. This is because with heterogeneous labour it is costly for the firm to 
determine the training cost of each worker to charge them individually. Instead, 
the firm prefers to pay the total training cost. This assumption is supported by 
the descriptive arguments by Weiss (1980) and Manning (1994) as well as the 
pooling equilibrium analysis in Chapter IV that monitoring of the individual 
training cost itself is costly because of the heterogeneity of the work force. 
Acemoglu (1997) argues that the training is general and yet the training firms 
do pay for it in some countries where the level of training is high such as in 
Germany and Japan and thus sets up his model accordingly. However, it goes 
without saying that the real incidence of the training cost is likely to be shared 
between the two, as in a typical tax incidence argument. In the multi-period, the 
nature of training plays an important role in determining the opportunity wage 
of the post-training periods. This is because the more general the training is the 
higher the productivity in an alternative job will be. Thus his opportunity wage 
i.e. the wage he can demand in the alternative job will rise with the degree of 
generality of the training In the present model we will assume that the training
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has both general and specific elements in such a way that the opportunity wage 
of the trained worker in the post-training period is w(a,*)+kc(a,*), where 
0<k<l is a parameter of general applicability of the training. Thus if k=0 it is 
completely specific, while k=l implies a fully general type of training.
(2) Case I : Optimizing At Each Period
First, assume that every firm maximizes the profit in the each period. Then for 
the period I, the firm maximizes the profit n  with respect to the employment 
level x, and the ability index a ,, with the subscript signifying the period I,
rc^ pyO^ MwCcg+cCogix, (v-i)
This is equivalent to the optimization problem in Chapter III of the single 
period case and the corresponding first order conditions are
d7c1/dx1=py’(x1)-[w (a1)+c(a1)]=0 (V-2)
drc/da^-Iw^a^+cXc^XIXpO (V-3)
Then the solution {0Cj*, Wj*, Xj*} could cause either excess supply or market 
clearing in the labour market, depending on the supply availability. As for the 
incidence of the training cost, (V -l) simply repeats our assumption that the firm 
pays for the training i.e. c(a,)x, irrespective of the type of training. Also note 
that from (V-2) the wage is equated to the net marginal productivity, i.e. net of
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training cost, and consequently there is no discrepancy between the wage and 
the marginal productivity. This point is worth mentioning since the discrepancy 
is a much-discussed issue in the training literature in relation to the labour 
turnover.
In the period II, with x,* workers already needing no more training the firm 
maximizes the profit n 2 by choosing the levels of wage offer w2, through deter­
mination of a 2, and of employment x2, given oq* and x,*, where
7c2=py(x2)-[w(a2)+c(a2)](x2-x1*)-[w(a,*)+kc(a,*)]xI* (V-4)
The second term refers to the labour cost i.e. wage and training, of new workers 
and the third to the wage cost i.e. the opportunity wage, of the existing workers. 
And the first order conditions are,
djt2/dx2=pyXx2)-[w (a2)+c(a2)]= 0  
drc2/d a 2=-[w’ ( a 2)+c’ (a 2)]x2= 0
which are in fact identical to the first order conditions for the period I.
Thus, a 2*=a,*, w2*=w,*, and x2*=xt* and the firm repeats his action in the 
period II. This rather trivial result is due to the fact that the reduction in the 
total cost of training x}* workers in the period II i.e. c(a,*)x1*, is a fixed sum by 
the time x,* is decided and thus does not affect the firm’s decision in the period
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(V-5)
(V-6 )
II. (V-6 ) implies that the optimal wage is unaffected and neither is the best 
group of workers for the firm. And this in turn means that with (V-5) the de­
mand for labour remains as before. This generates an upward-sloping wage 
profile over the periods with w,*=w(a,*) and w2*=w(a,*)+kc(a,*). And the 
profile becomes steeper as the degree of generality i.e. k rises. This is true as 
long as the excess supply condition holds. Note also that there will be no more 
recruitment as long as 0<k<l, since for the period II the existing worker costs 
w2*=w(a,*)+kc(a1*), while the new worker would cost w2*=w(a,*)+c(a1*), 
and w (a,*)+kc(a1*)<w(a1*)+c(a1*). When k=l, on the other hand, the firm 
becomes indifferent between the two groups of workers in the period II. For 
example, the firm could lay off all the existing workers and employ totally new 
labour force. This can be interpreted as not following a seniority rule, with the 
seniority rule being defined as giving a priority of employment to the longer 
serving workers. It goes without saying that when 0<k<l the rule holds as no 
new worker is employed. If more workers are needed in the period II due to an 
exogeneous increase in the product demand, the firm will still seek for the same 
type of workers by offering the same optimal wage as long as the excess supply 
exists. The new workers would then receive w ^ * )  in the period II, i.e. what 
the existing workers received in the period I, while the latter will have a wage 
increased to w(a,*)+kc(a,*).
We may contrast this result with how the Weiss model would perform in the 
two period case. If the profit maximization is done at each period as in our 
model, the Weiss model would produce the identical equilibria in the two
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periods. As a consequence, the wage profile will always be flat and there will 
be no seniority rule concerning who is to employ first. Considering the fact that 
the formation of human capital over time may play an important role in the 
operation of a labour market, these results require some justifications. Further­
more, the Weiss’ firm would remain ignorant about the productivity of each 
worker over two periods i.e. even after the production is completed. It is dif­
ficult to imagine that the firm continues to turn the blind eye to the information 
on the true productivity of the heterogeneous workers.
(3) Case I I : Optimizing Over Two Periods
So far the firm was assumed to act as a profit maximizer in each period. How­
ever, it is probably more realistic to assume that it maximizes the profit stream 
over time, as it takes time to generate the return on the training. Therefore, the 
firm would maximize, by setting the wage offer {w,, w2} and the employment 
levels x, and x2, the present value of the profit stream PV(7t),
PV(K)=py(x,)-[w1+c(a)]x1+ (l+ r)l[py(x2)-w2x2] (V-7)
where r is the discount rate. Before we move on to the firm’s optimization, note 
that it has to offer an attractive wage profile to the workers as well as max­
imizing its own present value. We tackle this by two steps. First list up all the 
wage profiles {Wj,w2} that gives the same labour cost to the firm. Then the 
worker’s utility maximizing wage profile is derived given some constraints on
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the profile. As c(a) appears in (V-7), w , & w 2 must attract those workers with 
the ability below a , one of the wage profiles being w,=w(a) & w 2=w(a)+kc(a). 
Then the firm could give any other wage profile as long as labour cost remains 
unchanged. Therefore, for the given values of a ,  x,, and x2, w, & w 2 will satisfy 
the following condition,
[w1+c(a)]xl+(l+r)'lw2x2=[w(a)+c(a)]x,+(l+r)'1[w(a)+kc(a)]x2 (V-8 )
i.e. w ,x1+(l+r)‘,w2x2=w(a)xI+ (l+ r)1[w(a)+kc(a)]x2 (V-8 )’
Assume further that there is no turnover, i.e. no worker quits or is laid off, and 
thus x,=x2=x. A typical specific training model — see, for example, Hashimoto 
(1981), Nickell (1976), Donaldson & Eaton (1976), or Ohashi (1983), would 
assume the turnover rate to be determined within the model. And in particular, 
a quit rate is generally assumed to be a positive function of the period II wage, 
with the rationale that the partly deferred payment reduces their incentive to 
quit, and this is the reason for the upward-sloping wage profile in general. In 
the present model, we do not have to worry about the deferment since the 
productivity rises over time at the firm as well as outside in our model as long 
as k>l. On the whole, it is not intuitively appealing to assume that the firm sets 
the quit rate above zero by setting the wage profile, unless this is done to screen 
the workers.
This assumption sets ranges to the values of w, & w2. First, observe that 
x,=x2=x changes (V-8 )’ to,
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wI+(l+r)‘,w2=w (a)+(l+r) '1 [w(a)+kc(a)] (V-8 )”
Suppose now that w,>w(a). Then by (V-8 )”, w2<w(a)+kc(a). The workers 
would find it to their benefit to quit the firm at the end of the period I, since they 
can earn w(a)+kc(a) elsewhere by definition. Thus, in order to keep the trained 
workers for the period II, the firm needs to set the wages to the ranges of
w,<w(a) & w 2>w(a)+kc(a) (V-9)
If, on the other hand, the wage in the period I is too low, the workers might 
find it difficult to believe the firm’s no-layoff policy. Thus the firm has to offer 
a wage profile which shows that laying off the trained workers to replace them 
with the new workers is more costly than keeping the existing labour force and 
thus it has no intension to do so.
i.e. w 1+ c(a)+ (l+ r)1[w(a)+c(a)]>w 1+c(a)+(l+r)'1w2 (V-10)
i.e. w(a)+c(a)>w2
And with (V-8 )” , the workers believe that there is no lay off, if
w ,>w(a)-[(l-k)/(l+r)]c(a) & w 2^ w(a)+c(a) (V-l 1)
(V-9) and (V-l 1) together set the ranges of wt & w2 as,
-122-
w(a)-[(l-k)/(l+r)]c(a)^w ,^w (a) & w(a)+kc(a)^w 2^ w(a)+c(a)
(V-12)
a quick glance at which tells us W j<w(a)<w(a)+kc(a)<w2, i.e. w,<w2, with the 
equality holding when k=0. So the wage profile is either flat or upward-sloping.
Given (V-12), the firm would set the wages to attract the workers. If the 
workers are assumed to be risk-averse following the analysis of Chapter V, the 
firm needs to offer a wage profile that maximizes the present value of the work­
er’s utility, PV(U)
PV(U)=u(wI)+(l+r)_lu(w2)
s.t. w ,>w (a)-[(l-k)/(l+ r)]c(a): Xx (V-13)
w ,<w (a): X2 (V-14)
W j+Q+ryV^wCaHG+ry’lwtoO+kcCa)]: p (V-15)
where the X} and are the multipliers for the w , constraints on the lower bound 
and the upper bound respectively, while p is for the iso-labour cost condition of 
the firm so that this with (V13) & (V-14) will set the lower and the upper 
bounds of w2. Then the Lagrangian L  is;
Z^=u(w1)+(l+r)'1u(w2)+X,1[w1-w(a)-[(l-k)/(l+r)]c(a)]+A,2[w1-w(a)] 
+p[w (a)+(l+r) 1 [w^+kc^oOJ-Wj-U+r) '1 w2] (V-16)
Note that the multipliers are set so that they become either zero if the constraint 
is not binding or positive if binding. In particular, \  and \  will have to satisfy 
one of the three conditions ; (1) ^ > 0  & A,2=0, i.e. Wj=w(a)-[(l-k)/(l+r)]c(a), 
which means from (V-8 )” , w2=w(oc)+c(a), (2) A,j=0 & A,2=0, i.e. w (a)-[(l- 
k)/(l+r)]c(a)<w,<w(a), which means from (V-8 )” , w(a)+kc(a)<w2< 
w(a)+c(a), or (3) A,,=0 & ^ 2>0, i.e. w,=w(a), which means from (V-8 )” , 
w2=w(a)+kc(a) Then the first order conditions imply the following,
as well as the constraints. Eliminating p from (V-17) and (V-18), we obtain,
uXw^-uXWjHXj-A^O
If (1) ^ > 0  & ^ 2=0, then u ’(w,)-u’(w2)<0 and thus w t>w2. This is not consistent 
with (V-12). If (2) ^ = 0  & X,2=0, then u^w ^-uX w ^O  and thus w,=w2. But it 
only holds when k=0. It turns out (3) ^= 0  & X2>0 is the solution, when 
W j=w(oc) and w2=w(a)+kc(a) from (V-8 )”.
Fig.V-1 illustrates the optimization on the w,-w2 wage space. The negatively- 
sloped line AD indicates the firm’s iso-wage cost line (V-8 )”, while the segment 
BC on the line AD is derived from the no-tumover condition (V-12). Note that
uXw^+^-^-p^O
u ’(w 2) -p = 0 (V-18)
(V-17)
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any {w ,,w 2} on the segment CD gives the firm incentive to lay o ff the workers 
while any on AB gives the workers incentive to quit. Among the indifference 
curves U,, U 2 and U3, U 2 satisfies the optimization and the optimal point is B 
which is a comer solution with w ,= w (a) & w2=w (a)+kc(a).. Note that at B the 
marginal rate o f substitution o f PV(U) between the wages o f the two periods is 
greater than the relative values o f the cost in the two periods for the firm, given 
w,<w2,
i.e. [u’(wj)/u’(w 2)]( 1 +r)> 1 +r (V-19)
And B is indeed the comer solution.
( l+ r)v v (a )+ \v (a )+ k c (a )D
w ,=w
w (a )
v v (a )-[(l-k )/( l+ r)]c (a )
Fig.V-1
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The solution at B means among various wage profiles {w,,w2} satisfying the 
iso-wage cost line (V-8 )” , the workers favour the flattest profile acceptable to 
the firm — any profile flatter than this would make workers quit after the period 
I and thus not acceptable to the firm, following the earlier argument of the 
chapter.
Therefore substituting w,=w(a) & w2=w(a)+kc(a) into (V-7), the firm’s optimi­
zation is reduced to,
max PV(7c)=py(x)-[w(a)+c(a)]x+(l+r) '1 {py(x)-[w(a)+kc(a)]x} (V-20)
The first order conditions are;
dPV (rc)/dx=py ’ (x)- [ w( a)+p c( a)]=0 
dPV (7t)/d a=- [ 1+(1 +r) 1 ] [w ’ (a)+ pc ’ (a)] x=0 
where p=(l+r+k)/(2 +r)
They resemble the first order conditions derived in Chapter III as well as those 
of the two period model of this chapter, with the main difference being the 
introduction of p. The function p(k,r) can be easily verified to be an increasing 
function of both k and r and to range from 1 /2  to 1 , as k ranges from 0  to 1 and r 
from 0 to infinity. Fig.V-2 shows how p changes with k for a given value of r.
P
(V-21)
(V-22)
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12/3 l*=rOO r=l HO
1/2
Fig.V-2
0
We differentiate (V-21) and (V-22) with respect to p and obtain the following 
comparative static results.
da/dp=-c(a)/[w”(a)+pc”(a)]>0 (V-23)
dx/dp=c(cc)/py”(x)<0 (V-24)
Thus a high value of p would mean a high level of a  and a high level of w in 
turn by w=w(a) but a low level of x, and vice versa. Recall the average labour 
cost function of Chapter I I I : vF(a)=w(oc)+pc(a) and redefine as 'F(a|p)= 
w(a)+pc(a). The economic interpretation of this result is that as p falls, the 
weight on c(a) in the average labour cost function : xF(a|p)=w(a)+pc(a), 
making low ability workers less costly, as well as reducing the labour cost itself. 
As a result, the firm reduces the general ability of the workers by offering a 
lower wage and raises the employment level.
Fig.V-3 illustrates visually what is happening. On the right hand side of the
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diagramme, the average labour cost functions for high and low values o f p, i.e. 
4/ (a |p H)= w (a)+ p Hc(a) and T/(a |p L)=w(oc)+pLc(a), as well as w (a ) are drawn. 
Note that as p H> p l ^ (a lp ^  is drawn above ^ (a lp ,) and by (V-24) (^*>0^*, 
where they are the solutions to ^ ’(c l^pH)=0 and vF’(o l^pL)=0 respectively i.e. 
(V-22). They in turn generate w H*= w (aH*)>wL*=w((XL*). On the left hand side 
o f the diagramme, the marginal productivity is drawn against the employment 
level i.e. py’(x), which is equated to wCcO+p^cCa) or w (a)+ p Lc(a ) i.e. (V-21), 
which in turn gives xH* or x L*. The diagramme indicates x H*<xL*, as py’(x) is a 
decreasing function of x and w (a H*)+pHc(otH*)>w(o(L*)+pLc (a L*). Note that 
w (a H*) is w ,, the wage for the period I, and w 2 is w(otH*)+kc(cxH*). And if there 
is an excess supply with pH, then pL would generates the lower supply level and 
the higher demand level, reducing the excess supply.
w (a)
0 ocL* <V ax
Fig.V-3
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Let us verify this result in terms of r, the discount rate and k, the parameter of 
general applicability of the training. Firstly, the higher the discount rate is the 
closer p becomes to one and the more it resembles to the one-period case. This 
is not surprising since a high discount rate means less importance attached to 
the future activities. Because the training cost incurs in the period I and the 
benefit of training is generated in the period II, the firm would put more on 
reducing the cost than when the discount rate is high i.e. r is large. To see this 
consider (V-20) when r=0 and r— i.e. 2{py(x)-[w(a)+(l/2)(l+k)c(oc)]x} and 
py(x)-[w(a)+c(a)]x respectively. The coefficient c(a) is larger relative to the 
coefficients of w(a) in the latter case. As a result the firm would quote a higher 
wage to attract workers with lower training cost i.e. abler workers, and the 
employment level will be lower because of the higher labour cost. As for the 
market equilibrium, an increase in the supply of labour as a result of the wage 
increase and a decrease in the demand for labour as a result of the labour cost 
increase will make the excess supply more likely, as long as the supply condi­
tions remains unchanged.
Secondly, a large value of k has essentially the same effect on the firm’s 
behaviour as well as on the labour market equilibrium as that of r through p. 
Consider two types of training with one being more specific than the other and 
call them specific training and general training with parameters ks<kg respective­
ly. By the analogous argument to those of pH>pL, the optimal wages will be 
such that ws*=w(as*)<wg*=w(ocg*) since a s*<ag*. Thus the period I wage is 
higher for the job offering general training than specific training. In order to see
-129-
the way the generality of training affects the period I wage, rewrite (V-20) as
PV(tu)={ 1+(1 +r)-‘ }{py(x)-[w( a)+( 1 +r+k)(2+k) ',c(a)]x} (V-20) ’
The more general the training is, the higher k and thus the opportunity wage 
will be. This makes the coefficient on c(a) larger and the optimal wage will be 
larger, as an increase in a  reduces the training cost term (l+r+k)(2 +k)'lc(a) 
more than it raises the wage cost term w(a) with higher k. Note that the de­
mand for labour i.e. x, will be lower for the general training as high k means 
generally high labour cost w(a)+(l+r+k)(2+k)‘1c(a). This together with larger 
labour supply due to a higher wage offer means that the excess supply is more 
likely for general training at the equilibrium. ( See Fig.V-3)
The wage profiles will be {w(as*), w (as*)+ksc(as*)} for the specific training 
and {w(ag*), w (ag*)+ kgc(ag*)} for the general training, where 
w(as*)+ksc(as*)< w (ag*)+kgc(ag*) can be shown with some extra calculations. 
We need to determine the sign of
(d/dk)[w(a)+kc(a)] given w ’(oc)+(l+r+k)/(2 +r)c’(cx)= 0  
Now (d/dk)[w(a)+kc(a)]=[w’(oc)+kc,(oc)](da/dk)+c(a)
But w’(a)+pc’(oc)=0 implies w ,(oc)+(k-k+p)c’(oc)=0. Thus,
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w,(ot)+kc’(oc)=(k-p)c,(oc)=[(l+r)(k-l)/(2 +r)]c,(oc)> 0
since k<l & c’(oc)<0. And differentiating w’(cc)+(l+r+k)/(2+r)c’(cc)=0 with 
respect to k, we obtain,
w”(oc)(da/dk)+(2 +r) A c ,(a)+[(l+r+k)/(2 + r)]?’(a)(da/dk )= 0  
da/dk=- c’(oc)/(2 +r){w”(oc)+[(l+r+k)/(2 +r)]c”(oc)} > 0
since c’(oc)<0 & w”(oc)+[(l+r+k)/(2+r)]c”(oc)>0. Thus
(d/dk) [w(a)+kc(a)]=[w ’ (ot)+kc’(oc)](d a/dk)+c(a)> 0
Therefore if ks<kg, w (as*)+ksc(as*)< w (ag*)+kgc(ag*) i.e. the more general the 
training is, the higher the wage profile will be. Furthermore, as k increases 
from 0  to 1 , the difference between the wages of the two periods i.e. kc(a) 
increases from 0 to c(a). Thus the wage profile becomes steeper with the 
generality of training between the two polar cases. ( The rate of wage increase 
from the period I to the period II can be defined by kc(a)/w(a). And widening 
of the difference by the generality of training would mean d/dk{kc(oc)/w(oc)}>0 . 
However, without specifying the functional forms of c(a) and w(a), this sign is 
indeterminate for 0<k<l.) On the other hand, the demand for labour is higher 
for the specific training i.e. xs*>xg*, while each firm receives less workers for 
the specific training case as ws*<wg*. Then the excess supply in the labour 
market will be reduced and the possibility of market clearing will emerge.
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These results are summarized in Table V-l and Fig.V-4
The last result does not seem convincing at the first glance. One may expect 
that relatively general training creates a fairly competitive atmosphere, as the 
acquired skill itself is applicable in all the firms. However, what really happens 
here is that a higher opportunity wage in the period II raises the average labour 
cost over the two periods and as a result the labour demand is reduced. At the 
same time the increased weight on the training cost i.e. kc(a) raises the optimal 
wage and that attracts more workers. Together, they are more likely to generate 
an excess supply equilibrium than with relatively specific training in the labour 
market.
Type of training 
k
Optimal wage 
Wage profile: w, 
:w 2
Labour demand
Market equilibrium 
is more likely to be;
More specific
K
ws*=w(as*)
w (a * )
w (as*)+ksc (a s*)
xs*
Market clearing 
Table V-l
More general
<  k 8
< wg*=w (ag*)
< w (a g*)
< w (ag*)+kgc(ag*)
> V
Excess supply
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w (a g*)+c(ag* ) : kg=l
w (a g*)
w(oc*)
w (a*)
w (a*)+kc(a*): 0 <k<l
w (a *): k = 0
Period I Period II 
Fig.V-4 : The wage profile
In this chapter we have established the following;
Firstly, a two-period training model of heterogeneous labour was introduced 
and contrasted with the adverse selection model of Weiss (1980) as well as the 
training models such as Donaldson & Eaton (1976), Nickell (1976), and Ohashi 
(1983). The model presented in this Chapter has several unique features com­
pared with these models. For example, it can be more easily extended to a 
multi-period case than the Weiss model, in which an upward-sloping wage 
profile can be derived. But unlike most of the training models the introduction 
of heterogeneity of labour in terms of training cost means that the firm initially 
pays for the training whether it is general or specific, although, as in the stan­
dard theory of tax incidence, the actual incidence would depend on the elastic­
ities of supply of and demand for labour. The training type instead affects the 
alternative wage of the period II.
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Secondly, the firm maximized the profit for each period. It turned out that the 
firm’s first order conditions were identical in the two periods. They were also 
equivalent to those of Chapter III except that the period II wage was higher due 
to the higher alternative wage.
Finally, we assumed that the firm maximized the present value of the profit 
stream. With no turnover an upward-sloping wage profile was derived. The 
firm’s decision and the consequent market equilibrium depended in particular 
on the generality of training. On the whole, the more general the training is, the 
higher the wage profile will be, the lower the employment level will be, and the 
more likely that the equilibrium entails the excess supply.
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CHAPTER V I : MONOPSONY AND COMPETITION IN 
HETEROGENEOUS LABOUR MARKETS
We have established earlier on in Chapter III that in a heterogeneous labour 
market, where workers differ in the training costs, a competitive equilibrium 
does not always imply market clearing unlike in the case of a homogeneous 
labour market. One might, then, wonder whether there are similar irregularities 
when the heterogeneous labour market is not competitive.
Consider monopsony, as a typical form of non-competitiveness in labour 
markets. It will be shown that the set of profit maximizing conditions of a 
monopsony firm is identical to that of a competitive firm in certain cases. The 
rationale behind this result is that if the supply of labour is not binding in the 
competitive equilibrium, i.e. if there is an excess supply, then this information 
about the supply , which a monopsony firm has an access to, becomes redun­
dant.
Consider a heterogeneous labour market of the type described in the earlier 
chapter, where the workers are heterogeneous in a  and consequently in w(a), 
the acceptance wage and in c(a), the cost of OJT. As the difference between 
competitive equilibrium and monopsony in a labour market lies in the availabili­
ty of information on the supply of labour to the firm/firms, we may illustrate 
this formally by using the Lagrangian method, for which the supply information
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acts as a constraint. We also extend the Lagrangian method to analyse within 
the same framework the homogeneous case, in which there is a well-established 
result that monopsony always produces lower levels of wage and employment 
than competitive equilibrium.
(1) The Lagrangian and the Constraint
Define the profit equation in the following form.
tv= py(xd)-wxd-Cxd (VI-1)
This is identical to (III-6 ) of Chapter III except that w and C are not the func­
tions of a .  And we introduce constraints, with X's being the multipliers, as
(i) ^,:w=w(a)
(ii) ^ 2:C=c(a)
(iii) ^ 3:w>Ws(xd)
so that the Lagrangian is given by
L=py(xd)-(w+C)xd+X1((w-w(a))+A,2(C-c(a))+A,3(w-Ws(xd)) (VI-2)
(i) and (ii) express the heterogeneity of the labour force through the reservation 
wage and the average cost of OJT, both of which vary with a . Note that (VI-1) 
with these constraints is (III-6 ), i.e. 7t= py(xd)-c(Gc)xd-w(a)xd, or it is identical to 
optimize (VI-2) with being restricted to zero. In the following discussion we
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do not consider the zero restrictions of X { and ^separately, i.e. it is either "A,,> 0  
and X.2>0 " or " ^ = 0  and ^ 2=0 ", since either one of them only would not generate 
the situation of adverse selection. A, ,> 0  and A,2> 0  implies that the firm holds 
information about the heterogeneity, while A, ,= 0  and A,2= 0  means no information 
to the firm while optimizing.
(iii) is the "monopsony" constraint. This is derived from the facts that; (i) a 
monopsonist knows the labour supply: w=Ws(xs) and (ii) he ensures that his 
demand is always met, i.e. x*>xd, where x s and xd are the quantity demanded and 
supplied respectively. Thus, w=Ws(xs)>Ws(xd) since W s,>0. This is illustrated 
in Fig.VI-1. Consequently, optimizing the Lagrangian (VI-2) with restricting 
to non-negative is the optimization of a monopsony firm, while with ^ = 0  it is 
of a competitive firm. Note that the former does not rule out X,3=0, since, unlike
(i) and (ii), (iii) is an inequality — ^ > 0  when the constraint is binding and ^ = 0  
when it is not.
w
w=Ws(xs)
w=Ws(xd) Fig.VI-1
0 x
Table VI-1 below relates the characteristics of a labour market to the restric­
tions on the X's.
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Wor cers
Heterogeneous Homogeneous
Firms
Monopsonist A,j,A2>0 ^ ,^ = 0  & ^>0
Competitive Xp \ > 0  & x = $ ^ ,^ = 0
Table VI-1
(2) The Cases
Let us now derive the firm's optimization conditions for different labour mar­
kets in turn.
(A) Monopsony with Heterogeneous labour: X-pX2>0 &X,3>0 
Because the firm knows the quality response of the labour, and 7^  are pos­
itive. And with the knowledge of the supply behaviour, the firm's optimization 
translated into the Lagrangian is (VI-2).
LA=py(xd)-(w+c)xd+A,1((w-w(a))+A2(C-c(a))+^3(w-Ws(xd)) (VI-2')
Optimizing LA with respect to w, C, a , xd and X's gives us a set of conditions 
as below
dL^Sw^x^A.j+AysO
dLA/dC=-xd+A,2=0
(VI-3)
(VI-4)
dLA/da^-A y(a)-A ,2c '(a )= 0  (VI-5)
^/dx^pyX x^-C w +cJ-^W 'C x^O  (VI-6 )
dLA/dA,,=w-w( oc)=0 (VI-7)
dl^/dA^C-ctcc^O (VI-8 )
3LA/dX3=w-Ws(xd)=0 (VI-9)
From (VI-3) (VI-4) and (VI-5), from (VI-6 ) (VI-7) and (VI-8 ) and from (VI- 
7) and (VI-9) respectively,
(xd-X,3)w'(a)+xdc,(oc)=0 (VI-10)
py’(xd)=w(a)+c(a)+X3W s,(xd) (VI-11)
w(a)=Ws(xd) (VI-12)
From (VI-10) and (VI-11), by eliminating A3, we obtain,
py’(xd)=w(a)+c(a)+(xd/wf(a))(w '(a)+c,(a))W s'(xd) (VI-13)
This is consistent with the usual monopsony condition in a labour market that 
at the equilibrium marginal productivity of labour (i.e. LHS of (VI-13)) is 
equated to marginal cost of labour (i.e. RHS of (VI-13)), since the marginal cost 
of labour is,
d/dxd(total cost)=d/dxd{(w(a)+c(a))xd}
=w(a)+c(a)+x d{ w'(oc)+c'( cx)}(da/dxd)
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=w(a)+ c(a)+xd{ w'(oc)+c'( a)}(Ws,(xd)/w'( a))
where, from totally differentiating (VI-12), w’(oc)da=Ws,(xd)dxd
(B) Competitive market with Heterogeneous labour: A,j,A,2>0 &^3=0 
As the firm does not know the supply response of the workers, it maximizes 
profit in the absence of constraint (iii). Thus the Lagrangian is,
LB=py(xd)-(w+C)xd+X,1((w-w(a))+X2(C-c(a)) (VI-14)
and this is optimized with respect to w, C, a , xd, and so that we obtain
dLB/dw=-xd+A,,=0 (VI-15)
d L B/d C = -x d+X2=0  (VI-16)
d L g /S a ^ ^ w X ^ -^ c ^ a )^  (VI-17)
dLB/dxd=pyf(xd)-(w+C)=0 (VI-18)
dLB/dA,=w-w(oc)=0 (VI-19)
d h B/dX2= C -c (  a)=0 (VI-20)
From (VI-15) (VI-16) and (VI-17), and from (VI-18) (VI-19) and (VI-20) 
respectively,
w’(a)+c'(cx)=0 (VI-21)
py'(xd)=w(a)+c(a) (VI-22)
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which are the optimization conditions derived in Chapter III for a competitive 
firm, i.e. (III-8 ) and (III-7) respectively. In order to make comparable the 
market demand in monopsony and competitive equilibrium, we let xd be the 
market demand by letting n= l, where n is the number of firms. Note that we do 
not lose generality by doing so, as we assume the lack of information to mean 
the competitiveness.
The optimization conditions (VI-10) (VI-11) and (VI-12) of monopsony would 
be equivalent to those of a competitive firm i.e. (VI-21) and (VI-22) if X3=0,  
since, with ^= 0 , (VI-12) disappears. Furthermore, when X,3=0 holds for monop­
sony, competitive equilibrium exhibits an excess supply of labour since the 
equilibrium conditions for monopsony are those of competitive equilibrium i.e.
w'(oc)+cf(oc)= 0  
py' (xd)=w(a)+c (a) 
w(a)>Ws(xd)
It needs to be pointed out that in the case A, i.e. the case of monopsony with 
heterogeneous labour, the possibility of ^ 3= 0  can not be ruled out a priori — it 
will be shown later that in the case of monopsony with homogeneous labour 
^3= 0  holds only at zero production. For, from (VI-3), X,3=xd-^ 1, and ^ > 0  by 
assumption so that is non-negative rather than strictly positive. Therefore, 
when a competitive equilibrium is characterized by an excess supply or equally
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non-binding labour supply, it is indistinguishable from monopsony. Whether 
^ = 0  holds or not depends on the exogeneously given functions y(#), w(*), c(*) 
and h(*) and product price p in a similar manner to the one described earlier in 
determining whether an excess supply exists with competitive equilibrium.
When X3>0, on the other hand, the supply condition is binding and from (VI- 
10),
w'(a)+c'( a)=( Xi/x d)wX a)>0 (VI-1 O')
which means that the equilibrium wage is above the optimum wage. In this 
case, competitive equilibrium exhibits market clearing i.e. the labour supply is 
binding, since ^ > 0  means that the profit a competitive firm would be increased 
if the supply information was available. Therefore, when X3> 0 ,  monopsony and 
competitive equilibrium are distinct and both are characterized by the binding 
labour supply.
Fig.VI-2 shows the comparison of the two equilibria for different values of Xy  
Note in particular that X,3=0 holds as long as competitive equilibrium (CE) is 
characterized by an excess supply of labour, where the two equilibria are identi­
cal (See Fig.VI-2(a) and (b)). But once competitive equilibrium exhibits market 
clearing, the two equilibria become distinct with monopsony (M) offering lower 
levels of wage and employment than competitive equilibrium (See Fig.VI-2(c)).
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S=AC
CE
x
CDFw
CE=
0 x
CDFw
CE=
0
Fig. VI-2
(C) Monopsony with Homogeneous labour: A,j=0 and ^= 0  &X3>0 
In maximizing the profit, the firm knows the supply of labour i.e. X3>0. How­
ever, for the moment we allow X^  to be non-negative. Then the Lagrangian is
Lc= py(xd)-(w+C)xd+X3(w-Ws(xd)) (VI-23)
Optimizing with respect to w, xd and X3, we obtain
d L J d w = - x d+ \ = 0  (VI-24)
dLc/dxd=py,(xd)-(w+C)-X3Ws,(xd)=0 (VI-25)
(VI-26)
It can be seen from (VI-24) that X3 is zero only when xd is zero — in other 
words, when production takes place the firm always makes use of the supply
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information, unlike in the heterogeneous case we have just discussed. Elim­
inating X3 from (VI-25) and (VI-26), we obtain the usual monopsonist’s equilibri­
um condition
py'(Xd)=(w+C)+XdWs,(xd) (VI-27)
This is the optimization condition in monopsony that marginal productivity of 
labour is equated to marginal cost of labour.
(D) Competitive market:A,,=0 and A,2=0 &X,3=0
The firm has to maximize the profit with w as given so ^3=0 . Thus the 
Lagrangian is
Note that the optimization condition of monopsony (VI-25) would be equiv­
alent to that of a competitive firm (VI-28) if X,3=0, analogous to the heter­
ogeneous cases described earlier. However, in the homogeneous case ^ 3=0 
implies no production by (VI-24). Hence competitive equilibrium and monopso­
ny are always distinct as long as there is production.
LD=py(xd)-(w+C)xd (VI-28)
Optimizing with respect to xd will give us a condition
py'(xd)=w+C (VI-29)
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In this chapter we have established that in a heterogeneous labour market an 
equilibrium in monopsony and competitive equilibrium are not necessarily 
distinct states as is the case in a homogeneous labour market. Using the 
Lagrangian approach, they are shown to be indistinguishable when the compet­
itive equilibrium is characterized by an excess supply of labour. This is the case 
where w=Ws(x) is not binding. And they are distinct as in the homogeneous 
case when competitive equilibrium is characterized by market clearing. Wheth­
er this occurs, of course, depends on the relative natures of the functions y(*), 
w(*), c(*) and h(*) and the level of product price.
-145-
CHAPTER V I I : COMPARATIVE STATICS
We have so far argued that the nature of a competitive equilibrium of a heter­
ogeneous labour market depends on the behaviour of the following functions; 
production function :y(*), opportunity wage function :w(*), training cost func­
tion :c(«) and distribution function of ability :h(«), as well as on the level of 
product price, p. Together they determine whether the equilibrium is character­
ized by market clearing or an excess supply of labour through the supply of and 
demand for labour. This can be seen by recalling how they were defined in 
Chapter III. The supply was defined by;
a(w) is an inverse function of w(a).
On the other hand, the demand of each firm was derived in Chapter III from a 
set of conditions; the conditional demand function (CDF) and the optimal wage 
function (OWF);
SL: Ns(w)=mxs(w)=nH(a(w)) (III-15)
where Ns is the aggregate labour supply 
m is the number of firms
xs is the labour supply that each firm faces
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CDF:0(xd,w)=(|) i.e. w=py’(xd)-c(oc(w)) 
OWF:vi/ '(a)=w'(a)+c'(a)=0 (VII-2)
(VIM )
And for the market as a whole, (VII-1) may be written in terms of Nd, so that
Thus from (111-15) (VIM ') and (VII-2), we see that;
(i) a shift in y(*) affects CDF only.
(ii) a shift in w(*) affects the supply, CDF and OWF.
(iii) a shift in c(*) affects CDF and OWF.
(iv) a shift in h(*) affects the supply, CDF and OWF.
(v) a change in p affects CDF only.
In this chapter before considering the precise effects of these functions and the 
price levels on the equilibrium levels of wage and employment, let us describe 
the effects of these on the demand and the supply sides of the market separately.
(1) The functions
(a) Production function : y(»)
We assume y(*) to be identical to all firms since for each production process 
its particular characteristics is assumed to be expressed by c(#).
CDF:0(Nd,w)=(t) i.e. w=py'(Nd/m)-c(a(w)) 
OWF:vF'(a)=w'(a)+c'(a)=0
(VII-1')
(VII-2)
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(b) Price level: p
The price level only appears in CDF and its increase as a result of an increase 
in the demand for product (Dp) would raise the demand for labour without 
causing the optimal wage to change. This is shown in Fig.VII-1 as a parallel 
outward shift of CDF.
w
0
Fig.VII-1: Dp T (i.e. p T)
(c) Training cost function : c(»)
This function appears in both of the demand conditions through c(«), sincer11 c(z)h(z)dz
c(a) = -------------; in such a way that for CDF it is the absolute level of the
I h(z)dz 
J 0
average cost that affects the level of employment, while for OWF it is the 
steepness of the average cost that affects the level of optimal wage. To see how 
the training cost function affects the labour supply and demand, consider adding 
a positive constant term k to the average cost function. Then (VII-1') will be,
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w=py’(Nd/m)-c(a(w))-k (VII-1")
This means a general increase in labour cost, which results in the reduction of 
the labour demand. Note that this does not affect the optimal wage since the 
optimal wage is solely determined by OWF. (See Fig.VII-2(a)) Now suppose 
c(a) is replaced by kc(a) where k> l. The new OWF will be,
w'(a)+kc'(oc)=0 (VII-2')
or w'(a)+c'( a)=( 1 -k) c'(a)>0
Thus at the ability level that satisfies (VII-2') the original OWF is positive. 
Because both w(«)+c(*) and w(*)+kc(*) have a single local minimum, a steeper 
c(#) implies an increased optimum value of a  and thus of w. On the other hand, 
how this affects the optimal quantity is indeterminate since the change of the 
slope can not be separately analysed from the change of the absolute level of 
c(*). This is illustrated as an upward shift of the original OWF in Fig.VII-2(b).
We still need to see how c(*) and c(«) are related. Suppose c(*) is increased by 
k, then
/ * a
(c(z)+k)h(z)dz
 = c(a)+k (VII-3)• a
h(z)dz
0
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implying that c(a) will equally be increased by k. Now suppose c(*) is in­
creased to kc(*) s.t. k>l, i.e. c(*) is steeper for all values of a ,  then
kc(z)h(z)dz 
0  = kc(a)
h(z)dz
(VIM)
implying that c(a) will also be steeper by k. Thus (i) a generally high valued 
c(*) generates lower labour demand and thus the demand function i.e. CDF 
nearer to the vertical axis and (ii) a steeper c(«) implies a higher optimal wage, 
which means the demand function away from the horizontal axis.
w w
0
(a) a high valued c(a)
N 0 N
(b) a steeper c(a)
Fig. VII-2
(d) Distribution of ability : h(a)
If a  is the sole and innate ability of each individual worker, then this distribu­
tion is exogeneous to the model. There are at least three cases in which a
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change of h(a) may be taken into consideration. Firstly, a  may be an observ­
able part of the innate ability, in which case a different type of observation or 
screening could generate a different distribution, d((3) say. Secondly, a  may be 
achieved through educational investment, in which case more education would 
mean that the distribution is more concentrated at higher values of a . The 
government may be interested in such a policy to raise the general standard of 
education. Thirdly, a demographic change could cause the distribution to 
change its shape. For example, immigration of workers with relatively high a  
into the country or emigration of workers with relatively low a  from the country 
would again generate h(a) with relatively high density at higher values of a .
Here, consider what will happen to the supply and demand conditions when 
the distribution h(a) becomes high density at higher values of a , as a result of 
the government policy to raise the educational level of the population or to 
allow in the immigration of workers with relatively high level of ability. Note 
that a difficulty arises when the effect of a change in h(a) is discussed, since 
this function appears in all of the three conditions of the supply and demand.
The supply response to a change in the distribution h(*) differs between (i) 
when the quality of the existing population improves and (ii) when extra supply 
of the high quality workers is added. In (i) as the total quantity is unchanged, 
there will be equal or less number of workers willing to work than before at all 
wage and this causes the supply to shift to left. In (ii) the high quality workers 
from outside are added to the domestic supply at the corresponding wage levels 
and this causes the supply to shift to right. This is shown in Fig.VII-3(a).
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To see the effect on the demand conditions, we need to see how h(a) affects 
c(a) and c'(oc). We might expect that as the population becomes wiser by more 
education or by accepting new and more able labour force from abroad, the 
average training cost will fall. But the way c'(oc) changes with h(a) is indetermi­
nate, unless h(*) and c(*) are given in a more specific manner.
Just to illustrate the situation, assume a discrete model with three ability levels 
: a ,, a 2,0Cj s.t a 3-a2= a 2-a,and Cj=c(a,)>c2=c(a2)>c3=c(a3) to be consistent with 
c'(*)<0. And assume that h(a) changes form a uniform distribution h,(a) i.e. 
h ,(a1)=hl(a 2)=hI(a 3)=l/3 to a new distribution h2(a) s.t. h2(a,)= l/6 , h2(a^)=2l6, 
and h2( a 3)=3/6. ( See fig.VIII-4(a)) Then the average training cost with the 
uniform distribution, defined as c(oc|h,(a)), is larger than that with the new 
distribution, defined as c(oc|h2(a)), for a = a p a 2, and oc3, and the former is flatter 
than the latter. This is because with h,(a), cCcXjIh^a))^,, c (a2lh,(a))=l/2 
(c,+c2), c (a3lh1(a))= l/3(c1+c2+c3), with h2(a), c ta jh ^ a ) ) ^ , ,  c (a2lh2(a))= 1/3 
(c,+2c2), c (a 3lh2(a))= l/6(c1+2c2+3c3), and c'(#) being defined between the a's.
The result is illustrated in Fig.VII-4(b), in which the training cost function, 
c(a), and the average cost functions for the two distributions, c(odh,(a)) and 
c(ajlh2(a)) are shown. Thus this example shows a case where a rise in the 
general level of ability of the workers reduces c(a) as well as raises the steep­
ness of c(a) for all values of a . However, in general it is difficult to prove that
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w0
S2
0
(a) Supply : S, Improved workers (b) Demand
S2 Added workers
Fig.VII-3 : When there is high density for high ability in h(a)
c(alh2) 
, c(a)
0 a '2
3/6
2/6
1/6
0 a 3 1 aa 2
(a) h j( a ) : the original population (b) Training cost functions 
and h ^ a ) : the abler population
Fig.VII-4
c(alh2(a)) is always steeper than c(alh,(a)), as the slope of c(a) is derived as a
rather complicated composite function of c(a) and h(a) — h(*)’s in the example
were quite simple ones. As a steeper c(») is not the robust result, here we only
consider a smaller c(*). In other words, we assume the optimal wage is not
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affected by the change of h(*). This is illustrated in Fig.VII-3(b) by a parallel 
outward shift.
(d) Opportunity wage function : w(a)
This function also appears in all of the supply and demand conditions. If 
productivity in the alternative job changes, there will be a shift in w(a). For 
example, as in Weiss (1980) if the alternative job exhibits diminishing returns 
to scale then a reduction in the employment level in the market in question will 
in turn induce a fall in the productivity in the alternative sector and hence w(a) 
will shift down. This will shift the supply to the right. At the same time this 
change in w(a), i.e. jower and flatter w(a) causes a shift in the demand condi­
tion in a way similar to that of c(a). ( See Fig.VII-5 ) Under constant returns 
to scale, on the other hand, w(a) will be unaltered by the employment level in 
the alternative sector. In this model we assume constant returns to scale so that 
neither supply nor demand would shifts by a change in the opportunity wage, 
w w
0 N 0 N
(a) Supply (b) Demand
Fig.VII-5 : When w(a) shifts downwards
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Using the analyses given for each function and the product price on their 
effects on the supply of and demand for labour, let us analyse the following 
three aspects of comparative statics : (a) an effect of a change in the product 
price (b) an effect of different technological processes, and (c) an effect of 
improving the general ability of the labour force, on the equilibrium, with the 
assumption of the constant returns to scale in the alternative job.
(2) Comparative statics
(a) Product demand : Dp 
Under constant returns to scale, where w(a) is unaffected by a change in the 
employment level in the alternative sector, a change in the level of product 
demand, with the firms being price takers in the product market, will have 
following consequences.
(i) If, at the equilibrium, there is an excess supply, then
- a fall in Dp results in downward rigidity of the wage.
- a rise in Dp results in either upward rigidity or a rise in the wage.
(ii) If, at the equilibrium, there exists no excess supply, then
- a fall in Dp results in a fall in the wage.
- a rise in Dp results in a rise in the wage.
(See Fig.VII-6)
Note that of the four consequences, the upward rigidity is the only non-robust 
result. Under the excess supply equilibrium, a rise in Dp results in an upward
-155-
rigidity if the rise is small or if there is a large volume of excess supply. Analyt­
ically, this asymmetry is due to the facts that (i) the optimal wage acts as a 
lower bound of a wage offer range and (ii) "flexibility dominates rigidity" i.e. if 
an outcome contains both flexibility and rigidity then we observe it as the 
flexibility of the wage.
CDF
w
0 N
CDF
w
0 N
(a) Initially in excess supply (b) Initially in market clearing
Fig.VII-6
(b) Different technological processes : c(*)
A technological process is meant here a combination of training the workers 
and production. Keeping the production function unchanged, let us consider 
these different training processes: c,(a), c2(a) and c3(a) such that
Ic,,(a)l>lc2'(a)l>lc3'(a)l V a  (VII-5)
and for which there exist a'* s.t.
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w'CcO+c^oc^O i= 1,2,3 (VII-6)
where h(*) is the same for the three cases. This implies 
a 1 *>a2*>a3* 
and w'*>w2*>w3* where w'*=w(a'*)
Fig.VII-7 illustrates the three cases ;
(i) c^* ): El — an excess supply equilibrium
(ii) c2(*): E2 — the supply is just binding
(iii) c3(*): E3 — the supply is binding i.e. market clearing
N0a 3* a 2* a 1*0 a
(a) OWF’s with different c(#) (b) Equilibria with different c(#)
Fig.VII-7
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(VII-7)
(VII-8)
The equilibrium is more likely to be of an excess supply when c(*) is steeper, 
since a steeper c(*) means a vertically more high-positioned CDF. But a steep 
c(«) is a training process in which more able workers are valued considerably 
highly relative to less able workers. Hence, for example, a labour market where 
individual difference in ability matters more in determining OJT cost is more 
likely to exhibit an excess supply equilibrium.
(c) Effects of an exogeneous change in the ability distribution
Following the analysis in (1) (c) of this chapter, we can deduce that an im­
provement in the labour force quality would always raise the labour demand but 
the effect on the labour supply depends on how the improvement is achieved. 
Market clearing is more likely with educational investment on the existing 
labour force than with adding labour supply of higher quality, since the former 
reduces labour supply while the latter increases it.
Fig.VII-8 illustrates the argument when the equilibrium is initially character­
ized by an excess supply of labour at E0. With the improvement in labour force, 
CDF shifts to the right. The labour supply shifts from S to S' when the domestic 
labour force is improved through educational investment and this moves the 
equilibrium from E0 to E', i.e. to market clearing situation. The shift from S to 
S" occurs with the imported labour and the equilibrium moves from E to E", i.e. 
the excess supply is more likely to be maintained.
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Fig.VII-8
(d) Effects of a change in product demand in different industries 
Consider two types of jobs I and II with cH(*) and cL(*) s.t.
ICnXoOWcjGOI Voc (VII-9)
With (2)(b), more able workers with low training cost are valued considerably 
highly relative to less able workers, i.e. the workers with high training cost in 
the job I than in the job II. The same comparison can be made between a skilled 
job and an unskilled job. This is because the former requires more training in 
terms of time spent or the level of intensity than the latter — remember that 
they are assumed to receive no training before the employment, so that the 
training cost differential among the workers of different ability is generally 
greater for the skilled job. It follows that the skilled job market ( i.e. job I ) is 
more likely to be characterized by a stable wage while the unskilled job market 
( i.e. job I I ) tends to exhibit a fluctuating wage, when the product demand
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changes. Also note the optimal wage i.e. the wage s.t. ^ ’=0 for the skilled job 
is higher than for the unskilled job. ( See Fig.VII-9 ) As for the employment 
level, this model suggests that the skilled job market tends to have excess sup­
ply, while the unskilled job market tends to be in market clearing.
It should be noted here that this result, though it may appear to be contrary, is 
compatible with an empirical finding that a skilled labour sector is generally 
characterized by a lower level of unemployment. There are two reasons for 
this. Firstly, a longer job queue in the skilled sector would imply a higher level 
of unemployment in that sector only if the skilled workers are confined to the 
skilled labour market. But as various models attempt to show, the skilled 
workers are accessible to the unskilled market as well. (See, for example, Fields 
(1974) and Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1977)). Under such an assumption the 
excess supply figure does not appear as an unemployment figure. Rather the 
excess supply becomes an issue of underemployment. This issue is analysed in 
the next chapter in the form of heterogeneous firms within one market.
Secondly, a job queue does not necessarily imply unemployment because what 
we consider here are "potentially" skilled and unskilled workers. If they had 
already been skilled or unskilled by the time they enter the market, they would 
have been distinguishable, which does not accord with our assumption. Our 
workers are unskilled before the OJT so that if not selected they will still be 
unskilled whichever market they apply to.
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Fig.VII-9: Equilibrium path
(3) Policy implications
Three policy implications can be drawn from this. First, an attempt to elim­
inate the excess supply in a skilled job sector by lowering the wage will not 
succeed since this will push the firms away from the optimal point, where the 
wage is equated to the marginal productivity. This denies the suggestion that 
the unemployment exists because the wage is set too high by political pressure 
or social convention such as a minimum wage law and therefore the wage 
should be allowed to vary to eliminate the unemployment. Rather, a policy to 
control supply or demand should be implemented to eliminate the excess supply 
as it is an equilibrium phenomenon.
Secondly, improving the quality of labour force can reduce the excess supply
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through generating more demand for labour. There are at least three ways to do 
this. Firstly, an immigration of high grade labour will improve the distribution 
of ability at home. This was shown in (l)(d) of this chapter. The intuition 
behind this result is that the generally improved labour force stimulates the 
production through the reduction of c(a) and thus encourages the firms to 
employ more workers. However, this also expands the labour supply and thus 
the excess supply may not be reduced so much. ( See Fig.VII-3 ) Second, you 
may educate the domestic labour force. Compared with the immigration policy, 
this requires more time and cost. However, as this gives a reverse effect on the 
labour supply from the immigration policy as in Fig.VIII, it is more effective in 
eliminating the excess supply. The third way to improve the quality of labour 
force is through the reduction of training cost itself. It can be done by improv­
ing the training method of by receiving subsidies. Again, the firms find the 
workers less costly and thus employ more to expand production.
This could be pursued in either of two ways: (a) by reducing the cost evenly or
(b) by concentrating on reducing the cost of relatively lower ability. (See the 
argument in (l)(c) of this chapter) Analytically, they amount to shift CDF to 
the right by lowering c(*) and down by flattening c(*) respectively, and both 
reducing the excess supply. (See Fig.VII-10) The choice of or the emphasis on 
either of the two ways over the other should be based on both the direct cost of 
the training and its indirect social and economic implications as well as its 
effectiveness in reducing the excess supply in a following sense. Firstly, it may 
well be more economical to simply raise everyone's ability than concentrate
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on raising the ability of a particular group of workers. Secondly, 'a uniformaliza­
tion' of the workers' ability through raising more the ability of the relatively 
lower ability workers may act to give equal opportunity to everyone in the 
society, but at the expense of the more able group. Thirdly, in a long run it 
might contribute more to the economic growth if an effort is made to raise even 
further the ability of the more able group. Although these are highly important 
issues in educational planning, within the present model they are much outside 
of the scope of the present paper.
Thirdly, under the excess supply equilibrium an introduction of a minimum 
wage gives a different result from what one usually expects. The standard result 
of an effect on a minimum wage based on a two-market analysis —
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see, for example, Elliot (1990), is that an introduction of a minimum wage 
would raise the market wage of a ‘covered sector’, a sector that follows the 
minimum wage legislation, while the wage of the ‘uncovered sector’ would fall. 
This is because there is a “spill-over” of labour supply from the covered sector 
to the uncovered sector and this causes the uncovered sector’s wage to fall. The 
implication is the legislation is ineffective since securing a better wage is made 
at the expense of a fall in a wage of the uncovered sector. It is further suggested 
that generating extra demand for labour is a better policy since it should raise 
the wages of the both sectors.
The same story gives different interpretation in our model. Fig.VII-11 il­
lustrates the argument. Assume that there is an excess supply equilibrium — 
note that a fully unskilled job market has to be left out of this analysis since an 
excess supply equilibrium does not exist in such a labour market, having a
constant c(a). An introduction of a minimum wage, wmin above the optimal
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wage in the covered sector would initially drive those unemployed to the uncov­
ered sector — a shift from S to S’. However, their search of job would be 
unsuccessful since the optimal wage in the uncovered sector w^ stays un­
changed i.e. the group of workers attracted by the optimal wage still remains the 
best choice for the firm. Thus the effect of the legislation is simply to increase 
the total excess supply of labour over the two sectors. Hence, while the uncov­
ered sector clears with the wage below the minimum wage for the standard 
analysis, our model predicts that the wage in the uncovered sector will not be 
affected. Also in our model, an increase in the demand for labour may not 
result in an immediate increase in the wage as long as an excess supply exists in 
that sector. It might be more effective to raise the optimal wage itself. This can 
be done by reducing the training cost of relatively able workers, as the firm 
would find the able workers less expensive and decide to raise the optimal 
wage. Following the argument in (l)(c), one could do so by subsidizing the 
training cost of relatively abler workers and thereby reducing their training cost. 
( See Fig.VII-lO(b))
In this chapter we have established the following ;
Firstly, we looked at the effects on the market supply and demand of changes 
in the forms of exogeneously given functions and the product price. The main 
results are th a t: (1) an increase in p shifts the CDF to the right without affecting 
the optimum wage, (2) an uniform increase in c(*) shifts CDF to the right with­
out affecting the optimum wage, (3) an increase in the steepness of c(») shifts up
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CDF, raising the optimum wage.
Secondly, a downward rigidity of wage is more likely to be observed than an 
upward rigidity of wage. This is because the optimum wage acts as a lower 
bound of the wage offer range.
Thirdly, a labour market with a steeper c(*), which may represent a relatively 
skilled labour market, is more likely to exhibit an excess supply equilibrium and 
thus a downward wage rigidity and vice versa.
Fourthly, the theoretical finding of the present model that an excess supply 
phenomenon is attributed to skilled labour markets is compatible with an empir­
ical finding that the problem of unemployment is more serious in unskilled 
labour markets. This is due to two reasons : (1) the excess supply being derived 
in the present model ought to be considered as underemployment rather than 
unemployment —* in reality, the unemployed skilled workers are also accessible 
to unskilled labour market but not vice versa, (2) in the view of the fact that 
there is OJT, the workers are all "unskilled" without joining the production 
process.
Finally, the policy implications to be drawn from this are:
(1) lowering the wage will not solve the problem of excess supply.
(2) three ways to eliminate the excess supply are;
(i) an immigration of the high ability labour force
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(ii) educational investment on the existing labour force
(iii) a reduction of training cost
(3) an introduction of a minimum wage will not cause the wage of the uncov­
ered sector to fall as long as there is excess supply.
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CHAPTER V III: HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
In the previous chapters we have characterized labour markets in terms of the 
nature of OJT, i.e. training cost function, c(»). It was shown that a labour mar­
ket in which relatively unskilled labour is demanded tends to be characterized 
by market clearing equilibrium and thus by a flexible wage when faced to a 
change in the product demand, while that of skilled labour tends to be character­
ized by excess supply equilibrium and thus by a downwardly rigid wage.
In this chapter we assume that within a single market firms as well as the 
labour force are heterogeneous by allowing the firms to have different c(«)'s. 
After the equilibrium is established for this heterogeneous firm case, compar­
ative static analyses are given and the chapter is concluded with some policy 
implications.
(1) Equilibrium
Assume that there are two groups of identical firms, A and B, within one 
market with their types differing merely in the form of c(*); cA and cB, in such a 
way that their optimal wages are wA*>wB*. Or formally,
3 optimal wages, wA* and wB*
s.t. *FA'(aA*) =w'(ocA*)+cA(ocA*)=0 & wA*=w(aA*)
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S W f( (XB *)+C B ,( a B* ) = 0  &  W b * ^ 0^ * )  
and wA*=w( ocA*)>w B*=w( ccB*) (VIII-1)
These are the same functions as those appeared in Chapter III and thus have 
the characteristics described in the assumptions. Note, however, that cA and cB 
differ in cA(*) and cB(*) but share the same h(*). As for the difference of cA(*) 
and cB(*), we assume the single-crossing property, i.e. that cA(*) is always steep­
er than cB(*). Or formally,
ICa’OW Cb’O 1 V(koc<l (VIII-2)
Following the argument in Chapter VI about the relationship between c(*) and 
c(*), this in turn implies
lcA*(•)!>'^b’W  V (k a< l (VIII-3)
and consequently (VIII-1) holds. Fig.VIII-1 illustrates this. Notice that because 
of (VIII-3) *Fa lies to the right of 'Fg generating a A* greater than a B* and thus 
wA* greater than w B*. We will see later on in this chapter that two distinct wage 
offers can exist within a single market as long as the sum of the labour demand 
of the two groups of the firms does not exhaust the available labour supply. The 
multiplicity of the equilibrium wage can be best understood as these wages 
being on what is called as an "offer curve" in Rosen (1974) in his ambitious 
attempt to analyse an equilibrium of a heterogeneous labour market. The
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present model with the heterogeneity of firms can be thought of as a member of 
this type of job matching models with Tinbergen (1951) being one of the pi­
oneer works.
WA*
W  *  B
0 a  * a
w(a)
Fig. VIII-1
The basic framework of the equilibrium in the present model remains the same 
as that of the homogeneous firm case of the earlier part of this paper and Chap­
ter III in particular — the equilibrium can still be characterized either by market 
clearing or by excess supply. The difference, however, is that such an analysis 
has to be made within each group of firms forming what could be called a 
"sub-market" within the labour market. Furthermore, as might be expected, 
whether each sub-market exhibits market clearing or excess supply is condition­
al upon the behaviour of the other group. Market equilibrium must fall into one 
of the following categories; (i) excess supply in A & B (ii) excess supply in A 
and market clearing in B (iii) market clearing in A and excess supply in B (iv) 
market clearing in A and B. (See Table VIII-1 below, where the entries cor-
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respond to the supply and demand situations of the whole market.)
Sub-market B in
S>D S=D
Sub-market 
A in
S>D (i) S>D (ii) S=D
S=D (iii) Not defined (iv) S=D
Table VIII-1 : The characteristics of the market equilibrium
Let us consider these market equilibria in turn. In the following analysis we 
define;
Wj** : the equilibrium level of wage for the group i firms 
a.** : the ability level at the equilibrium wage, W;** i.e. wi**=w(ai**) 
x ** : the equilibrium level of employment of an individual firm in the 
group i
n  : a number of firms in the group i
Nj** : the total level of employment for the group i at the equilibrium s.t. 
Nj’^ n x * *  with i=A and B
(i) Excess supply in A & B
As the both sub-markets exhibit an excess supply, their optimal wages are the 
equilibrium wages. And the equilibrium levels of ability wage and employment 
for the two groups, (wA**,NA**,ocA**,) and (wB**,NB**,(XB**), must satisfy the 
following;
py'(xA**)=w( a A* *)+cA( aA* *) (VIII-4)
w '(aA**)+cA’(a A**)=0 
py’(xB**)=w(aB**)+cB(aB**) 
w '(aB* *)+cA’(a B**)=0
(VIII-5)
where xA**=NA**/nA and nAand x B**=NB**/nB. This is illustrated in Fig.VIII-2. 
In order to facilitate the diagrammatic representation, h(*) is assumed to be 
uniform over 0<oc<l and there is only one firm in each group i.e. nA=nB=l and 
thus xa* * = N a ** and xB**=NB** — we continue to assume that the firms are 
competitive rather than duopolistic. The equilibrium values are determined as 
follows; First, o^** and ocA** are derived from (VIII-5) and (VIII-7).( in 
Fig.VIII-2, they are the minimands of *FA and *FB respectively in the first quad­
rant) Given the CDF’s (VIII-4) and (VIII-6), the demand for labour is derived 
for a single firm in the each group i.e. xA** and xB**. ( In Fig.VIII-2, this is 
shown in the second quadrant.) And from this we can derive the demand for 
labour of the each sub-market, i.e. NA**=xA** and NB**=xB** since nA^ i B= l. ( 
See the fourth quadrant) If there is excess supply for the both sub-markets, the 
following conditions have to hold;
( In Fig.VIII-2, this means the empty space below the shaded and dotted areas in 
h(*) in the fourth quadrant.) It should be noted that the diagrammatical illustra­
tion is valid for any nA and nB. Changing these values merely change the sizes
H(oca**)>Na**
H(ocb* *)>Nb* *+Na* *(H(ccb * *)/H( a A* *))
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of the shaded areas — for example, when they are large the sub-markets and 
thus the whole market is more likely to be in market clearing. On the other 
hand, they do not affect the optimal wages at all.
|w (a)
x
h(a)
Fig.VIII-2
(ii) Excess supply in A and market clearing in B
The equilibrium conditions for the group A firms are the same as in (i), while 
the conditions for the group B firms do not include OWF. Instead, there is an 
equation expressing the market clearing o f the whole market. Namely,
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py'(xA**)=w(aA**)+cA(aA**)
w’(a A**)+cA'(aA**)=0
py'(xB**)=w(aB**)+cB(aB**)
H (aB**)=NB**+NA**(H(aB**)/H(aA**)) (VIII-8)
where xA**=NA**/nA and nAand xB**=NB**/nB Fig.VIII-3 shows how the 
equilibrium is reached. Suppose first that the two groups of firms offer their 
optimal wages i.e. the group A firms offering wA** and the group B firms 
offering wB*, the optimal wage(cf. the first quadrant). This will generate the 
labour demand of xA** and xB° for a single firm in each group, (cf. the second 
quadrant). This means in turn for the each sub-market the labour demand of 
Na** and Nb°. However, this gives excess demand for labour for the whole 
market for the wage below wB* — this is indicated by the "double shaded" area 
in the fourth quadrant. The excess demand causes the group B firms' wage offer 
to rise above their optimal wage wB* as far as wB**, at which the supply equals 
the demand through an increase in the supply (cf. the fourth quadrant) and a 
decrease in the demand (cf. the second quadrant). Note here that the equilibri­
um in the sub-market A is not affected at all, since its higher wage offer means 
no worker chooses a group B firm when he faces the two different wage offers.
(iii) Market clearing in A and excess supply in B
This is not plausible since if the group A firms can clear the market with the 
wage wA**, which is above their optimal wage by definition, then no group B 
firm can attract any worker with their optimal wage, which is their offer wage
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with excess supply. This is indicated by "Not defined" in Table VIII-1.
|w(a)
W,B
N **
Fig.VIII-3
(iv) Market clearing in A and B 
Suppose first that the sub-market A is in market clearing at wage wA+, which 
is higher than the optimal wage wA* by definition. Then no group B firm can 
attract any worker at its optimal wage wB*, since w A+>wA*>wB* and whoever 
willing to work at w B* is already employed by a group A firm as there is no
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Fig.VIII-4
excess supply. A group B firm will have to raise the offer wage as high as wA+ 
to compete with the group A firms. With the group B firms joining the demand 
for labour, there will be an excess demand, which will cause the wage to fall 
until the supply equals demand. In this case there will be a unique equilibrium 
wage.
At the equilibrium the solutions (w A**,NA**,ccA**,) and (w B**,NB**,ocB**) 
must satisfy the following ;
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py'(xA**)=w(aA**)+cA(aA**)
py'(xB**)=w(aB**)+cB(aB**)
Na* *+Nb **=H(aA**)
(VIII-10)
where xA**=NA**/nA and nAand xB**=NB**/nB and (VIII-10) indicates a single 
equilibrium wage. This is illustrated in Fig.VIII-4. Note that at a A** *FA and 
*FB are positively sloped (cf. the first quadrant), implying that no excess supply 
exists. This also means NA**+NB**=H(ocA**) (cf. the fourth quadrant)
(2) The Training Cost Function and Multiple Wage Equilibrium
In Chapter VII, we have shown that a steeper c( •) and thus a steeper c (#) tends 
to cause the market equilibrium to be characterized with the excess supply of 
labour under the assumption of homogeneous firms i.e. uniform c(*). What 
effects could generally steeper c(*)'s and thus c(*)'s have on the market equilibri­
um when firms are heterogeneous within a market, i.e. when c(*) differs among 
the firms ?
We can answer this question in two ways, both of which would simply be 
derived as corollaries to what we have just found. Firstly, there is a question 
concerning each group of firms within a market. It was shown that the steeper 
c(*) is relative to others the higher the optimal wage would be and thus the more
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likely it is to have a job queue i.e. excess supply.
Secondly, let us consider two different markets each of which consists of 
heterogeneous firms in the present sense. A market whose firms are generally 
characterized by steep c(*) is more likely to be in excess supply equilibrium and 
hence to be characterized by a multiple wage equilibrium, the wage being the 
optimal wages of each firm. On the other hand, a market whose firms are 
generally characterized by flatter c(*) is more likely to be in a market clearing 
and single wage equilibrium.
(3) Comparative statics
We shall examine the effect of a change in product demand on the levels of 
equilibrium wage and employment by looking at two types of price change. 
Firstly, we look at the effect of the product price change on equilibrium in a 
market with two groups of firms, who are competitors in the same product 
market, i.e. there is a unique product price p, that changes. Secondly, we allow 
the two groups to be suppliers of different products, whose prices are pA and pB. 
In this latter case, our aim is to examine the comparative statics of a change in 
only one of the two product prices.
(a) The effect of a product price change in a single industry case 
It was shown that the market equilibrium for the two-group case is character­
ized by one of the following.
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(i) Excess supply equilibrium with both firms facing an excess supply.
(ii) Market clearing equilibrium with the group A firm facing excess 
supply and the group B firm facing market clearing.
(iii) Market clearing equilibrium with both firms facing market clearing.
In terms of the product price, (i) is likely to occur with relatively low p, (iii) 
with relatively high p, while (ii) is the intermediate case. An equilibrium wage 
locus in terms of the product price p is illustrated in Fig.VIII-5(a), with the areas 
with numbers corresponding to the above three types of the equilibrium, and p, 
and p2 signifying the product prices above which the group B firms and the 
group A firms face market clearing levels of labour supply respectively. It is 
worthwhile mentioning that as the product demand increases the wage dif­
ferential, wA**-wB** narrows down, with its upper and lower bounds being 
w a* " w b *  anc*zero respectively and with the wage offer of the steeper c(*) group 
being more rigid. Furthermore, the closer the slopes of cA(*) and cB(*) are, the 
closer wA* and w B* are, and the more rigid wB* is. (i.e. (ii) is less likely to 
occur) ( See Fig.VIII-5(b) in comparison with (a ) ).
The argument may be extended to a case of multiple optimal wage equilibri­
um. (Fig.VIII-6(a) illustrates a case of five groups of firms with each having 
distinct optimal wage Wj* with i=A,B,C,D,& E s.t. wA*> wB*>wc*>wD*>wE*) 
Again they are assumed to be competitive. The loci are derived in a following 
manner. Suppose first that at 0<p<pj the level of labour demand is low enough 
for all of the five groups of the firms to be in excess supply in their sub-markets.
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When p rises all the firms will raise their demand and the group E with the 
lowest optimal wage is the one who faces the market clearing first. As a result 
they will have to raise their wage offer until it reaches w D*, the optimal wage o f  
the group D firms. During this time other groups can secure their demand at 
their optimal wages and thus they will not have to change the wage offers. And 
this process will continue until all the offer wages are equalized, after which 
point there will be a uniform wage. Notice that the highest optimal wage group 
i.e. group A offer the most rigid wage, while the lowest optimal wage group i.e. 
group E offers the most flexible wage as the product price varies.
w
w
w
0 0 P
(a) when w*'s are not close (b) when w*'s are close
Fig.VIII-5
An interesting implication o f this result is that the distribution o f  the wages is 
more equal when the product demand is high i.e. in a boom. A family o f the 
distributions o f wages for different product price levels is given in the Fig.VIII- 
6(b), when there is only one firm in each group. Note here that the distributions 
apart from the extreme cases i.e. all at wA* and all are distinct, are skewed to the
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right. Although one has to be careful when deriving a hypothesis to explain the 
real world phenomenon from a simplified model, it is worthwhile noting that a 
similar skewness is observed with the distribution of personal income in the real 
world. The skewness is often explained in relation to a normally distributed 
ability — what is known as "Pigou paradox" that a normally distributed ability 
does not generate a normally distributed income but a Pareto or lognormal 
distribution o f income. In the present model the skewness came from a uniform­
ly distributed optimal wages as opposed to Roy(1950) but with more elements 
of econom ics than Champernowne(1953). (See Chapter II(2)(iv)) Indeed it is 
important because this derivation takes into consideration the demand side o f  
the market.
w
w
w
W,
W
w
(a) Equilibrium wage loci
firms
P
(b) Equilibrium wage distribution
Fig.VIII-6
So far we have not specified which equilibrium among the three (i.e. (i) (ii) 
and (iii)) a market is actually in. This can only be determined ex post by observ­
ing the behaviour o f the wage when the product price change actually occurs.
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However, it is plausible to state that in the market where c(*) is generally steep 
the market is more likely to be in the excess supply equilibrium and vice versa.
Within the same industry, the different steepness of c(*)'s among the firms is 
best interpreted as the difference of the system of training workers of the firms. 
Firms with steep c(*)'s think that the opportunity wage of a worker (defined as 
his productivity in an alternative job such as in a self-employment sector) is a 
quite reliable proxy to his training cost and vice versa. The following example 
might help the reader to verify this point. Assume that the opportunity wage 
reflects one's productivity in a self-employed sector, in which strong individuali­
ty rather than conformity counts. Then a firm in which workers are trained 
individually may be categorized as having a steep c(*) since it means to value 
workers with high opportunity wages highly, while a firm with a mass training 
scheme may be categorized as having a flatter c(#). We might label the former 
a "specialist firm" and the latter a "generalist firm" — here we do not employ the 
terms skilled and unskilled labour as in the previous chapter, to illustrate that 
the difference of c(*) is due to difference in OJT process rather than that in skill 
level.
With these labelling, the results in the section can be rephrased as;
(1) Generalist firms offer lower wages than specialist firms.
(2) A wage offer of generalist firms is more flexible.
It should be noted that whether these two types of firms co-exist depends on 
two things. At a theoretical level, their profit levels must be such that it does
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not pay a firm to change its OJT method because of a certain fixed cost of 
starting a new OJT scheme, as different OJT method could mean different profit 
level. At a more practical level, they often co-exist as the values that workers 
put on the work, be it monetary or non-monetary, differ among them. We do 
not analyse in detail this latter aspect in the present paper, since here the utility 
functions of workers are assumed to be identical and are functions of the present 
wage only.
(b) The effects of a product price change in a multi-industry case 
So far we have limited our analysis to a labour market for one industry or 
firms competing in the same product market. In this section we consider a 
labour market where the demand comes from more than one industry. Conse­
quently, the different c(*) may be the result of different types of skills required 
in different industries. It also needs to be pointed out that there are more than 
one product price that could change when considering comparative statics. We 
examine the effect of a change in product prices pA and pB on equilibrium in 
turn.
(i) A change in pA
Assume that the both groups are facing excess supply. An increased labour 
demand for the group A firms will be met initially by using up the excess sup­
ply at the beginning without a wage increase. Once the excess supply is exhaust­
ed, wA** starts attracting the workers who would otherwise work for a group B 
firm. This will cause the group B firms to raise their wage offer above their 
optimal wage wB*.
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(ii) A change in pB
Suppose that both the group A firms and the group B firms are facing excess 
supply with their optimal wages as the equilibrium wages, i.e. wA*=wA** and 
wB*=wB**. The increase of labour demand is initially met without raising the 
wage offer wB**, because of the excess supply situation. The wage will have to 
be raised when there is no excess supply left for the group B firms. And wB** 
will continue to rise until it reaches wA*, after which the two wage offers rise 
together.
The equilibrium wage loci of the above two cases resemble that of (a), where 
pA=pB. The main point here is that irrespective of which price changes, the 
wage offer to be influenced initially is that of the firms offering a lower wage 
i.e. the group B firms' wB** in our case. In particular, an increase in the labour 
demand of the higher wage offer firms raises the wage offer of the lower wage 
offer firm. If we define these two groups of firms A and B as demanders of 
skilled and unskilled labour respectively —■ we do not call them specialist and 
generalist firms as in (a) since we defined these terms to mean different process­
es of producing the same product while the two groups here are suppliers of 
distinct products, the above result may be rephrased as "an increased demand 
for skilled labour raises the wage offer of the unskilled labour." (See Fig.VIII-6)
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(5) Statistical Discrimination
The concept of heterogeneous firms employed in this chapter can also be used 
to explain how statistical discrimination occur in labour markets. To see this 
recall two groups of firms, A and B, of Chapter VIII (1). And replace the 
groups by groups of workers, A and B, while all the firms are assumed to be 
identical. Each group consists of heterogeneous in terms of c(*) but indistin­
guishable workers, while the groups are distinguishable from each other.
w *B
wA*
w(a)
Fig.VIII-8
0 (Xb* aA* a
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Fig.VIII-8 illustrates how the discrimination would take place. The firm faces 
two groups of workers whose average labour cost are given by 
vFA(a)= w(a)+cA(a) and 'F B(a)=w(a)+cB(a)
The firm would offer the wage that minimizes the labour cost i.e. wA*. Howev­
er, in order to secure the minimum labour cost it needs to refuse all the group B 
applicants, since a typical group B worker attracted by wA* has a much higher 
expected labour cost. This is the case of statistical discrimination, since not all 
workers in the group B are less productive than those in the group A and yet 
they are refused. Such discrimination may be dealt with by an anti- 
discri mi nation legislation appealing for an equal opportunity to all. However, 
this will force the firms away from the optimal point. The better remedy lies in 
the change of ability distribution of the group B through education so that the 
firms do not find it profitable to discriminate against the group B.
(6) Policy Implications
There are three main policy implications that can be drawn from the results 
obtained in this section. The first is concerned with non-uniformity of the 
equilibrium wage. In a simple neo-classical framework, the existence of multi­
ple wage may be explained as a result of a luck of information on the wage 
variation or a lack of competition among the firms to eliminate the variation. In 
the present approach, instead, it was shown that multiple wage is possible at the 
equilibrium, when the firms are heterogeneous, with the heterogeneity being 
expressed here in terms of different OJT cost among the firms. It was also
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noted that the multiplicity would be more likely in a market where labour traded 
is mostly skilled. Hence the resulting unequal distribution of labour earnings 
can not be eliminated by making available the information on the wage vari­
ation or by encouraging the competition among the firms. As the multiplicity 
comes from the heterogeneities in both workers and the firms, the most effec­
tive policy to eliminate the inequality would be to eliminate the heterogeneities 
themselves. As for the firms, this means for all the firms to have an identical 
training cost function so that the optimal wage is unique to all the firms. Or the 
government may be able to tax or subsidize the firms on their training cost to 
uniformalize the optimal wage. As for the firms, this would mean to, for exam­
ple, recommend to all the firms to pursue the same OJT. As for the workers, the 
opportunity wage has to be uniformalized among the potential workers by 
means of educational planning. This would supplement the training as post- 
educational investment. .
The second is concerned with the distribution of labour earnings and business 
cycle. The labour earnings are distributed more equally during booms with high 
labour demand and more unequally during slumps with low labour demand 
— the second part of Kuznet's Reversed U shape hypothesis i.e. after some spell 
of income unequalization, economic growth will eventually bring about the 
equality. (See Kuznets (1963)) Thus the redistribution of income through 
taxation is most needed when it would hurt the economy most, rather than when 
the economy can afford to be generous to the less fortunate members of the 
society.
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Thirdly, the wages are not determined by equating supply and demand unless 
the market is in market clearing equilibrium and hence the wage differential is 
the direct result of the production process and in particular of the OJT. There­
fore those wage differentials can not be eliminated or eased by controlling the 
supply of or demand for various types of labour, as is the case for neo-classical 
models of labour markets. So, for example, a rise in demand for skilled labour 
raises the wage of unskilled labour first and thus reduces the wage differential, 
while in a neo-classical model this would widen the wage differential.
In this chapter, we have established the following ;
Firstly, we have shown that when firms are heterogeneous within a market in 
terms of c(*) a multiple wage equilibrium is possible. The necessary condition 
for the multiple wage equilibrium to occur is that the firm with the highest wage 
offer faces an excess supply of labour. Conversely for the highest wage offer 
firm to be in market clearing means that the whole market is in market clearing 
equilibrium and with its wage being the single equilibrium wage.
Secondly, with comparative static analysis it was shown that in a multiple 
equilibrium situation, the lower the wage is relative to other offers the more 
flexible it is as the product demand fluctuates. Also the theoretical model 
suggests that the distribution of wages is skewed to left just as the real world 
income distribution shows, with it becoming more equal in booms and less
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equal in slumps.
Thirdly, with different types of industries acting as demanders of labour in the 
same labour market, wage offers for skilled labour tends to be more rigid than 
those for unskilled labour. Whichever product it may be, a change in its de­
mand affects most the wage offer of the most unskilled labour. In particular, a 
rise in demand for products for which a skilled labour is required will first raise 
the offer wage of unskilled labour. The rational behind this result is that the 
demanders of the unskilled labour have to raise the wage to make up for the 
labour supply taken away by the skilled labour demanders.
Fourthly, the model was used to explain how statistical discrimination could 
occur. It was pointed out that an anti-discrimination legislation to give equal 
opportunity to all would force the firms away from the optimal point and thus 
some other policy to change the ability distribution of the discriminated group 
would be more advisable.
Finally, some policy implications were drawn. The multiple wage is not a 
market failure and thus the policy to eliminate it would require basic revisions 
of supply of and /or demand for labour. The equity measure is more important 
in slump than in booms. And lastly the wage of unskilled labour is affected and 
is so first by a change in demand for any type of labour.
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CHAPTER IX OBSERVATIONALLY DISTINGUISHABLE WORKERS
(1) Introduction
So far we have been assuming that ability of each worker is not observable to 
the firm at the time of contract. Indeed, this was the crucial assumption in 
explaining as to why the workers are paid uniformly despite their heterogeneity 
in the earlier model. In reality, however, it is more likely that the ability of each 
applicant is known to the recruiting firm at least partially. Recall the excess 
supply equilibrium we have described earlier on. If a firm can select workers 
from those willing to work at the optimal wage rather than picking them at 
random, it will rank and recruit workers according to the ability level, because 
the total training cost would be reduced. This in turn raises the employment 
level.. Thus it is the interest of the recruiting firm to know the ability levels of 
the applicants.
Typically, a job opening specifies an offer wage and a minimum hiring stan­
dard as well as other aspects of working conditions. This also prompts the 
potential workers to reveal their ability — otherwise, they may be considered as 
not satisfying the standard and fail to get the job. Hence the distinguishability 
becomes an important element for both sides of the labour market. In this 
chapter, we examine the mechanism of a labour market, in which observational- 
ly distinguishable workers form a job queue by their known ability levels for 
jobs specifying the wage offer and the minimum hiring standard. The basic
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framework of this model is unchanged from the indistinguishable workers case 
of the earlier chapter. In particular, the recruiting firms offer OJT and the 
uniform wage is offered to several openings of an identical job despite the 
heterogeneity of the applicants.
There are several theoretical issues to be clarified before we move on to the 
analysis. To illustrate them, let us first present an example of a type of a labour 
market we have in mind in this chapter. In Japan, where there are more than 
500,000 university students graduating in March every year, early summer 
months are the busiest time for the final year students with their job search. 
Although most of them are lucky enough to secure a job before graduation, this 
activity is rather tiresome for the job searching students as well as for the recruit­
ing firms, with so many future workers trying to find the ideal post within few 
months. To fit in all those, many large firms offer tens or even hundreds of the 
same job openings and give them OJT. Typically, the job applicants experience 
a three-stage recruiting procedure by a firm. At the first stage, screening by 
educational credentials singles out the applicants with good academic achieve­
ments as well as from universities of relatively high reputation. The successful 
applicants are then invited to take a short test, in which general rather than 
specific knowledge is asked. This may be repeated and by the end of this stage 
the number of applicants is greatly reduced. An interview or several interviews 
are held in the last stage of the recruitment for the group of applicants already 
small enough to make more detailed and personal evaluations. The applicants 
are asked to express their commitment to the firm, the fellow employees and to 
the job itself. If the interviews are repeated, the interviewers are upgraded in
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the firm’s hierarchy each time.
The newly recruited workers, who are relatively homogeneous by age will 
receive OJT, a training necessary to adapt them to the new working environ­
ment. This will then be followed by a promotion race. In Japan, the path to the 
promotion is known to be quite long compared to those in other developed 
countries. Koike (1991) argues, for example, that the major promotion for 
university graduates could take place as late as 15 years after the recruitment.
Several remarks may be made about this example. Firstly, the competitions 
for jobs is hard and tiresome not because of large excess supply of labour but 
because each graduate applies to many firms. In a way such a search strategy is 
not meaningless, as the firms see the educational achievement as an indicator of 
trainability rather than immediate productive quality in its own right — in 
general it is more so for students of non-pure science courses than to those of 
science courses but the former group is much larger. Furthermore, the ranking 
table of universities makes university entrance extremely competitive. And this 
makes many families start investing in education of their children at a much 
earlier stage. Many educationalists hold the opinion that such an interest in 
education is rather overheated, and these selected graduates are not always so 
much more productive than others since academic achievement is not the only 
quality needed for job performance. In fact some firms, notably Sony already 
for some years, do not ask the applicants which university they graduated from. 
But it has not yet become the standard procedure. ( See Takeuchi (1995) for 
more extended analysis. He provides extremely useful information on this
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issue. I do not deal with it here mainly because it is more of a sociological 
approach and thus would not be directly relevant to the present analysis.)
Secondly, despite a decade or more that the workers have to wait to receive 
what they deserve, the quit rate is not known to be particularly high in Japan 
compared with other developed countries. ( See Koike (1991)) This is puz­
zling, at least theoretically, since one might expect the workers to quit to move 
to other job or where he can be paid what he thinks is worth right away. Con­
trast this type of turnover with the relationship between training and job tenure 
discussed earlier in Chapter II and Chapter V. It was about evaluating productiv­
ity of workers over time in the world of homogeneous labour, while here we are 
concerned with evaluating workers of homogeneous ability. There are several 
reasons for not paying the wage according to one’s productivity even if the 
individual difference is known by the educational credentials. Firstly, it would 
be too tedious and costly to derive an individual wage scheme for everyone 
recruited to the same job — the productivity difference among the recruits may 
be too insignificant especially in our example. To the extent that OJT is a group 
activity, it might be difficult to determine the individual OJT cost — the firm 
may know the total OJT cost instead. Put it differently, firms are not likely to 
adjust the wage to individual recruits who are expected to perform the same 
task. There are cases where the wage may be set according to one’s productivi­
ty. For example, an already highly skilled worker may negotiate his wage to 
fully reflect his productivity. But it is a different type of labour market all 
together from our case of recruiting inexperienced workers to train them to be 
skilled. And even for our highly skilled worker the wage will be associated to
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the job characteristics or grade — the firm would claim that the employee 
receives £ x per month say, because he performs a job of the grade y say, which 
generates the productivity worth £ x, rather than because his productivity is 
worth £ x. The best way to imagine it is that workers are allocated to already 
existing job slots and there is not always a slot for everyone. Extended discus­
sions on such an issue are found in the job evaluation literature in the manage­
ment science — see, for example, Patten (1977) for an introductory reference, 
but often their arguments are not based on economic theories.
There is also a question of an accuracy of the screening — the educational 
credentials need to be complemented by short tests and interviews, because it is 
not considered to be the perfect screening device. After all, the best way to 
screen is monitoring on the job. It may not be a good idea to determine one’s 
wage fully based on the pre-employment information, which is not perfect.
That this inaccurately measured wage can affect one’s incentive to work is 
another reason for the uniform wage. ( See Patten (1977)) Think of the recruit­
ment as the starting point of a promotion race. It would be the interest of the 
firm to organize a fair race starting with the same wage and rewarding later on 
properly reflecting the achievement of each participant.
One might also wonder what happens to those unsuccessful applicants i.e. 
those with the credentials below the minimum hiring standard. Can they, for 
example, improve the chance of recruitment by offering to work at a lower 
wage? Recall that in the indistinguishable workers case, the further attempt of 
unsuccessful applicants by offering to work at a lower wage is not effective as
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this merely acts to reveal their low level of ability. When the ability is observ­
able, the wage offer of those unsuccessful applicants will be bid down to their 
own opportunity wages as the firms are assumed to know w(a). As this is the 
wage they can earn in the alternative sector, they do not find worthwhile to seek 
an employment in this firm. Notice that this argument is valid provided that the 
successful applicants are paid the uniform wage, the assumption supported by 
the earlier remarks of this chapter. Thus as long as the uniform wage is main­
tained by the reasons explained earlier, no once-unsuccessful applicant can 
make it with the second attempt by undercutting his offer wage.
The model of this chapter is a simplified version of such a process of recruit­
ment, OJT and promotion as described by the Japanese example. Thus the 
model is particularly relevant to the labour market for new recruits who require 
training , and not for already skilled workers. In this model ‘qualification’, the 
educational credential, is the only screening device and there is no short test or 
interview. The underlining assumption is that the qualification is not perfect but 
superior at least to the other two. Secondly, it is a one-period model with 
recruitment and OJT but without promotion. A multi-period model with promo­
tion races would be more complete and appropriate particularly for dealing with 
the incentive aspect. However, we stay with the one-period model in order to 
concentrate on the adverse selection aspect of the labour market model in rela­
tion to the heterogeneity of labour. The equilibrium will be described by a 
market clearing situation for the workers with the qualification range covered 
between the wage offer, i.e. the qualification of the workers whose opportunity 
wage is the optimal wage, and the minimum hiring standard. And those below
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the minimum hiring standard forming the excess supply.
(2) The Model
Recall the set of profit maximization conditions for the model with indistin­
guishable workers,
py’(xd)=c(a)+w(oc) (HI-7)
?(a)+w '(a)=0 (III-8)
from which a* and x* are derived for the excess supply equilibrium. And the 
profit is,
7U,=py(x*)-[w*(a*)+c(<x*)]x* (IX-1)
It follows from this that if the firm can choose a particular group of x* workers 
out of the pool of workers at w* by setting a minimum hiring standard a , its 
profit would be increased. This is because selecting the better x* workers in 
such a way from the pool of workers would imply,
7i„=py(x*)-[w*(a*)+c(a,a*)]x* (IX-2)
J  c(z)h(z)dz 
where c(a,a)=   and oc=a*
Jh(z)dz
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And as dc(a,cc)/doc <0 and c(a*) = c(0,a*) = c(0,oc)
c(a*) > c(a ,a) for 0 < a< a  (IX-3)
Consequently, 7C, < 7C,,
Formally, the firm's optimization problem for the present model is,
max_[7CII=py(x)-{w(a)+c(a,a)}x] (IX-4)
x ,a ,a
The first order conditions are,
drc,, / dx=py'(x)-{w(oc)+c(a,a)}=0 
dKn / da= -{c1(a,a)}x>0 
dKn / da=-{w '(a)+c2(a,a)}x=0
where c,=dc/daand c2= d d d a
Note that the second condition holds with equality, when x*=0 or , a= a , both 
implying 'no production'. In other words, the optimum value for a  is indetermi­
nate within this set of the first order conditions. In order to determine x*, a*  
and a* (or w* equivalently), the firm requires a condition for labour supply 
availability unlike in the case of observationally indistinguishable workers,
-197-
(IX-5)
(IX-6)
(IX-7)
where it comes to the market with their desired levels of wage and the employ­
ment. The first and the third together would be equivalent to the conditions for 
the case of observationally indistinguishable workers if a=0. Consequently the 
third condition does not necessarily hold with equality either just as for a market 
clearing case of the previous model.
The optimum values x*, a*  and a*  are determined as the market equilibrium 
values such that,
where, as in the indistinguishable workers' case, H (0  is the portion of the 
labour supply that is available to one firm.
These three conditions imply in turn;
(i) the marginal productivity is equal to the marginal labour cost
(ii) the marginal labour cost with respect to a  is non-positive.
(iii) supply equals demand
And unlike the indistinguishable workers' case, they will have to be determined 
simultaneously. Recall that (IX-9) depends on a  as well as a . Although there 
is no excess supply equilibrium in the sense described earlier, the equilibria 
should be categorized into two types in terms of the value of a — a>0 means it
py'(x)={w(a)+c(a,a)}
w'(a)+c2(a,a)<0
H(a)-H(a)=x (IX-10)
(IX-8)
(IX-9)
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succeeded in securing the labour force with w'(oc)+c2(a,a)=0, while a=0 means 
that the firm could not secure the quality and quantity of workers it had wished 
with w'(cx)+c2(a,a)<0. Therefore they are analogous to excess supply and 
market clearing respectively.
Fig.IX-1 shows how the equilibrium is reached in this model with distinguish­
able workers. We assume the uniformly distributed h(*) as in the similar di­
agrammatical illustrations of earlier chapters. Firstly, let the firm set the min­
imum hiring standard at 0. Since a  is now fixed, c (v )  depends on a  alone. 
Assume first that (IX-9) holds with inequality. This is identical to the market 
clearing equilibrium of the indistinguishable worker case. If (IX-9) holds with 
equality, this in turn determines a , say, in the equation and together they, i.e. 
0 and a 0, determine the supply of labour i.e. H(oc0)-H(0)=a0 and the demand for 
labour, i.e. x0 through (IX-8) at the same time. In this particular example, 
x0> a0, i.e. there is excess demand. And the wage would be raised to ate the 
supply and demand. This would mean in turn that a new set of offers, i.e. {a, 
w(a)} has to be made to attract more workers. In this diagram, it is expressed 
by a higher wage w*=w(a*) and a positive minimum hiring standard a*. Note 
that with a*>0, c(a*,a)>c(a0,a) V a < a ^ l. This also implies that RHS of 
(IX-8) becomes smaller, resulting in a new and higher level of x, as py'(x) is 
lower. The process will continue until (IX-10) is met. In Fig.IX-1, x*=oc*-a*. 
Note that for every a , there exists some a  to satisfy (IX-9). In Fig.IX-1 the 
optimal wage is indicated to be greater for (IX-9) with a greater value of a . 
However whether this holds depends on the functional form of c (v ) . This is
discussed later.
What is established here is that involuntary unemployment can exist at the 
equilibrium just as for the models o f the earlier chapter with indistinguishable 
workers. But here the unemployed are not randomly chosen from those willing  
to work at the offer wage but they are the workers with their ability lower than 
the minimum hiring standard. In fact the indistinguishable workers' case may 
be thought o f as a constrained case o f the present model, with the constraint 
being a^O. The type o f a labour market that is likely to exhibit the excess 
supply equilibrium is the same as the earlier model. Hence, the minimum 
qualification is more likely to exist in a skilled job market, in which excess 
supply is more likely, than in an unskilled job market.
Fig.IX-1
(3) Comparative statics
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Having determined the equilibrium mechanism of this model with distinguish­
able workers, we can now turn to its comparative static analysis. We shall 
examine the effect of a change in the product demand on employment schedules 
i.e. on the wage level and the minimum hiring standard. One of the quite inter­
esting and practical questions here is how changes in economic state affects the 
heterogeneous workers. Take a case of reduced product demand. If, for exam­
ple, such a reduction is met by raising the minimum hiring standard without 
affecting the wage, then this would hurt less able workers more as they are 
going to be involuntarily unemployed. If, on the other hand, the reduction in 
demand is met by lowering the equilibrium wage, then this would hurt everyone 
equally in the sense that everyone still in employment will face the reduction in 
wage and those who left the job did so voluntarily. Thus the comparative statics 
in this model can tell us about the distributional effects of a change in economic 
state. Or "Would a bad time affect everyone equally by reducing the wage or 
the less able workers more by raising the minimum hiring standard?"
In pursuing the analysis, we need to consider the case of oc>0 only, for if a=0, 
then the equilibrium exhibits a market clearing situation in the sense described 
in the earlier chapters with indistinguishable workers and thus an exogeneous 
change at the margin would not affect a . Differentiate, therefore, (IX-8),
(IX-9) with equality, and (IX-10) with respect to p and we obtain,
py"(x)(dx/dp)+y'(x)=wf(a)(da/dp)+c1(a,a)(da/dp)+c2(a,a)(da/dp)
(IX-11)
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w"(oc)(da/dp)+c2,(a,a)(da/dp)+c22(a,a)(da/dp)=0
h(a)(da/dp)-h(a)(da/dp)=dx/dp
(IX-12)
(IX-13)
where c21(oc,a)=02c/5a6a and c22(a ,a)= 52c/6oc2
With w '(a)+c2(a,a)=0 at the equilibrium, (IX-11) (IX-12) and (IX-13) may be 
written in a matrix form as;
py" 0 -C l dx /d p -y*(x)
0 W"-|-C22 C2I d a /d p — 0
_ l -h(cc) h ta). _da/dp_ .  0  .
(IX-14)
And therefore
dx/dp =IA|-' {-yf((w"+c22)h(a)+c2I»h(a))} (IX-15)
doi/dp =IAI'* {-y,#c2l} (IX-16)
da/dp =IAI*‘ {y’(w"+c22)} (IX-17)
where IAI=py"{(w,t+c22)h(a)+c21*h(a)}+(w,,+c22)c], i.e. the determinant of the 
matrix of (IX-14)
Among the terms in (IX-15) (IX-16) (IX-17) and IAI, we know;
y’>0, y"<0, w"+c22>0, h(*)>0, Cj<0, c22>0, p>0, 
while we do not know the sign of c21. However,
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_  _  _  J  c(z)h(z)dz
C2|— c21(a ,a )  = d 7c / d a d a =  ( d / d a d a )  -^-=----------
Jh(z)dz
= (d /da )  [h(a){c(a)~ c(a,a)}/{H(a)-H(a)}]
= [h(a)/{H(a)-H(a)}2 ][-c,(^a){H (a)-H (a)}+{c<a)-c(a,a)}h(a)]
= [h(oc)h(a)/{H(a)-H(a)}2][c(a)+c(a)-2c(a,a)] (IX-18)
since c,= -h(a){c(a)-c(a,oc)}/{H(a)-H(oc)} (IX-19)
Thus c21>(<)0 if (l/2){c(a)+c(a)}>(<)c(a,a) (IX-20)
It is difficult to say anything precise about the direction of the inequality 
without specifying at least functional forms of c(*) and h(*). All that can be said 
at this point is that c ( v )  has c(a) and c(a) as its upper and lower bounds respec­
tively, with these polar cases representing the limiting cases of h(*) being con­
centrated at a  and a  respectively. Therefore a very high concentration of the 
distribution at a  would imply c21<0 and at a  c2I>0. However, as a  and a  are not 
exogeneously given variables but rather they are endogeneously determined in 
the market equilibrium, we can not state whether c21>(<)0 by simply examining 
the shape of h(«) in this manner. However, given the sign and the size of c21, the 
signs of (IX-15) (IX-16) and (IX-17) can be easily determined. To see this 
group the terms which appear in (IX-15) (IX-16) and (IX-17) into the following 
four terms — IAI, {-y'((w"+c22)h(qc)+c21*h(a))}, -y'*c2l, and y'(w"+c22). Their
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signs will depend on the sign and the size of c2l in such a way that,
IAI =py,,{(w"+c22)h(a)+c21*h(a)}+(w"+c22)c ,>0,
if c2l< -{h(a)/h(a)}(w"+c22)[l+{c,/h(a)py"}] 
{-y'((w"+c22)h(a)+c2,*h(a))} >0, if c21>-{h(a)/h(a)}(w"+c22)
-y'*c21>0, if c21>0 
y'(w"+c22)>0 for all values of c21
And for these ranges of c21, the signs of (IX-15) (IX-16) and (IX-17) are deter­
mined as in Table IX-1 below.
c2,<B c21—B B<c21<C
ull_N
I o C<c21<0 c2,=0 0<C2I
dx/dp + ? - 0 + + 4*
da/dp + ? - - - 0 +
da/dp + ? - - - - -
where B= -{h(a)/h(a)}(w"+c22)[l+{c1/h(oc)py"}] and C= -{h(a)/h(a)}(w"+c22)
Table IX-1
The case of 0<c21 is what one would normally expects from an increased 
demand for product, where it generates an increase in the employment level by 
raising the wage offer (since an increase in a  means an increase in w) as well as 
relaxing the minimum hiring standard. The case of c21=0 is an interesting one as 
it claims that the increase in employment is achieved by lowering the minimum 
hiring standard only without changing the wage offer. When C<c2I<0, the wage
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offer is reduced while the employment level is increased, implying that the firm 
decides to employ less able but cheaper workers. The cases of B<c21<C and 
c2l=C show rather unexpected results that the increased demand for the product 
causes the reduction and no change in the labour demand respectively. The 
entries for the case of c2l=B mean that they are undefined since this condition 
implies IAI=0 and in such a case we can not solve the simultaneous equations 
(IX-14). And finally if c21<B, the employment is increased by raising both the 
wage offer and the minimum hiring standard, implying that the firm decides to 
employ more expensive but more able workers.
In total, the comparative statics results can be almost anything if we do not 
restrict the value of c21. On the other hand, it is true that c21 is derived from c(*) 
and h(*) which do follow certain behaviour. Let us attempt to illustrate more 
explicitly the issue here, by specifying c(*) and h(*) as linear functions such
The second function secures that H (l)= l for all values of a and at the same time 
represents linearly increasing/constant/decreasing density functions for neg­
ative/zero/positive value of a respectively.
With these specifications,
that;
c(a)=l-a
h(a)= (l-^)+ aa where -2<a<2
(IX-21)
(IX-22)
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fc(z)h(z)dz f (1 -  z){(l -  “ ) + az}dz
cfa a)=  = —— =----------- ----------
fh(z)dz f°{ (l--)+ az} d z
Ja 2
a
2
3a
4
I ' "  
2
! - -  + (— -  - ) ( a  + a )  -  -  ( (a 2 + oca + a 2)
a a — x l - - + - ( a + c O  
2 2
(IX-23)
so that, for example, for the following three values of a, c(a ,a) is
(i) If a=0; c(a ,a)= l -  )- ( a  -  a) (IX-24)
/ •  • \  x r  ^  — x 1 2(a2+aa+fic2) / I V  n r t(n) If a=2; c ( a ,a ) = l - ------- = -------—  (IX-25)
3(a+a)
—  2 _  —(a+a)— ((a2+«oc + a2)
(iii) If a=-2; c(a,a)=  l - ----------- ~ ^ ~ = ----    (IX-26)
“  2 - ( a  + a )
And so from (IX-20) (IX-21) and (IX-23), c2l>(<)0 if
l -  -  + (— - -)(a + a) -  -  ((a2+ cxa + a?)
(l/2){2-(a-HX) }^«) 2 4 2 ~ _ 3 ---------
l _ _ + _ ( a + a )
i.e. |{2 -  (a+a)}{! - |(a + a )}^ {2 - (a+a)}>(<)
a /3a l w— N a .—2 — 2\
l - -  + (— - “ ) ( a + f l ) - “ ( a  + o c £ + a )
i.e. (l/l2 )a (a+ a)2>(<)0
i.e. c2l>(<)0, if a>(<)0 (IX-27)
Referring to Table IX-1, we can conclude that with a linear training cost
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function if the population is concentrated among the more able workers i.e. a>0, 
then an increase in the product demand is likely to bring about an increase in the 
wage offer and a lowering of the minimum hiring standard. If the population is 
concentrated among the less able workers i.e. a<0, then the increase in the 
product demand is likely to bring about a lowering of the minimum hiring 
standard as before but the wage offer will fall. Finally, if the population has a 
uniform distribution of ability i.e. a=0, then the wage offer will be rigid.
How about the convexity of c(*)? Can we say anything about the sign of c21 
from the convex shape of c(*) by assumption i.e. T2 in (1) Assumptions of 
Chapter III)? In order to examine this, continue to assume the linear h(*) as in 
(IX-22) but a strictly convex c(«) as we have already dealt with a linear c(*) i.e. 
c(a)= l-a. We would like to verify the sign of c21 or equally from (IX-20) ^  
{c(a)+c(a)}>(<)c(a,a). The convexity implies,
1 {c(a)+c(a)}= = 1 —  P  (B-Az)dz>=-^—  f“ c(z)dz (IX-28)
2  a - a - k  a - a Ja
where B-Aa is a linear function of a , which goes through (a, c(a)) and (a , 
c(a)),(See Fig.IX-2)
Now compare the RHS of (IX-28) and c(a,a),
z J —  J c ( z ) d z > ^ — f c(z)dz- - r 1 f c(z)h(z)dz 
a - a Ja a - a Ja H ( a ) - H t o ) ^
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. (IX-29)
1 r “ 1 1 r “ a
==  j  c(z)dz- —------------ -— — ------- = ------ j  c (z )( l- -+ a z )d z
a ~ a  “ ( a + a ) { i - - + - ( a + a ) } a ~ a  ° 2
r a  1 —
aj c (z ){~ (o m -^ )-z }d z  
( < x + a ) { l - - | + | ( a + a ) }
As -2<a<2, the denominator is positive unless a = a  or a+a=0. And
f c(z){—(a+a)-z}dz>0
* a  2
since (i) c(*) is a decreasing function
(ii) ^(oc+a)-a is linear in a , and 0 at cxp=^(a+a) (See Fig.IX-3(a)and(b))
Therefore if a>0,
^{c(a)+c(a)}= ■= f (B-Az)dz>zi f c(z)dz>
2 ”  a - a Ja
1 . f c(z)h(z)dz=c(a,a) (IX-30)
H ( a ) - H to ) Jo
and hence if a>0, c21>0. Note that, on the other hand, a<0 does not necessarily 
guarantee c21<0. This rather asymmetric result is due to the convexity of c(») in 
a . So these examples show that a positive slope of the population density and a 
convexity of the training cost function makes as a more likely outcome an 
increase of wage in response to an increase of product demand. (See Table 
IX-2)
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These results can be summarized in more descriptive terms as follows. An 
increase in product demand may or may not raise the employment level. When 
it does, it always lowers the minimum hiring standard but the effect on the wage
hW
c(oc)
B-Aa
c(a)
c(a)
0 a a a
Fig.IX-2
cW
Linear
Convex
a<0
- /+
a=0
0
a>0
+
Table IX-2 : dw/dp
c(a)
0 a oc a
0
(a) (b)
Fig.IX-3
offer could work in either way. ( See Table IX -1) For example, if  highly qual­
ified workers i.e. those with high a  are scarce i.e. a<0, then the increased de-
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mand for product may be met by lowering of the wage together with a greater 
decrease in the minimum hiring standard such that the average qualification of 
the workers the firm wishes to hire unambiguously falls. Or if a large propor­
tion of the population have a high level of ability i.e. a>0, then the increased 
demand for product generates an increase in wage offer and an decrease in the 
minimum hiring standard at the same time. And an increase rather than an 
decrease in the wage offer becomes more likely as the return on training cost of 
qualification is relatively higher at the lower level of qualification i.e. c"(a) is 
large.
While the increase of employment is generally achieved by widening the 
hiring standard range both upwardly and downwardly, the relative magnitudes 
of these adjustments depend largely on the forms of w(«), c(«) and h(») — as an 
extreme case, it was shown that when c(«) is linear in a  and h(*) is a uniform 
distribution of a  (i.e. a=0 in (IX-22)), the wage is rigid.
Fig.IX-4 illustrates these comparative statics results with a uniformly distribut­
ed h(*). Assume that the market is in equilibrium at (w*=w(oc*), a*,x*} for 
every firm. When p rises, this will shift py'(x) outward. At the present wage 
offer and minimum hiring standard, there is an excess demand of x,-x*. This 
will then have to be offset by attracting more workers. When the minimum 
hiring standard is relaxed to a , — this change of a  is indicated in Fig.IX-4 by 
drawing a new OWF i.e. w (a)+c(a,,a), the wage offer will change to w,=w(a,) 
and the demand for labour will drop to x2. In this particular case if x2= a ,-a ,,
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then the new equilibrium is reached. Note, however, that whether a*^(<)0  
depends on c 2l>(<)0.
The main difference between these results and those obtained in the earlier 
model is the existence o f the wage rigidity when the product demand changes. 
In the present model, the wage rigidity occurs when c ( v )  takes a certain form, 
e.g. linear. Then there are two ways to explain the wage rigidity within this 
framework. One is to say that the wage rigidity occurs as an equilibrium phe­
nomenon as in the earlier model. But for this, the characteristics o f c ( v )  has to 
be specified. Namely, we need to assume a constant marginal return to qual­
ification, with the return being defined by reducing the cost o f OJT. Another 
way is to assume that the wage rigidity is a constraint imposed on the labour 
market operation. With this approach it is easier to explain why the wage is 
rigid
w.(a)
x* w* 0 a, a* a* a, aX X, x 2
Fig.IX-4
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downwards only — namely, the pressure to keep the wage rigid only exists 
downwardly. The result is a greater rise in the minimum hiring standard than 
otherwise, which hits the low ability group harder.
(4) Policy implications
Firstly, when a uniform wage is offered to heterogeneous workers there is 
always an incentive coming from workers as well as from firms to make the 
workers distinguishable, even if the uniform wage system is to continue. Then 
the government will do well by helping to reveal everyone's ability. Not to 
make the information available to firms is to miss out a Pareto improvement i.e. 
this will not help the workers either, although on the equity criterion this might 
not appear to be desirable. The equal opportunity, however, should be given to 
every worker in acquiring education before they come to the labour market.
Secondly, the excess supply in the labour market can not be eliminated by 
advising the firms to reduce the wage offer — the firms simply would not do it. 
One of the effective ways to eliminate this involuntary unemployment is to offer 
some employment subsidy to the firms who are willing to lower their minimum 
hiring standard.
Thirdly, as for the downward wage rigidity, it may not be desirable but this 
inability of the wage to respond to the fall in demand for product can be com­
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plemented by a greater rise in the minimum hiring standard, with the result that 
the low qualification workers are hit harder than when the wage is flexible. In 
other words, the downward wage rigidity simply protects the more able workers 
by sacrificing the less able workers. Hence allowing the downward wage 
rigidity is not only inefficient but also unequalizing, or socially undesirable. 
Therefore the government should discourage any move towards the wage rigidi­
ty*
In this chapter we have established the following;
Firstly, it was pointed out that in the real world observationally distinguishable 
workers may be paid uniformly, despite the neo-classical claim that they ought 
to receive different wages. Rather the distinguishability determines not the 
wage of each worker but the ability range of workers to be employed at that 
unique wage. This was supported by a Japanese example of a university grad­
uate recruitment process. Thus the model is particularly relevant to the labour 
market for new recruits who require training , and not for already skilled work­
ers.
Secondly, the main difference between the model of this chapter and the model 
of the earlier chapter is the treatment of the minimum hiring standard — the 
earlier model can be thought of as a special case of the present model with the 
minimum hiring standard constrained at zero. Also it is worthwhile noting that 
at the equilibrium demand is always equal to supply, the latter being defined as
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the number of workers bounded between the wage offer and the minimum 
hiring standard.
Thirdly, an increase in product demand will always be met by lowering of 
minimum hiring standard, while the response of the wage offer is not determi­
nate. With a certain specification of functions, it was claimed that the wage 
would react positively to the change in demand unless the population is concen­
trated at low qualification, in which case a negative response by the wage to the 
change of product demand is possible. Also if the marginal return of education 
in reducing the cost of OJT is much greater at a low level of qualification, then 
this tends to cause the positive response of the wage to the change in product 
demand.
Finally, the policy implications are: (1) the government should encourage the 
information on the individual ability to be available to firms. (2) to eliminate 
the excess supply of labour the government should encourage the firms to 
employ the workers with low qualification by offering, for example, some 
employment subsidy to firms willing to employ them. (3) the government 
should bear in mind the distributional effect of allowing the downward rigidity 
of wage and should discourage any move towards it.
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CHAPTER X : CONCLUSION
This work has offered an alternative approach to the theory of wage determina­
tion, producing new and interesting interpretations to labour market phenomena. 
The following are the summary of the work and some suggestions for the future 
research.
There have always been cynical criticisms against attempts by neo-classical 
economists to explain theoretically the real world phenomena. And the labour 
issues are probably one of the most "sacred” areas, to which the economists 
with scientific rationality have found it difficult to enter, as some feel that such 
an approach applied to labour market analysis is too simplistic to describe 
complicated human mind and the institutions created by it. It makes it is dif­
ficult to find 'the standard economic theory' for labour economics. In fact there 
are many theories and ideas, be it neo-classical or otherwise, but none could be 
considered as outstanding or prominent in this field of economics.
The theories, however, could be categorized into either an institutional type or 
a neo-classical type. Consider the various approaches presented in the survey of 
Chapter II. There is a trade-off between theoretical rigour and intuitive appeal 
at one end of the spectrum there is the institutional approach, which offers 
intuitively appealing and realistic explanations of the labour market phenomena 
but seems to miss out theoretical rigour and at the other end there are various
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types of the neo-classical approach, which seem to maintain the theoretical 
rigour but have lost intuitive appeal. And these two types of approaches seem 
to interact very little. Among those, however, the efficiency wage models and 
the training models stand out closest as syntheses of the institutional approach 
and the neo-classical approach, to bridge the gap between the theory and the 
real world of labour market phenomena.
The present model shares the basic concept of adverse selection and invariably 
contains the positive and negative features of the adverse selection models. For 
example, the assumption of heterogeneous labour, which is the key assumption 
of the adverse selection model, makes the model quite realistic, closing the gap 
between the theory and the real world. This is a valuable attempt since one of 
the most popular criticisms towards the neo-classical analysis of labour markets, 
particularly from other social scientists, is that it is too simplistic to assume that 
workers are homogeneous since the very formation of our society is based on 
the diversity of the individual members of the society. However, when the 
heterogeneity of labour is assumed together with the uniform wage, although in 
the real world it is not unusual, it was necessary to justify theoretically that they 
can co-exisf, as in Chapter IV.
In Chapter IV, a theoretically rigorous argument for the validity of uniform 
wage was given, using the concept of informational equilibrium. It was shown 
that the uniform wage assumption is a theoretically valid one within this model 
when the monitoring cost is sufficiently high or when the ability distribution of
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workers has relatively high density among the workers with high ability.
What the present model differs from the rest of the efficiency models and the 
adverse selection models is the introduction of On-the-Job Training aspect of 
labour. This concept of OJT as a part of labour market mechanism was also 
suggested in Thurow(1975)'s institutional approach and thus the present model 
is even more synthesizing than most of the efficiency wage models. Such a 
modelling helps to correspond a type of labour market to an equilibrium type 
and to its response to economic fluctuations. Throughout the chapters, c(*) acts 
as a parameter for such a modelling. It is important to note that this approach 
gives new insight and direction to the market analysis of heterogeneous labour. 
While the efficiency wage models can suggest the existences of job queues and 
rigid wages, our model can go further to determine the market characteristics of 
such phenomena.
Chapter V extended the concept of training to include one more period in the 
model. Based on the heterogeneous labour and multi-period the model explains 
the existence of a job queue as well as the way the wage profile is upward- 
sloping.
That the model has maintained the theoretical rigour can also be seen in Chap­
ter VI. Using the Lagrangian multiplier method, it was pointed out that in the 
world of heterogeneous labour, monopsony and competition are not always 
distinct. One of the implications of this result is that to restrict monopsony in
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the labour market does not always reduce the firms advantage relative to the 
workers. It is hoped that the method be employed to investigate a more general 
case of imperfect competition in comparison with perfect competition.
Chapter III and VII together form the main body of the present work. The 
model offered explanations for the existence of unemployment and the down­
ward rigidity as most of other adverse selection models do. The present model, 
however, goes more than that to correspond the market characteristics to these 
phenomena. Thus, for example, unemployment and thus downward wage 
rigidity are more likely to occur in a skilled labour market. Based on these 
analyses, it was suggested that the unemployment can not be eliminated by 
lowering the wage — thus, for example, unemployment is not caused by an 
unreasonably high minimum wage. It also suggested that policies to control the 
demand side of the market such as accepting of immigration of able workers, 
raising the educational standard of the domestic workers, or subsidizing the 
firm’s OJT would be more effective.
Chapter VIII and Chapter IX have offered some new insights into the market 
mechanism in general and of the labour market in particular. In Chapter VIII 
the idea of multiple wage equilibrium in one market can offer a new dimension 
to the analysis of income distribution. One important result here is that whatev­
er happens in the society will first affect the weakest, to whom therefore the 
policy makers need to pay greater attention. This is a rather cynical but perhaps 
quite realistic view of the world. The derivation of a skewed distribution of
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wage offers yet one more explanation to the Pigou paradox and further insight 
into the trade-off between efficiency and equity. The further investigation into 
this issue requires more time and space and thus it should also be left for other 
occasion.
The model of Chapter IX is probably the closest to the real world mechanism 
of labour market among the models presented in this work. But this means at 
the same time that it is least theoretically rigorous. The minimum hiring stan­
dard as one of the conditions for an employment offer is a realistic assumption 
but to model this together with a uniform wage offer, although there is nothing 
unusual in reality, requires some theoretical justification. As for the results 
obtained here, the minimum hiring standard adjustment to the demand fluctu­
ation when the wage is not flexible gives a new explanation to the wage rigidity, 
It is worthwhile pointing out that this explanation allows both economic (in that 
it assumes equilibrium) and non-economic (in that it allows downward wage 
rigidity as a result of social agreement) aspects of labour market.
Its implication that involuntary unemployment exists among less qualified 
workers says again that the weaker members of the society are more prone to 
exogeneous shocks. However, this result slightly differs from the result in 
Chapter IX — while in Chapter VIII the selection of the weaker is made at 
random under excess supply as the workers are indistinguishable, in Chapter IX 
the weaker are the low ability workers always. This sounds quite gloomy but 
perhaps seems more realistic, and gives the true picture of what is going on
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about who is actually hit the hardest.
Finally it needs to be mentioned that the real world of labour is much more 
complex than what any of these models suggests. However, it has shown at 
least that modelling of training and heterogeneous labour improves intuitive 
appeal of the analysis greatly. And it is hoped that more investigations are 
going to be made along this line of research.
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